Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
LLM Theses

Theses and Dissertations

8-11-2020

Using Charter Damages to Provide Meaningful Redress and
Promote State Accountability: A Re-examination of the Omar
Khadr Case
Katharine June Fisher
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/llm
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Fisher, Katharine June, "Using Charter Damages to Provide Meaningful Redress and Promote State
Accountability: A Re-examination of the Omar Khadr Case" (2020). LLM Theses. 41.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/llm/41

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Osgoode Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LLM Theses by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital
Commons.

USING CHARTER DAMAGES TO PROVIDE
MEANINGFUL REDRESS AND PROMOTE STATE
ACCOUNTABILITY: A RE-EXAMINATION OF
THE OMAR KHADR CASE

KATHARINE FISHER

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE
STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN LAW
YORK UNIVERSITY
TORONTO, ONTARIO

January 2020

© Katharine Fisher, 2020

ABSTRACT
In July 2017, the Government of Canada reportedly paid Omar Khadr $10.5 million to settle his
civil suit. Khadr sought damages under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms resulting from
Canada’s active participation in human rights breaches during his imprisonment at Guantánamo Bay.
Although the Charter damages remedy serves critically important public law functions, it is not achieving
its full potential in many cases. Using Khadr as a case study, I apply the framework developed in Vancouver
(City) v Ward to analyze what Khadr’s entitlement to Charter damages might have been if his civil claim
had not settled. The Khadr case poses potential challenges relating to Crown prerogative, institutional
competence, and causation. Despite these possible concerns, I argue that Khadr had a strong case for a large
constitutional damages award based on the severity of Canada’s actions and the impact of Canadian
decision-making on a vulnerable youth detainee.
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION
Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen, was detained and imprisoned from July 2002 to May 2015.
Thirteen years of his young life (from age fifteen to twenty-eight) were spent in captivity. Khadr was
subjected to repeated instances of torture, mistreatment, and humiliation at the hands of the United States
(“US”).1 He was denied the most basic guarantees of due process and he was left to languish inside the
legal abyss that is Guantánamo Bay. The Canadian government did not intervene on Khadr’s behalf (as
other Western nations had done for their detained nationals), nor did it acknowledge his youth status.
Instead, Canadian officials actively participated in Khadr’s ordeal by interviewing him and sharing
intelligence with the US. Canada became inextricably tied to the harm Khadr suffered, but the full extent
of Canadian complicity was never addressed by a court or a public inquiry. Khadr did not receive any
compensation until his civil claim against the Government of Canada settled for $10.5 million in July 2017.
In this thesis, I explore whether damages under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2
(“the Charter”) could have been ordered against the Government of Canada if Khadr’s case had not settled.
Charter damages are an important remedy in Canadian public law. They provide monetary redress to
claimants who have suffered breaches of fundamental rights. Khadr sought Charter damages resulting from
constitutional violations committed by the Canadian government. He also sought private law damages for
the torts of negligent investigation, conspiracy, and misfeasance of public office.3 Although the Charter
damages remedy can be a powerful mechanism of state accountability, it is still in its developing stages.
Certain problems have emerged, such as the general hesitation to order large awards, concerns about
institutional competence, continued reliance on private law to shape the remedy, and questions about the
effectiveness of the current framework4 used to assess Charter damages.

1

Khadr claimed he was tortured at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan and at Guantánamo. While recovering from
injuries at Bagram, Khadr stated that he was forced to remain in stressful positions, go without pain medication, endure
threats of rape, and urinate on himself. Khadr’s Factum submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) in 2010
discussed how his chief interrogator at Bagram was ultimately convicted in the notorious beating death of Dilawar,
another Bagram prisoner. While at Guantánamo, Khadr alleged he “was subjected to "walling" (meaning that he was
repeatedly pressed against a wall until he passed out), shackled in painful positions for hours at a time, isolated for
many months at a time, exposed to extreme temperatures, threatened with rendition and sexual violence, repeatedly
picked up and dropped on the floor while shackled, forced to urinate on himself, and used as a human mop to clean
up the mess and then denied a change of clothing for two days.” See Prime Minister of Canada, et al. v Omar Ahmed
Khadr, 33289, Factum of the Respondent Omar Ahmed Khadr at paras 15-18, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/casedossier/info/af-ma-eng.aspx?cas=33289> [Khadr SCC 2010 Factum].
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
3
Omar Ahmed Khadr v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada Amended Amended Amended Fresh as Amended
Statement of Claim to the Defendant, T-536-04 (24 October 2014) at para 1 [Khadr Civil Claim].
4
The SCC outlined a four-step framework in Vancouver (City) v Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 SCR 28 [Ward].

-1-

I argue that, if his claim had not settled, Khadr should have been entitled to a substantial Charter
damages award to compensate him, promote the integrity of the Charter, and deter Canada’s involvement
in controversial foreign regimes. There are potential countervailing factors, however, which could impact
a court’s assessment of Khadr’s damages claim. There is also a deficiency of relevant precedents to guide
the quantification analysis in such an exceptional case. Working through how Charter damages might be
assessed and quantified fosters greater understanding of the remedy, issues that can plague its analytical
framework, and the principles that ought to guide its evolution. My research also comments on the merits
of Khadr’s constitutional damages claim, showing that his experience warrants a large award based on the
severity and enduring impact of the Charter breaches.

This introductory chapter is split into four parts. In Part I, I briefly explain the purpose of the
Charter damages remedy and the current framework used to assess whether damages are appropriate in
each case. In Part II, I provide background about Omar Khadr and the events that led to his civil claim. In
Part III, I outline the research undertaken in this project and the arguments advanced in the following
chapters. Finally, I discuss the organization of the project in Part IV.

PART I: WHAT ARE CHARTER DAMAGES?
Subsection 24(1) of the Charter allows individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated
to seek redress against the state.5 In 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) confirmed that subsection
24(1) contains a right to seek damages. In Vancouver (City) v Ward,6 (“Ward”), the Court developed a fourstep framework to assess a claimant’s eligibility for Charter damages. At the first stage, the claimant must
prove that a Charter violation occurred. Second, he or she must demonstrate why damages are appropriate
and just; Charter damages are not an automatic remedy.7 The burden shifts from the claimant to the state
at the third step of the Ward framework, which allows the state to show why damages are inappropriate.
This is referred to as the countervailing factors stage. Finally, if a court determines that damages are
warranted, it must calculate the quantum of the award.8

The Court acknowledged in Ward that a Charter (or constitutional) damages remedy is not the
same as a private law (or tort) damages remedy,9 noting that a Charter damages award “must further the

5

Charter, supra note 2 at ss 24(1).
Supra note 4.
7
The phrase ‘per se’ damages is used in the literature to describe the principle of awarding damages for the
constitutional breach itself. Harm to the claimant is not required.
8
Ward, supra note 4 at para 4.
9
Ibid at para 22.
6
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general objects of the Charter.”10 Constitutional damages should therefore be viewed as conceptually
distinct from private law damages. The Court highlighted three objectives of Charter damages:
compensation, vindication, and deterrence.11 Compensation is primarily concerned with repayment for
personal loss. Vindication attempts to preserve the importance of Charter rights and ensure that they are
not eroded over time. A deterrence-based damages award sends a message to the state that its conduct is
unacceptable.12 Vindication and deterrence-based awards are theoretically more difficult to quantify, but
these are the more public objectives that help distinguish Charter damages from private law damages.

Although Ward was a breakthrough for litigants seeking constitutional relief, some commentators
expressed concern that state immunity defences, problems with quantification, and access to justice
concerns could stall Ward’s potential.13 More Charter damages claims are now being brought before courts,
but the success rate is low.14 In some cases, courts have relied exclusively on private law damages to
compensate aggrieved persons instead of conducting a meaningful review of whether Charter damages
could serve different functions. Even when a claimant is awarded Charter damages, the quantum does not
always reflect the severity or impact of the constitutional infringement.15 There are notable examples where
large Charter damages awards have been ordered,16 but the awards in the majority of other cases are

10

Ward, supra note 4 at para 25.
Ibid at para 4.
12
Ibid at para 25.
13
See for example Kent Roach, “A Promising Late Spring for Charter Damages: Ward v. Vancouver” (2011) 29 NJCL
135 at 137-38 [Roach, “A Promising Late Spring”], Allen M. Linden, “Charter Damage Claims: New Dawn or
Mirage?” (2012) 39 Adv Q 426 at 438, and Ranjan Agarwal & Joseph Marcus, “Where There is No Remedy, There
is No Right: Using Charter Damages to Compensate Victims of Racial Profiling” (2015) 34 NJCL 75 at 95-97.
14
W.H. Charles, Understanding Charter Damages – the Evolution of a Charter Remedy (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2016)
at 103.
15
A recent example of this is Russell v British Columbia (Public Safety & Solicitor General), 2018 BCSC 1757, 2018
BCSC 1757 (CanLII) [Russell]. Although a proper Ward analysis was conducted, the Court only ordered $1,000 in
Charter damages based on a breach of Russell’s right to access counsel. A thirteen hour period elapsed between when
Russell asked to speak to a lawyer and when that right was implemented.
16
See for example Henry v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2016 BCSC 1038, 2016 BCSC 1038 (CanLII)
[Henry BCSC] (over $8 million awarded in compensation, vindication, and deterrence-based damages to remedy a
wrongful conviction stemming from prosecutorial misconduct, though this award was later reduced); Taylor v London
(City) Police Services, 2016 ONSC 5839, 2016 ONSC 5839 (CanLII) ($25,000 in compensatory Charter damages
ordered to address psychological injuries stemming from the claimant’s interaction with police and $7,500 to address
vindication and deterrence); Elmardy v Toronto (City) Police Services Board, 2017 ONSC 2074, 136 OR (3d) 471
(Div Ct) [Elmardy] ($50,000 awarded to vindicate the claimant’s rights and deter racial profiling); Henebry v Ontario,
2018 ONSC 6584, 2018 ONSC 6584 (CanLII) ($20,000 in vindication and deterrence-based damages ordered to
remedy Charter breaches caused by the negligence of correctional officers); Brazeau v Attorney General (Canada),
2019 ONSC 1888, 2019 ONSC 1888 (CanLII) [Brazeau] ($20 million in vindication and deterrence-based damages
ordered on behalf of a class of mentally ill inmates to make structural changes to prisons), appeal to Ont CA proceeded
November 6, 2019; and Reddock v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 ONSC 5053, 2019 ONSC 5053 (CanLII)
[Reddock] ($20 million in compensation, vindication, and deterrence-based damages ordered to a class of inmates
held in administrative segregation for more than fifteen consecutive days).
11
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substantially less.17 It is questionable whether small awards even cover the legal costs incurred by litigants
to bring their claims forward.

PART II: WHO IS OMAR KHADR?
Although he was born in Canada, Khadr’s family moved to Afghanistan when he was eleven. His
father, Ahmed Khadr, was a known associate of Osama Bin Laden. Ahmed was placed on a global terrorist
watchlist after 9/11.18 Sheema Khan stated that “all the Khadr children had been indoctrinated with the alQaeda ideology from an early age.”19 Pentagon reports alleged that Omar Khadr received weapons training
so he could fight alongside al-Qaeda forces and construct improvised explosive devices.20

Omar Khadr was apprehended by US forces in Afghanistan in July 2002. He was fifteen years old.
Khadr was captured during what has been described as a firefight between US-led coalition forces and the
occupants of an al-Qaeda compound. Sgt. Christopher Speer, an American Delta Force soldier, died from
injuries sustained in the encounter. Khadr was accused of throwing the grenade that killed Sgt. Speer,
although this allegation has been disputed.21 Khadr, seriously wounded in the conflict, was taken to Bagram
Air Base in Afghanistan where he remained for more than two months.

Khadr was transferred to the US naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba in October 2002. The base
had become the host for suspects captured in the global War on Terror. Michelle Shephard observed that
Khadr “was considered an intelligence treasure trove because of his father’s connections and his own travels

17

Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2019) (accessed online
through Thomson Reuters ProView November 6, 2019) at para 11.640 [Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada].
18
Sheema Khan, “Politics over Principles: The Case of Omar Khadr” in Janice Williamson, ed, Omar Khadr Oh
Canada (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012) at 54. See also Graeme Smith, “Man helped
by Chrétien on most-wanted terror list”, The Globe and Mail (27 December 2001), online:
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/man-helped-by-chretien-on-most-wanted-terror-list/article4158498/>.
19
Khan, supra note 18 at 54.
20
Michelle Shephard, Guantanamo’s Child (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd., 2008) at 83 [Shephard,
Guantanamo’s Child].
21
The US military initially explained that, despite the lack of eyewitness testimony, Khadr was the one that threw the
grenade because he was the only belligerent still alive. In 2008, a classified document accidently released to reporters
contained a different account of the circumstances. In the document, a US soldier who participated in the battle
provided sworn testimony that two belligerents were still alive after the grenade had been thrown. The soldier testified
to killing the first belligerent he saw alive and then shooting at Khadr, who was already wounded and facing away
from him. This incident prompted Khadr’s military lawyer to suggest that a cover-up may have occurred. See “New
witness account shows Khadr charges should be dropped: lawyers”, CBC News (5 February 2008), online:
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/new-witness-account-shows-khadr-charges-should-be-dropped-lawyers-1.765709>
and Michelle Shephard, “Khadr secret document released by accident”, Toronto Star (4 February 2008), online:
<https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2008/02/04/khadr_secret_document_released_by_accident.html?li_source=
LI&li_medium=star_web_ymbii>.
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since 9/11.”22 Canada was not granted access to Khadr until February 2003 because consular visits were
prohibited.23 Representatives from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“CSIS”) and the Canadian
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (“DFAIT”) were allowed to meet with Khadr at
Guantánamo for intelligence-gathering purposes on two occasions in 2003 and once in 2004.
Canadians questioned Khadr about “matters that provided important evidence relating to future
criminal proceedings against him.”24 Canada shared information gleaned from the interviews with US
officials.25 Khadr repeatedly told Canadians he had been tortured, imploring his interviewers to bring him
back to Canada.26 Critically, the 2004 interview was conducted with knowledge that Khadr had been
subjected to extensive sleep deprivation before the Canadian visit.27 In August 2005, Khadr’s lawyers
obtained an injunction restraining Canadian officials from conducting further interviews.28

It was not until November 2005 that Khadr was formally charged with an offence. More than three
years had elapsed since his transfer to Guantánamo. He was accused of murder, attempted murder,
conspiracy, and aiding the enemy.29 His trial proceeded through the US military commission system. After
the US Supreme Court ruled that the military commission scheme was unconstitutional in 2006,30 the
commission process was rebranded and Khadr was charged with war crimes in 2007. Khadr was accused
of murder in violation of the law of war, attempted murder in violation of the law of war, conspiracy,
providing material support for terrorism, and spying.31

The Supreme Court of Canada pronounced on the Khadr matter in 2008 and 2010. Charter
violations were found on both occasions. In 2008,32 the Court determined that Canada’s refusal to provide
records of the Guantánamo interviews amounted to a breach of the disclosure obligation in section 7 of the
Charter.33 Khadr was entitled to disclosure of the interview records and information obtained through those

Shephard, Guantanamo’s Child, supra note 20 at 103.
Ibid at 116.
24
Khadr Civil Claim, supra note 3 at para 35.
25
Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3 at para 5, [2010] 1 SCR 44 [Khadr SCC 2010].
26
Shephard, Guantanamo’s Child, supra note 20 at 123-24.
27
Khadr SCC 2010, supra note 25 at para 5.
28
See Khadr (Next Friend of) v Canada, 2005 FC 1076, [2006] 2 FCR 505 [Khadr FC 2005].
29
Shephard, Guantanamo’s Child, supra note 20 at 177.
30
See Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 126 S Ct 2749 (USSC) (2006) [Hamdan]. The Court reviewed the legality
of the order establishing prosecution by military commission. The majority found that the military commission
procedure violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
31
Shephard, Guantanamo’s Child, supra note 20 at 204.
32
Khadr v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2008 SCC 28, [2008] 2 SCR 125 [Khadr SCC 2008].
33
Ibid at para 33.
22
23

-5-

interviews that was given to US authorities. The Charter applied to Canadian officials at Guantánamo when
they shared information with the US and “became participants in a process that violate[d] Canada’s
international obligations.”34
In 2010,35 the Court held that the actions of Canadian officials at Guantánamo deprived (and
continued to deprive) Khadr of his liberty and security of the person under section 7 of the Charter.36 The
deprivation was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice because it “offend[ed] the
most basic Canadian standards about the treatment of detained youth suspects.”37 Despite finding a serious
Charter breach, the Court concluded that a declaration of unconstitutionality under subsection 24(1) of the
Charter was a sufficient remedy. Lower courts had ordered Canada to request Khadr’s repatriation,38 but
the SCC determined that this was institutionally inappropriate. The Court struck a stunningly deferential
tone by allowing the federal government to determine the proper response to a severe violation.39
One of the strongest influences that shaped the SCC’s decision in 2010 was Crown (or royal)
prerogative. Prerogative powers are residual powers held by the executive branch. They are exercised over
specific areas, including management of foreign affairs, negotiation of treaties, declarations of war, and
granting pardons.40 Historically, courts have been reticent to review prerogative decisions made by the
executive due to concerns about the separation of powers. Exceptions are made, however, when these
decisions engage the Charter rights of individuals.41 Although the SCC did review Canada’s decisionmaking in 2010, the Court determined that ordering the executive to seek Khadr’s repatriation was beyond
its institutional competence.42

Khadr pleaded guilty to the war crimes charges in October 2010. He was sentenced by a US military
panel to forty years in prison. This was symbolic, however, because of pretrial plea negotiations which had
not yet been divulged. The plea agreement imposed an eight year prison sentence and allowed Khadr to

34

Ibid at para 36.
Khadr SCC 2010, supra note 25.
36
Ibid at paras 21-22.
37
Ibid at para 25.
38
See Khadr v Canada (Prime Minister), 2009 FC 405, [2010] 1 FCR 34 [Khadr FC 2009] and Khadr v Canada
(Prime Minister), 2009 FCA 246, [2010] 1 FCR 73 [Khadr FCA 2009].
39
Khadr SCC 2010, supra note 25 at para 39.
40
Jennifer A. Klinck, “Modernizing Judicial Review of the Exercise of Prerogative Powers in Canada” 54:4 Alta L
Rev 997 at 998-99.
41
See Operation Dismantle v The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 441, 18 DLR (4th) 481 [Operation Dismantle cited to SCR]
and Black v Canada (Prime Minister), (2001), 54 OR (3d) 215, 2001 CanLII 8537 (Ont CA) [Black cited to CanLII].
42
Khadr SCC 2010, supra note 25 at para 46.
35
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seek a transfer to Canada after serving one year in a US facility.43 He eventually returned to Canada in
September 2012 to continue serving his sentence.
In 2015,44 the Khadr matter reached the Supreme Court of Canada for a third time. Khadr’s lawyers
fought Canada’s determination of Khadr’s inmate status, arguing that he should have been placed in a
provincial facility rather than a maximum security federal prison. In 2014, the Alberta Court of Appeal
found that Canada’s decision was not in accordance with the International Transfer of Offenders Act45 and
it granted Khadr’s habeas corpus application for transfer to a provincial facility.46 The Supreme Court of
Canada upheld the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the statute.
Khadr was released on bail in 2015 pending an appeal of his conviction in the US.47 In July 2017,
the Government of Canada reportedly paid $10.5 million48 to settle Khadr’s $20 million civil suit. The basis
of the settlement and its terms are confidential. Government officials relied on the 2010 SCC decision and
arguments about the rule of law to defend the payout, explaining that Khadr’s human rights had been
violated.49 It can be inferred that the SCC’s findings in 2008 and 2010 influenced the decision to settle.
In March 2019, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench lifted stringent bail restrictions to which Khadr
had been subject, finding that Khadr had served his sentence.50 Treating his sentence as a youth sentence,
the trial judge exercised discretion to consider time spent out on bail as time served.51 After nearly seventeen
years of detention, imprisonment, and litigation, Khadr’s liberty was restored.

PART III: RESEARCH PROJECT
It is an understatement to say that Omar Khadr has been, and continues to be, a divisive figure in
Canada. After the settlement was reported in July 2017, controversy erupted. Many Canadians were angered

Charlie Savage, “Child Soldier for Al Qaeda Is Sentenced for War Crimes”, New York Times (1 November 2010),
online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/us/02detain.html>.
44
Bowden Institution v Khadr, 2015 SCC 26, [2015] 2 SCR 325 [Khadr SCC 2015].
45
SC 2004, c 21 [ITOA].
46
Khadr v Edmonton Institution, 2014 ABCA 225, 385 DLR (4th) 647 [Khadr ABCA 2014].
47
Kim Mackrael & Sean Fine, “Harper unapologetic about Ottawa’s efforts to keep Omar Khadr in prison”, The Globe
and Mail (8 May 2015), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harper-unapologetic-aboutgovernments-efforts-to-keep-khadr-in-prison/article24334556/>.
48
Aaron Wherry, “What 3 legal minds think about the Omar Khadr settlement”, CBC News (12 July 2017), online:
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/omar-khadr-legal-analysis-aaron-wherry-1.4199409> [Wherry, “3 Legal Minds”].
49
Aaron Wherry, “Liberals defend and Tories attack Omar Khadr payout, both citing principles”, CBC News (7 July
2017), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/omar-khadr-settlement-goodale-scheer-analysis-wherry-1.4194912>.
50
Khadr v Warden of Bowden Institution, 2019 ABQB 207, 372 CCC (3d) 219.
51
Ibid at paras 91-92.
43
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by the government’s decision. The settlement was justified to the public based in part on the government’s
calculation that proceeding with litigation would have been much more expensive.52 Given the complexity
of the tort claims, it is far from certain that Khadr would have been able to prove all requisite elements.
Further, the existence of a Charter breach does not automatically entitle a claimant to Charter damages.
The Ward framework exists to determine whether constitutional damages are just and appropriate. To date,
Ward has not been applied in a case like Khadr’s where a prerogative power conflicted with the Charter.

I examine two distinct research questions in this thesis. The first question is: what factors would
have influenced Khadr’s entitlement to Charter damages if his civil claim had progressed to trial? This
involves applying the first three steps of the Ward framework to ascertain whether Charter damages are
just and appropriate. I argue that Khadr could establish a strong entitlement based on (a) the SCC’s prior
findings that Charter breaches occurred; (b) potential further Charter violations committed by the Canadian
government that have never been addressed; and (c) the fact that a Charter damages award would promote
all three objectives of the Ward framework: compensation, vindication, and deterrence.

Although Khadr is unlikely to encounter much difficulty at the first two stages of the Ward test, he
faces potential issues at the third stage due to both countervailing factors identified in Ward: the existence
of alternative remedies and concerns about good governance.53 It is possible that a court hearing Khadr’s
civil claim could find that private law damages would adequately meet compensatory, vindicatory, and
deterrent objectives. Although I do not evaluate the success of the tort claims in this research, I discuss the
difficulties Khadr faced in proving the required elements. I also discuss why private law damages, on their
own, are insufficient to fully promote subsection 24(1)’s vindicatory and deterrent objectives.

With respect to good governance, the state would likely submit that a large Charter damages award
could jeopardize its decision-making under the foreign affairs prerogative or divert officials from properly
performing their duties. The state could also argue that, due to the discretionary nature of its decisionmaking under the prerogative, it should only be held liable for conduct that involves bad faith or some other
standard of fault. If this argument were successful, it would result in the creation of a new immunity or
defence to Charter damages claims. Despite some concerns that could be raised by the state at the
countervailing factors stage, I argue that none are powerful enough to warrant dismissal of Khadr’s claim.

Michelle Shephard, “15 years and nearly $5 million in legal costs later, Ottawa apologizes to Omar Khadr”, Toronto
Star (7 July 2017), online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/07/07/lawyer-for-us-soldiers-widow-callsfor-urgent-hearing-on-freezing-khadrs-105-million-settlement.html>.
53
Ward, supra note 4 at para 33.
52
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The second research question I examine is this: if Khadr were able to prevail against countervailing
factors, how should Charter damages be quantified at the final stage of the Ward inquiry? There is a dearth
of case law in the Charter damages jurisprudence to assist with the quantification of damages for the type
of harm Khadr suffered. Using the British Columbia Supreme Court’s quantification analysis in Henry v
British Columbia (Attorney General)54 (“Henry BCSC”) as a starting point, I explore additional sources that
could shape quantification in the Khadr case. These include wrongful conviction settlements, previous
Government of Canada settlements with individuals detained and tortured by foreign authorities, Canadian
human rights tribunal decisions, and private law damages cases. Although it can be tempting to default to
well-established private law quantification principles, courts must remain cognizant of the unique purposes
animating the Charter damages remedy.

The Charter damages jurisprudence reveals a level of uneasiness to order large, meaningful awards.
I argue that a substantial Charter damages award is necessary to promote compelling objectives in the
Khadr case, so I review reasons why a court might be reluctant to order a sizeable sum. I explore whether
generally low quantums (outside of recent class actions)55 stem from the Ward framework, the way Ward
is being applied, or the institutional culture within which Ward operates. I argue that there are issues in all
three areas. A focus on balancing the interests of the claimant and the state in the Ward framework,
continued reliance on private law to deal with constitutional problems,56 and judicial deference with respect
to monetary remedies57 are discussed as explanations for the remedy’s sluggish evolution.

Ultimately, judges must refocus the analysis on providing a responsive and effective remedy to
Charter damages claimants who have suffered distinct kinds of harm, not on expanding the state’s ability
to defend itself. Ordering larger damages awards more frequently, especially in cases where serious rights
violations have occurred, will help the remedy move past the current period of stagnancy and
unpredictability.

PART IV: METHOD AND ORGANIZATION
This research project is a doctrinal analysis of the Ward framework in a particularized context. I
use the Khadr civil claim as a case study to analyze issues plaguing the continuing development of the
54

Supra note 16.
See Brazeau and Reddock, supra note 16.
56
For further information on Charter damages as a unique public law remedy distinct from private law, see Peter
Adourian, Charter Damages: Private Law in the “Unique Public Law Remedy” (LLM Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, 2018) [unpublished].
57
See Lawrence David, “Resource Allocation and Judicial Deference on Charter Review: The Price of Rights
Protection According to the McLachlin Court” (2015) 73 UT Fac L Rev 35.
55
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Charter damages remedy. Khadr is a model Charter damages claimant, yet there are still obstacles that
could constrain a court’s decision to order an impactful remedy.

There are three reasons why I use Khadr as a case study. First, Charter breaches were found in
Khadr’s case, which helps establish his entitlement to Charter damages. Second, the facts raise issues
relating to the exercise of Crown prerogative. To date, a court has not applied the Ward framework to a
Charter damages claim stemming from state action under a prerogative power. Analyzing how Crown
prerogative intersects with the Ward framework is helpful to understand how future cases in the foreign
affairs realm might be approached. Finally, I focus on Khadr because of his tragic history. Although he may
be an unsympathetic plaintiff to many, Khadr suffered immensely over a prolonged period. Charter
damages would accomplish profoundly important objectives, such as deterring egregious conduct at the
highest level of government and preserving the rule of law. Damages would also solidify the importance of
using the remedial arm of the Charter to provide redress for serious constitutional infringements.

This chapter outlined the research project undertaken in this thesis. In Chapter Two, I explore
subsection 24(1) of the Charter to understand its purpose. I dissect the Ward decision and evaluate its
potential to enhance and expand the Charter damages remedy. I also canvass theoretical frameworks in the
Charter damages literature that continue to guide analysis of the remedy. Finally, I survey cases in the postWard Charter damages jurisprudence to highlight some of the trends and problems mentioned above.
In Chapter Three, I discuss Khadr’s detention, the Canadian government’s response, and the
litigation battles that ensued for over a decade. The analysis reveals that Canada was largely impervious to
the plight of a teenager incarcerated in a highly controversial prison where human rights abuses were taking
place. Considerable attention is given to the 2010 SCC decision and how it could affect Khadr’s civil claim.
I also outline the civil claim in greater detail and review sources that assessed the 2017 settlement.
In Chapter Four, I apply steps one to three of the Ward framework to establish Khadr’s entitlement
to Charter damages. I review additional sources of rights breaches in addition to the existing violations
found by the SCC in 2008 and 2010. I then show how Charter damages promote compelling compensatory,
vindicatory, and deterrent functions. I discuss countervailing factors related to alternative remedies and
good governance, ultimately arguing that these concerns should not threaten the success of Khadr’s claim.

In Chapter Five, I discuss what the quantification analysis should look like in the Khadr case. I
argue that, although private law can be helpful to quantify compensatory Charter damages, a court should
- 10 -

not be overly constrained by its principles. When quantifying vindication and deterrence-based Charter
damages, a court has even greater latitude to craft a meaningful remedy. A court should therefore draw
from all relevant sources in its assessment. I conclude the chapter by discussing forces that might be holding
judges back from ordering large damages awards, arguing that this remedial timidity needs to be challenged
so the remedy can progress.

Chapter Six offers concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
CHARTER DAMAGES REMEDY
INTRODUCTION
Canadian courts have struggled to define the parameters of a constitutional damages remedy since
the mid-1980s. Marilyn Pilkington’s theory of Charter damages58 stressed that the remedy should exist as
a standalone cause of action independent from private law.59 Pilkington argued that a person whose
constitutional right has been violated has suffered a unique kind of fundamental harm which “has fewer
avenues of redress.”60 This theory emphasized that Charter damages serve different functions than private
law damages.61 A court sends a message by awarding Charter damages and that message goes beyond
compensating an individual claimant for harm he or she suffered. In some cases, a court’s message is to
highlight the importance of protecting Charter rights. In others, the message might be to deter a pattern of
wrongful state conduct. Charter damages are a significant mechanism by which courts can provide redress
to aggrieved persons, preserve the rule of law, and promote governmental compliance with the Constitution.
The existence of Charter damages as a standalone remedy – with its own set of defined objectives
– was not acknowledged until 2010, twenty-eight years after the enactment of the Charter. Although the
Ward judgment was progressive, it implicitly accepted the idea that Charter damages represented a threat
to good governance in some situations.62 Ward also provided considerable leeway for a Charter damages
claim to be defeated. The broad countervailing factors stage allows the state to argue that Charter damages
are inappropriate for a variety of reasons. This can be problematic in areas where courts have traditionally
afforded deference to other branches of government, such as matters involving the exercise of Crown
prerogative or the allocation of public funds. Despite Ward’s potential to increase judicial reliance on the
Charter damages remedy, indicators show that courts still tread lightly in this developing area.63

Courts often struggle to determine when certain constitutional remedies are appropriate. This was
obvious in the Khadr litigation. The Khadr case came before the Supreme Court of Canada three times and
Charter infringements were found in 2008 and 2010. Despite the gravity of Khadr’s circumstances, the

Marilyn L. Pilkington, “Damages as a Remedy for Infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”
(1984) 62 Can Bar Rev 517 [Pilkington, “Damages as a Remedy”].
59
Ibid at 536.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
See Ward, supra note 4 at para 39: “In some situations, however, the state may establish that an award of Charter
damages would interfere with good governance such that damages should not be awarded unless the state conduct
meets a minimum threshold of gravity.”
63
Charles, supra note 14 at 103.
58

- 12 -

Court unanimously concluded in 2010 that declaratory relief was the proper remedy.64 A year later, the
Court unanimously ordered the federal Minister of Health to grant a controversial exemption which would
allow a safe injection facility to continue providing assistance to drug users.65 These decisions stand in stark
contrast to one another, showing that the Khadr case presented remedial challenges to the Court.
Even though the SCC could have taken a more activist stance by ordering Canada to seek Khadr’s
repatriation (as the lower courts had done), the Court declined to do so. The Khadr case involved a unique
blend of pressures and constraints. The Court attempted to balance concerns about respecting the
government’s discretion under Crown prerogative, upholding the rule of law, and maintaining proper
institutional separation between the executive and judicial branches. The Court also had to contend with
causation issues, defining the extraterritorial reach of the Charter, and the undeniable public and political
controversy surrounding Khadr. In the end, the Court adopted an excessively deferential stance to avoid
triggering conflict with the federal government. Although none of the previous Khadr judgments concerned
Charter damages, the factors that influenced the Court in 2008 and 2010 are relevant to the Ward analysis.
I address these issues in more detail in Chapter Three.

This chapter describes the evolution of the Charter damages remedy and its conceptual
foundations. The discussion is divided into four parts. I begin by identifying the legal framework within
which constitutional remedies are provided in Canada, explaining the differences between subsections 24(1)
and 24(2) of the Charter and subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.66 In Part II, I review
foundational theories about Charter damages advanced by scholars during the early years of the Charter.
Particular attention is given to commentary about the purpose and objectives of Charter damages and the
debate about whether the remedy should be viewed as independent from private law. In Part III, I canvass
Supreme Court of Canada cases that shaped the Charter damages remedy up to the Ward decision in 2010.
The fourth and final part of the chapter examines Ward in greater detail, reviews scholarly opinions on the
decision, and discusses continuing problems in the Charter damages jurisprudence.

PART I: THE FRAMEWORK FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
There are three distinct provisions in the Canadian Constitution that provide constitutional

64

Khadr SCC 2010, supra note 25 at para 47.
See Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134 [PHS]. See
also Paul Daly, “Royal Treatment: The Crown’s Special Status in Administrative Law” (2017) 22:1 Rev Const Stud
81 at 101, where the author noted that the SCC’s reasons in PHS “could easily be transposed to Mr. Khadr’s case”.
The major point of difference between the two decisions, in Daly’s view, was the influence of Crown prerogative.
66
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
65
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remedies: subsections 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter and subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
Subsection 24(1) states that
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed
or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the
court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.67
This broad provision allows aggrieved persons to seek relief from the state. Damages are only one possible
outcome. Other remedial options include a declaration that the state has violated the Charter,68 a stay of
proceedings,69 costs,70 an order of mandamus,71 retaining supervisory jurisdiction,72 and an injunction.73

Subsection 24(2) of the Charter is more narrowly constructed and tailored to criminal proceedings.
The subsection 24(2) remedy empowers a court to exclude evidence obtained in violation of an accused’s
Charter-protected interests if the admission of that evidence “would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute.”74 Subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 invalidates unconstitutional legislation.
Subsection 52(1) establishes the primacy of the Canadian Constitution and proclaims that laws inconsistent
with the Constitution will be of no force and effect. Remedial options used by courts under subsection 52(1)
include striking down a law,75 severing offending language from the statute,76 reading down a provision

67

Charter, supra note 2 at ss 24(1).
See Khadr SCC 2010, supra note 25 at para 48.
69
A stay of proceedings is considered a drastic remedy under subsection 24(1), only ordered “in the clearest of cases”
where the accused has suffered prejudice. See R v O’Connor, [1995] 4 SCR 411 at 460-61, 130 DLR (4th) 235.
70
An award of costs can be made under subsection 24(1) to remedy violations stemming from “a marked and
unacceptable departure from the reasonable standards expected of the prosecution.” See Ontario v 974649 Ontario
Inc., 2001 SCC 81 at para 87, [2001] 3 SCR 575 [974649 Ontario].
71
An order of mandamus requires the state to take specific action. It was used in PHS, supra note 65, to compel the
federal Minister of Health to grant an exemption from the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act which would allow
PHS to continue operating a safe injection facility.
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See Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 SCR 3 [Doucet-Boudreau
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rights are enforced, and not merely declared.” See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2018 Student ed
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2018) at 40-37 to 40-48 for a discussion of these subsection 24(1) remedies.
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Charter, supra note 2 at ss 24(2). See also R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 SCR 353.
75
Subsection 52(1) compels a court to find that a law inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid. See Hogg, supra
note 73 at 40-4.
76
Severance is used when only part of a law is unconstitutional. It involves striking down the offensive portion of the
law and leaving intact the part that is constitutionally compliant. See Tétreault-Gadoury v Canada, [1991] 2 SCR 22,
81 DLR (4th) 358, where the SCC found that the government’s restriction of unemployment benefits to people under
65 violated section 15 of the Charter. The proper remedy in this case was to sever the age 65 bar contained in the
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that is overbroad,77 reading in language to remedy an under-inclusive provision,78 ordering a temporary
suspension of invalidity,79 and providing an exemption for a particular claimant or group.80

Subsection 24(1) was the subject of debate during the formation of the Charter. As Kent Roach
explained, the initial Charter proposals put forth by the federal government did not contain an enforcement
provision.81 The government subsequently proposed a narrow remedial clause, which Roach argued
“revealed fears that courts would go beyond their competent jurisdiction to issue Charter remedies, that
they would implement innovative forms of relief, and that they would enforce rights which would not apply
to the applicants personally.”82 Early drafts of subsection 24(1) contained limiting language, providing that
relief could only be granted when “no other effective recourse or remedy is available or provided for by
law”.83 A 1979 draft also stipulated that a claimant’s right had to be “infringed or denied to his or her
detriment”84 to seek relief, indicating that loss or harm must have occurred apart from the infringement.
These phrases were omitted from the expansive final version of subsection 24(1) that exists today.

To illustrate the vital importance of a constitutionally entrenched remedial provision (and the fact
Unemployment Insurance Act and extend the benefits to individuals over 65. See Hogg, supra note 73 at 40-14 to 4016.
77
Reading down involves narrowing the focus of the provision to ensure constitutional compliance or to “cure
constitutional defects” – see Kent Roach, “Enforcement of the Charter – Subsections 24(1) and 52(1)” (2013) 62
SCLR (2d) 473 at 477. See for example Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 2015
SCC 7, [2015] 1 SCR 401, where the SCC read down part of the search and seizure scheme in the Proceeds of Crime
(Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act because it did not provide proper safeguards for solicitor-client
privilege.
78
A notable example of reading in took place in Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493, 156 DLR (4th) 385. In this case,
the SCC found that Alberta’s anti-discrimination legislation violated the plaintiff’s section 15 rights under the Charter.
The legislation did not list sexual orientation as a basis for discrimination. The Court added sexual orientation to the
statute to ensure constitutional compliance and further the objectives of the legislation.
79
A suspended declaration of invalidity is a deferential remedy that allows the legislature time to respond to a judicial
determination of unconstitutionality. The law or provision which has been deemed unconstitutional will continue to
be enforced for a certain period. The SCC used this remedy in Carter v Canada, 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331,
finding that Criminal Code provisions prohibiting assisted suicide violated section 7 of the Charter. The declaration
of invalidity was suspended for a year to allow Parliament time to respond. The period of suspension was subsequently
increased to sixteen months. See Hogg, supra note 73 at 40-12 to 40-13.
80
In R v Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 SCR 96, the trial judge granted a constitutional exemption from a mandatory
minimum sentence to a police officer who had been convicted of manslaughter. The SCC did not uphold this decision.
Hogg noted that, while Ferguson did not prohibit constitutional exemptions, it was not encouraging. See Hogg, supra
note 73 at 40-23. For further description of subsection 52(1) remedies, see Robert J. Sharpe & Kent Roach, The
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 6th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2017) at 444-56.
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and Structure”].
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that damages were intended to be part of that provision), it is helpful to quote the words of Professor Joseph
Magnet, who represented the Canadian Jewish Congress during the 1980-81 Charter Special Joint
Committee debates:
Well, we think that to deal with problems like this, as well as the full panoply of rights
which will be entrenched in the charter, that an enforcement clause is crucial, that the
charter would be hollow without it and we think that this is in conformity with our
international obligations under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the text of
which is set out for you. There is also a right in the Covenant to damages…85
Francis Young, an advisor for the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission, echoed these concerns,
stating that “…a new section should be added to the charter to provide for efficient recourse, like
injunctions, statements, inadmissibility of evidence and damages.”86 Dale Gibson noted that successive
drafts of subsection 24(1) expanded the scope of potential remedies to be awarded rather than confining a
court’s options to declaratory or injunctive relief as originally contemplated.87 Gibson stated confidently
that the new range of remedies “would clearly include damages, where suitable”.88 These comments reveal
that constitutional damages were envisioned during the formation of the Charter.

Before moving on to the next section of this chapter, it is helpful to comment on the distinction
between private law and public law. In Canada, the state can be held liable in both spheres. The remedies
discussed above are all rooted in the Constitution Act, 1982 and the Charter and they are designed to remedy
unconstitutional laws or unconstitutional state action. These remedies affect the relationship between state
and citizen and they fall within the domain of public law. Actions brought against the state in private law
can involve negligence (where the state has breached a duty of care) and intentional torts (where the state
has committed wrongs such as misfeasance of public office, false imprisonment, or battery). Private law
typically governs the relationship between citizens, so it is based on different legal principles than public
law. The most dominant principle in the private law realm is compensation for injury.
The state is shielded from liability in certain situations through the operation of immunities.89 Some

85
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Ibid at 355.
87
Gibson, supra note 83 at 502.
88
Ibid.
89
For a detailed discussion of the various private and public law immunities, see Adourian, supra note 56 at 21-28.
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immunities are found in statutes90 while others have developed through the common law.91 Certain
immunities are considered absolute, while others are limited or qualified. The limited or qualified immunity
protects state officials who act in good faith.92 Roach explained that the purpose of these immunities is to
safeguard the functioning of government: “without them, officials might be prevented from performing
their public duties in a vigorous fashion.”93

Reliance on private law principles to shape the developing Charter damages remedy has been
contested since the Charter’s inception.94 Although private law can offer some guidance as the Charter
damages remedy continues to evolve, it should not obscure or diminish the distinct functions served by
constitutional damages. Charter damages should be focused on objectives beyond just compensation. These
damages are awarded to remedy violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms, so the analysis that
guides courts should reflect that reality. This tension between private law and the developing Charter
damages remedy is discussed in more depth in the following section.

PART II: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHARTER DAMAGES
After the enactment of the Charter in 1982, the analysis of Charter damages was plagued by a lack
of consensus about the purpose and scope of the remedy. As I will discuss in Part III, the lack of guidance
from the SCC during the Charter’s formative years did not help the budding Charter damages remedy that
some scholars attempted to promote. Academic commentators advanced competing views about the
objectives of Charter damages and the principles that ought to guide the remedy. Debate ensued about
whether it should be focused primarily on compensation and what role, if any, vindication or deterrence
should play. As stated above, there was also disagreement on how much the Charter damages remedy
should be influenced by private law principles. Some of the most relevant literature is reviewed below.

In 1984, Marilyn Pilkington advanced one of the most frequently-cited arguments in support of an
expansive Charter damages remedy. She claimed that Canadian courts were given broad discretion under
subsection 24(1) of the Charter and that constitutional remedies “should not be the vehicles of judicial
90

See Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1 at para 1, [2017] 1 SCR 3 [Ernst]. This case involved the
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restraint.”95 Pilkington noted the fundamental difference between a court’s role in adjudicating disputes in
the private and public realm: “The emphasis shifts from dispute resolution to the articulation and
enforcement of constitutional values.”96 In her view, a court could award damages to a claimant who
suffered no actual loss resulting from the infringement.97 This became known as the ‘per se’ theory of
Charter damages. Pilkington attached considerable importance to the vindication aspect of Charter
damages, noting that a claimant who had obtained compensation in tort should still be able to seek damages
under subsection 24(1) for vindication.98

Pilkington expanded on these views in 1987, answering an important question that had arisen in
the academic debate: “If [a person] has suffered actual injury why are damages under the common law of
tort not sufficient remedy?”99 Her response was that certain Charter rights do not have tort law equivalents.
Even if there were a comparable right in tort law, Pilkington argued that it would not guarantee protection
for the claimant’s constitutional entitlements.100 Pilkington emphasized that a person whose constitutional
right has been violated “surely has suffered damage of the most fundamental sort, regardless whether he or
she can prove any tangible loss.”101 This principle justified the per se theory of liability.

In 1987, Roach argued that a rights-protection model should guide subsection 24(1)’s
interpretation.102 In its simplest sense, this model focused on correcting violations of a specific individual’s
constitutional right. It was not concerned with “vindicat[ing] the general public interest in constitutional
behaviour.”103 Roach contrasted subsections 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter, noting that the former was
“less collectivistic”104 than the latter. Consequently, a court should not be overly concerned with the
perception or interests of the broader community in crafting a remedy under subsection 24(1).105 Although
a core element of subsection 24(2) analysis is society’s perception of the criminal justice system, similar
concerns should guide a court’s approach to remedies under subsection 24(1). Courts should be mindful of
how a remedial decision will be perceived by Canadian society regardless of whether the remedy is being
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ordered pursuant to subsection 24(1) or 24(2). A court’s overarching purpose is the same under both
provisions: to give effect and meaning to Charter guarantees.
In a 1988 article106 and 1990 text,107 Ken Cooper-Stephenson sought to provide more detailed
theoretical guidance for the developing Charter damages remedy, which he classified as a constitutional
tort.108 Cooper-Stephenson noted that “the obvious choice for the Charter damages remedy is to tap the
doctrinal resources of tort law”.109 He stressed that the Charter damages remedy should be focused on
compensating individual claimants, not deterring future state behaviour or addressing larger public
problems.110 Cooper-Stephenson believed that other remedies under subsection 24(1) (such as injunctions
or declarations) could accomplish broader “community reform”.111 Charter damages were “part of a
structure of remedies which combine together to meet the collective needs of constitutional
enforcement.”112 In other words, the Charter damages remedy should maintain its focus on corrective
justice113 for individual claimants while injunctive or declaratory relief could influence state behaviour.114

Several years later, Ghislain Otis critically examined the emerging scholarly argument that
damages could be awarded to remedy a Charter breach absent actual loss, injury, or serious misconduct.115
This is the per se theory of Charter damages described above. Otis argued that judicial reluctance to accept
this view in Canada is warranted, although he expressed regret that courts had not provided much guidance
to explain why such a foundation for the remedy is inappropriate.116 Otis opined that the prevailing
academic theories of Charter damages could “risk looking upon monetary redress as a panacea”.117

While he did not reject the notion that subsection 24(1) claims based on per se liability should still
be actionable, Otis argued that these situations should not attract a monetary remedy beyond nominal
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damages.118 In his view, nominal damages (potentially awarded together with non-monetary remedies)
could vindicate the claimant and “affir[m] the intrinsic importance of rights”.119 Nominal damages are used
in private law to vindicate a plaintiff where there has been no injury. Otis emphasized that a substantial
monetary award was not required to acknowledge the value of Charter rights or deter state action where no
demonstrable loss or misconduct was apparent.120

In 1993, Lorne Sossin examined the Charter damages remedy in the context of prosecutorial
misconduct.121 Sossin described the continuing evolution of Charter damages as “murky”122 and analyzed
whether compensation or deterrence should be the dominant concern for a Charter damages award designed
to remedy prosecutorial misconduct. In opposition to Cooper-Stephenson, Sossin argued that compensation
was an inappropriate basis upon which to ground the Charter damages remedy because of the formal
equality principle animating the Charter.123 The presumption that all claimants are equal under the Charter,
in Sossin’s view, privileged certain litigants.124 Sossin argued that deterrence should be the primary
rationale underpinning a Charter damages award because unconstitutional state conduct (at least in the
sphere of criminal prosecution) can often stem from systemic problems.125 Sossin stressed that Charter
damages awards “should be based on the importance of the right, and the gravity of the violation”126 while
private law causes of action would serve the compensatory function.127

In 1995, David Mullan rounded out the academic debate by arguing that the future for Charter
damages was rather bleak.128 Mullan attempted to explain why, despite its breadth, the remedy was
infrequently pursued by litigants or granted by courts in the Charter’s first decade. He argued that the
SCC’s framing of certain provisions of the Charter (principally sections 7 and 15) limited the possibility
of damages being awarded outside the criminal context.129 Mullan also cited jurisprudence from comparable
jurisdictions to show that courts were not prepared to accept that a constitutional breach automatically
118
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triggered per se state liability and a corresponding damages award.130 In his view, Canadian courts were
likely to remain cautious and continue relying on existing common law principles and immunities which
limited the state’s exposure to Charter damages.131

The discussion of Charter damages in the academic literature grew quiet in the late 1990s and
2000s. In his comprehensive text on the subject, W.H. Charles examined what he described as the second
phase of Charter damages evolution from 1995 to 2010. He determined that courts at all levels awarded
Charter damages in approximately one-third of cases in this period.132 When the analysis was narrowed to
just appellate decisions, damages were awarded in roughly half the cases.133

Writing just before the Ward judgment in 2010, Raj Anand argued that the continued trend of
limiting Charter damages claims was “at odds with a purposive interpretation of the Constitution.”134 Anand
was emphatic that Charter damages were necessary to uphold and promote the Charter’s objectives. Like
Mullan, Anand traced judicial hesitation to award Charter damages partly to state immunity defences.135
Anand endorsed a robust ‘Pilkingtonian’ view of the remedy, arguing that the importation of tort law
principles into the Charter damages analysis was inappropriate. Specifically, the principle of double
recovery (which provides that a plaintiff should not be compensated twice for the same injury) “render[ed]
the existence of constitutional torts redundant.”136
Anand’s commentary reflected dissatisfaction with the way courts had interpreted and applied the
Charter damages remedy prior to Ward. The limited guidance given by the Supreme Court of Canada
arguably contributed to the remedy’s lack of vitality. The absence of a clear standard to assess whether
Charter damages were appropriate also created inconsistency in the jurisprudence with respect to fault
requirements, double recovery, the overall purpose of the remedy, and what objectives it ought to promote.
To understand the Charter damages landscape as it existed prior to Ward (and why the Ward decision was
necessary), influential judicial decisions are examined in the following section.
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PART III: THE ROAD TO WARD
As discussed above, Charles found that Charter damages claims were rejected in two thirds of
cases between 1995 and 2010.137 Although the number of successful Charter damages cases increased in
this period compared to the years following the passage of the Charter,138 the results were not particularly
inspiring. The main reasons for rejection of Charter damages claims in the 1995-2010 period were failure
to meet a fault requirement (such as bad faith) or failure to prove that a Charter breach occurred.139 The
average Charter damages award ordered during this period was $12,482.140 This figure omits the very high
award made in McTaggart v Ontario141 (“McTaggart”) so as not to distort the real average.

The literature discussed in Part II demonstrated that a coherent framework for Charter damages
was missing in the early decades of the Charter. The SCC did not address this gap until 1994. In RJRMacDonald Inc. v Canada (AG),142 the Court briefly commented that “no body of jurisprudence has yet
developed in respect of the principles which might govern the award of damages under s. 24(1) of the
Charter.”143 Despite this partial acknowledgement of the remedy’s existence, the Court did not offer any
comments to help guide its evolution. The Court simply pronounced that Charter damages were “not the
primary remedy in Charter cases.”144

The Supreme Court of Canada addressed subsection 24(1) again in the early 2000s, though some
of its decisions did not directly concern Charter damages. In R v 974649 Ontario Inc.145 (“974649
Ontario”), the Court focused on a narrow procedural issue: whether a judge of a provincial court had
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jurisdiction under subsection 24(1) to order costs against the Crown for a breach of the Charter. The
opening paragraph of the decision contained the following pronouncement: “To the extent that it is difficult
or impossible to obtain remedies for Charter breaches, the Charter ceases to be an effective instrument for
maintaining the rights of Canadians.”146 In keeping with the spirit of this statement, the SCC held that it
was appropriate for a trial judge acting pursuant to his or her authority under provincial offences legislation
to award costs against the Crown.147

Despite the progressive tone of 974649 Ontario, the SCC took a step back in 2002 when it decided
Mackin v New Brunswick (Minister of Justice)148 (“Mackin”). This case specifically concerned Charter
damages. The issue in Mackin was whether the elimination of the provincial court supernumerary judge
position in New Brunswick violated subsection 11(d) of the Charter. Two provincial court judges brought
claims against the province, arguing that legislation that abolished the supernumerary position “affected the
components of tenure and financial security that form part of judicial independence.”149 The claimants
challenged the constitutionality of the legislation under subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 and
sought damages and costs under subsection 24(1) of the Charter. The SCC found a violation of subsection
11(d) that could not be justified. The Court followed previous decisions which established a general rule
against awarding concurrent remedies (i.e. a declaration of invalidity under subsection 52(1) coupled with
an order for damages under subsection 24(1)).150 The Court was reticent to award Charter damages in
earlier cases where constitutional challenges to legislation were brought because it “would be tantamount
to giving the declaration of invalidity retroactive effect.”151

Charter damages were sought in addition to the constitutional challenge in Mackin, so the Court
applied the rule against concurrent remedies. The Court also introduced a test to define circumstances which
could trigger an exception to the rule. If state actors exercised their duties “in good faith and without abusing
their power under prevailing law and only subsequently are their acts found to be unconstitutional, they
will not be liable.”152 Charter damages could only be ordered alongside a subsection 52(1) remedy for
“conduct that is clearly wrong, in bad faith or an abuse of power”.153 The Court attempted to justify its
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conclusion that bad faith was required based on the need for “balance between the protection of
constitutional rights and the need for effective government.”154 Put another way, the Court did not want to
hinder the government’s legislative discretion or make state officials fearful of applying the law in the
course of their duties.155 This perceived tension between rights protection and good governance156
influenced the Court’s decision in Ward several years later.

Mackin did not resolve confusion about whether the state had to commit some type of fault before
Charter damages could be awarded. If anything, Mackin complicated the situation. Hawley v Bapoo,157 a
decision of the Ontario Superior Court, recognized the divisions in Charter damages case law. The Court
noted that “there [had] been disagreement about the need for mala fides on the part of the government actor
and what, if any role, his or her good faith plays in the decision to award damages.”158 The Court conducted
a lengthy analysis of the jurisprudence, concluding that there was “nothing in the text or history of the
Charter”159 that suggested proof of state of mind was necessary to award damages outside the Mackin
context. Further, the Court commented that imposing a bad faith requirement would undermine the purpose
of a constitutional damages remedy. If a claimant could prove bad faith, he or she could succeed in tort
actions.160 It is regrettable that the damages portion of this judgment was overturned by the Ontario Court
of Appeal. The appellate court was bound by its judgment in Ferri v Root,161 which required wilfulness or
bad faith to order Charter damages.

The SCC revisited subsection 24(1) of the Charter again in Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia
(Minister of Education)162 (“Doucet-Boudreau”). The Court addressed whether a trial judge’s decision to
retain jurisdiction over a complicated remedial order was appropriate. The trial judge found a violation of
minority language rights enshrined in section 23 of the Charter. Specifically, the trial judge determined that
the Government of Nova Scotia “had not given sufficient attention to the serious rate of assimilation among
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Acadians and Francophones in Nova Scotia.”163 This pressing issue was not given priority even though it
was constitutionally mandated, which violated section 23. The trial judge ordered a creative and expansive
remedy under subsection 24(1) to ensure compliance with constitutional guarantees. The province and the
provincial French language school board were ordered to use their best efforts to construct schools and
provide homogenous French programs by certain dates. The judge retained supervisory jurisdiction to
monitor the province’s progress and hear reports on compliance.164 The province successfully appealed the
portion of the decision relating to retention of jurisdiction to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.165

A narrow majority of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal brought by the
Francophone parents. The Court stated that subsection 24(1) of the Charter should be interpreted
purposively to give effect to the principle that “where there is a right, there must be a remedy.”166 This
approach required that courts develop responsive and effective remedies to promote the purpose of the right
at issue and the remedies section.167 The majority concluded that the trial judge’s ruling was meaningfully
crafted in response to “ongoing cultural erosion”.168 Four justices dissented, however, arguing that the
retention of jurisdiction after the trial judge had issued a final decision violated separation of powers
doctrine.169 The dissenting judgment, written by Justices LeBel and Deschamps, devoted considerable time
to delineating the judiciary’s proper role in crafting constitutional remedies. The dissenting justices
emphasized that, once a decision is made, judges should “resist the temptation to directly oversee or
supervise the administration of their orders.”170

The SCC majority provided a set of principles in Doucet-Boudreau to help determine if a remedy
under subsection 24(1) is appropriate and just. The first principle is that the remedy should “meaningfully
vindicat[e] the rights and freedoms of the claimants.”171 A meaningful remedy will appreciate the claimant’s
unique experience and the manner in which his or her constitutional right was violated.172 Second, an
appropriate and just remedy will respect the constitutional separation of powers and rely on legitimate
means to secure its implementation.173 Third, the court or tribunal ordering the remedy must not “leap into
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the kinds of decisions and functions for which its design and expertise are manifestly unsuited.”174 The
remedy must be within the court or tribunal’s proper sphere of authority. Finally, the remedy must be fair
to the state and not “impose substantial hardships that are unrelated to securing the right.”175

Although the SCC majority upheld a polarizing supervisory order in Doucet-Boudreau and offered
principles to guide the purposive interpretation of subsection 24(1), some comments could be viewed as
limiting potential remedies. Three out of the four principles were focused on separation of powers concerns
and institutional competence. Only one principle concentrated directly on the vindication of a claimant’s
right and Charles noted that there was no discussion of deterrence in the Court’s framework.176 Further, the
Court was fractured in Doucet-Boudreau. The majority emphasized that a truly purposive approach to
Charter remedies must focus on the responsiveness of the remedy (to properly address the rights violation)
and the effectiveness of the remedy (to further the overall purpose of subsection 24(1)).177

By contrast, the four dissenting justices in Doucet-Boudreau focused more on the proper
institutional role of courts, stressing that the trial judge’s decision to retain supervisory jurisdiction
overstepped carefully delineated boundaries and offended the separation of powers.178 While the majority
praised the trial judge’s remedial creativity to combat a pervasive problem that the government failed to
properly address, the dissenting justices preferred a more restrained, deferential approach that respected the
tradition of governmental compliance with judicial orders.179 The tension between activism and restraint
with respect to remedies, as well as the need to balance the interests of the claimant and the state, affected
the Court’s decision in Khadr SCC 2010 and its crafting of the Ward framework.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Khadr SCC 2010 was released in January 2010, six months before
Ward. The SCC concluded that the Federal Court’s order of mandamus (requiring the Government of
Canada to seek Khadr’s repatriation from Guantánamo Bay) was inappropriate.180 The Court found that the
actions of Canadian officials who interviewed Khadr at Guantánamo in 2003 and 2004 triggered a violation
of Khadr’s section 7 Charter rights that was not in accordance with principles of fundamental justice. The
Court determined that intelligence gleaned from the Canadian interviews with Khadr, which was shared
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with the US, “may have provided important evidence relating to [Khadr’s] criminal proceedings”.181
Further, Canadian officials conducted the 2004 interview with knowledge that “Khadr had been subjected
to three weeks of scheduled sleep deprivation”.182 Despite these disturbing findings, the Court concluded
that a declaration was a suitable remedy under subsection 24(1).183 This supposedly achieved the proper
balance between acknowledging the harm done to Khadr and affording deference to the executive branch’s
prerogative powers.

Khadr SCC 2010 will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three, but it is important to mention
in a review of subsection 24(1) cases prior to Ward. Even though the Court cited Doucet-Boudreau for the
proposition that an appropriate and just remedy under subsection 24(1) should provide meaningful
vindication of the claimant’s rights,184 declaratory relief was deemed sufficient. This decision undermined
the purposive approach to subsection 24(1) outlined in Doucet-Boudreau. It also revealed the Court’s
concern about its institutional role and its capacity to order remedies affecting the exercise of Crown
prerogative.

Although some of the cases discussed above enhanced the jurisprudential foundation for the
developing Charter damages remedy, there was still no practical analytical framework to guide courts.
Further, Charles noted that when courts did order Charter damages from 1995 to 2010, most awards were
compensation-based.185 Many issues still plagued the Charter damages remedy in 2010 that needed to be
addressed by Canada’s highest court. There was confusion in the case law about fault requirements,
especially relating to the conduct of police. There was also uncertainty about whether per se damages could
be awarded when a claimant could not demonstrate actual loss. Charles observed that certain terminology
used by different courts in the assessment of Charter damages (i.e. “symbolic” or “moral” damages)186
“complicate[d] an already difficult and ambiguous situation”.187 Finally, the question of whether Charter
181
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damages should be awarded in addition to (or independent of) private law damages did not have a definitive
answer. The time was ripe for the Supreme Court of Canada to finally address these issues when Ward
came before the Court in 2010. The Ward judgment is analyzed in the next section, along with academic
responses to the decision and its continuing impact on the Charter damages jurisprudence.

PART IV: WARD’S CONTINUING INFLUENCE
Ward recognized the distinct purposes of Charter damages and the remedy’s importance in public
law.188 The unanimous judgment, written by Chief Justice McLachlin, accurately described judicial
authorities on Charter damages as “sparse”.189 Alan Ward’s claim for Charter damages arose from an
instance of mistaken identification. In 2002, the Vancouver Police received a tip that an individual with
certain characteristics planned to throw a pie in the face of then-Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. Ward
unluckily matched the description. Perceiving Ward to be fleeing the scene, the police chased and detained
him in the street. After being handcuffed, Ward became agitated about the detention. He was subsequently
arrested for breach of the peace, taken to the police station, and strip searched upon arrival. He spent
approximately four and a half hours in detention and his car was impounded before he was ultimately
released.190

Ward sought private law damages (for the torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment, and
negligence) and constitutional damages (resulting from alleged breaches of sections 7, 8, and 9 of the
Charter) against the City of Vancouver, the province of British Columbia, and individual police and
corrections officers. He also sought a declaration that his Charter rights had been infringed. The trial judge
found that the assault, battery, and negligence claims failed. False imprisonment was proven based on the
unnecessarily long duration of Ward’s detention.191 The Court also concluded that breaches of sections 7,
8, and 9 occurred: the arrest was lawful, but the strip search and impoundment were not. The trial judge
granted a declaration that Ward’s rights were violated. $5,000 in private law damages was ordered as
compensation for Ward’s false imprisonment. A further $5,100 in Charter damages was ordered: $5,000
for the strip search and $100 for the impoundment.192 The trial judge awarded Charter damages absent bad
faith or negligence. The decision was upheld on appeal, albeit with a dissent emphasizing that bad faith
should be required.193
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The SCC upheld the trial judge’s decision except for the $100 impoundment award. The Court
reasoned that Ward did not suffer loss relating to the seizure of his car, so damages were not functionally
justified.194 The SCC concluded that a declaration under subsection 24(1) was appropriate to vindicate
Ward’s section 8 Charter right and to deter “future improper car seizures”.195 In doing so, the Court subtly
rejected the theory of per se compensatory damages being ordered without proof of loss or harm.196 The
Court noted, however, that absence of loss “does not preclude damages where the objectives of vindication
or deterrence clearly call for an award.”197

The Court emphasized the important distinction between an action in tort (seeking private law
damages) and an action brought under subsection 24(1) of the Charter (seeking constitutional damages):
“[t]he nature of the [Charter damages] remedy is to require the state (or society writ large) to compensate
an individual for breaches of the individual’s constitutional rights.”198 This is why the state, not individual
actors, must be named as the defendant in an application for Charter damages.199

The Court established a four-step test in an attempt to provide much-needed clarity to judges
deciding Charter damages claims. At step one of the Ward framework, the claimant must prove that a
Charter breach occurred. There is no mention of a fault requirement; the Court described the Charter
violation as “the wrong on which the claim for damages is based.”200 Put differently, the breach itself can
be considered fault on behalf of the state. At the first stage of the Ward analysis, the claimant is only
required to demonstrate that a constitutional violation took place.

At step two, the claimant is expected to show why Charter damages are functionally justified.
Damages must serve one of three potential functions: compensation, vindication, or deterrence.201 Different
concerns animate all three objectives. Compensation is usually treated as “the most prominent of the three
functions”202 and generally focuses on restoring the claimant to the position he or she held prior to the
unconstitutional conduct. Vindication is more theoretical, targeting the broader societal harm flowing from
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a Charter breach.203 Deterrence-based awards strive to encourage future compliance with the Charter and
send a clear message to the state that its conduct is unacceptable.204

The state is given the opportunity to demonstrate why Charter damages are inappropriate at step
three. The Court did not provide a list of countervailing factors that could limit a claimant’s entitlement to
damages. Instead, the Court commented that “[a] complete catalogue of countervailing considerations”205
would develop as the jurisprudence evolved. The two factors discussed were “the existence of alternative
remedies and concerns for good governance.”206 To defend against a Charter damages claim, the state can
argue that the compensation, vindication, and/or deterrence objectives are properly addressed by other
remedies (i.e. private law damages or a declaration under subsection 24(1)). The state can also argue that
its ability to effectively govern would be jeopardized by a Charter damages award.207

The Court commented at step three that the carving out of future Mackin-esque state immunities
could result from certain situations where good governance concerns are raised.208 No guidance was
provided about the circumstances which could trigger these further defences. The Court merely noted that
these situations would require “a minimum threshold [of fault], such as clear disregard for the claimant’s
Charter rights”.209 Borrowing from private law, the Court stated that the appropriate degree of fault would
vary with the nature of the claim and the governance issues raised.210 The Court reaffirmed the importance
of Mackin in this passage and left the door open to further immunities being created. I presume that, due to
the Court’s comments about Mackin appearing in its discussion of countervailing factors, issues involving
fault and immunities would be addressed at that stage of the inquiry after the claimant has demonstrated an
entitlement to Charter damages.

If no valid arguments are advanced by the state at the countervailing factors stage, the analysis
moves to the fourth and final step of the Ward framework: quantification. The Court noted that tort law
principles are useful in quantifying compensation-based damages awards, but less so for awards based on
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vindication or deterrence.211 The Court cautioned that Charter damages awards must strive for fairness
between the parties involved. An appropriate and just award would strike a balance between the claimant
and the state.212 Consequently, large awards “may be inappropriate or unjust from the public perspective.”213

Although the Ward framework is flexible and adaptive, its interest-balancing approach is marred
by a lack of clarity at the countervailing factors stage and a tone of restraint at the quantification stage.
These issues have produced inconsistent results and generally low damages awards. Jason Varuhas
commented that, in an interest-balancing test, “the interest in protecting and vindicating the right ought to
be given primacy, and structure ought to be imposed on the balancing exercise.”214 Varuhas mentioned the
“unbreakable relationship between right and remedy”,215 a principle stressed by the SCC in DoucetBoudreau.216 Varuhas argued that “redress [should be] denied only if there are very strong reasons, based
in evidence, to believe that relief would precipitate significant negative effects.”217 If a Charter damages
framework does not emphasize the need to provide claimants with responsive and effective remedies, and
valid claims can be eclipsed by theoretical policy concerns, the purpose of subsection 24(1) is weakened.

Instead of prioritizing the importance of constitutional rights protection, the SCC recognized
several limitations on Charter damages claims in Ward. Two countervailing factors were identified and the
Court implied that more would develop as the jurisprudence matured.218 The good governance factor was
broadly defined and it is not clear how serious a threat to effective governance must be to trigger the creation
of a further state immunity. The Court also did not specify the fault threshold that would apply to a limited
immunity involving Charter damages claims. The Court determined that the fault threshold would likely
vary depending on the situation, leaving the matter to be decided by future trial courts.219
The Court’s focus on compensation as the principal objective of Charter damages can also be
viewed as a limitation. There will be cases where claimants experienced a constitutional violation, yet they
are unable to provide clear evidence of personal loss. In Ward, the Court did not uphold the $100 damages
award for the car seizure because Ward did not suffer loss resulting from the section 8 Charter breach.220
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The Court could have upheld the $100 award under the heads of vindication or deterrence (which do not
require evidence of personal loss), but it chose not to do so. Although vindication and deterrence were
identified by the Court as important goals, they were described as “play[ing] supporting roles”221 in most
cases. The subordination of vindication and deterrence – the objectives that help make Charter damages
distinct from private law damages – ensured that compensation and corrective justice remained the
dominant purpose of the remedy.
Further, the Court’s preoccupation with quantifying a Charter damages award that is fair to both
parties could be used as a rationale to keep awards low and dilute the strength of the remedy. The concern
with fairness and interest-balancing is rooted in Doucet-Boudreau. The Court also observed that fairness is
a concern in private law, so it ought to have a corresponding place in the Ward framework.222 Fairness
should not be the prevailing concern at the quantification stage, particularly for an award that is premised
on vindication or deterrence. The idea of equalizing violator and victim in the constitutional context is
inappropriate, especially in situations where the breach is egregious or wilful. The state is the defendant in
a Charter damages claim, not a private citizen. A court is also responsible for upholding the Constitution
in a Charter damages claim, not settling a private dispute.223

Limiting the quantum of Charter damages awarded to remedy a troubling constitutional breach
risks tempering the severity of the violative conduct and minimizing the importance of the Charter right at
issue. Although a court must not be unduly harsh, it should not feel hindered from making a large, impactful
award in appropriate circumstances – especially for the purpose of vindication and/or deterrence. A court
ought to consider fairness as a relevant concern, but fairness should not justify paltry damages awards where
claimants experienced significant violations of core rights or where state action needs to be strongly
deterred.

In Ward, the Court examined how constitutional damages awards are quantified in other
jurisdictions, noting a general trend of caution.224 The Court was clear that large damages awards may be
inappropriate because of their potential to deter beneficial government action and divert public funds to
private individuals.225 Although large damages awards should not become the norm to remedy all Charter
violations, lower courts should not be discouraged from awarding sizeable sums where appropriate. This
221
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kind of language from Canada’s highest court did not encourage judges to make substantial awards to
defend Charter guarantees. To understand Ward’s impact, it is helpful to canvass the academic discussion
that followed the release of the decision. I review scholarly opinions in the next section and summarize
relevant post-Ward judgments in the final section of this chapter to illustrate continuing problems with the
framework and how it is being applied.

Academic Responses to Ward
The Ward decision revived academic interest in the Charter damages remedy. Some scholars were
cautiously optimistic that the decision could usher in a new era of rights protection. Responding directly to
Mullan’s piece sixteen years earlier, Roach maintained that Ward was a promising step forward for Charter
damages because the SCC provided a coherent framework to guide adjudication of these claims and move
away from courts having “unfettered remedial discretion.”226 The Court’s focus on three distinct (but
imprecise) remedial goals – compensation, vindication, and deterrence – established “a foundation for
continued interpretation and debate”.227

Justice Allen Linden put forward a more skeptical argument, suggesting that Ward was unlikely to
trigger any kind of revolution in Charter damages jurisprudence.228 In his view, Charter damages would
be used in rare cases, but the remedy could become more significant if small damages awards were
increased.229 Like Cooper-Stephenson, Justice Linden preferred that the remedy be classified as a
constitutional tort (language the Court did not adopt in Ward), arguing that private law should be “allowed
to help in the evolution of this new jurisprudence.”230 Robert Charney and Josh Hunter231 also emphasized
the importance of private law guiding the Charter damages remedy. The authors, both government counsel,
argued that Ward “did not stray very far from basic tort law principles.”232 Charney and Hunter maintained
that the level of harm required to trigger liability in tort law should not be ignored in the Charter context.
They stressed that the SCC’s comments in Ward indicated that some level of fault would still have to be
proven to justify a Charter damages award.233
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Concerns about the impact of judicial deference in the remedial context emerged in the post-Ward
literature. Writing just as the Ward judgment was released, Gerald Chan expressed his unease about the
quantum of damages ordered ($5,000) to remedy a significant and humiliating Charter breach.234 He noted
that this small sum was unlikely to (a) encourage anyone to pursue a Charter damages claim; or (b) deter
egregious state behaviour.235 Chan argued that three previous SCC decisions involving subsection 24(1)236
(one of which was Khadr SCC 2010) reflected a departure from the broad interpretation of subsection 24(1)
encouraged in previous cases.237 Chan maintained that these judgments represented a shift in the Court’s
priorities.238 In his view, the Court seemed to focus more on minimizing the effect of a remedy on the state
rather than providing meaningful redress to promote vindication of the Charter.239 Although he did not
provide a detailed discussion of Ward or Charter damages, Chan’s outlook for the subsection 24(1) remedy
as a whole was not terribly optimistic.
Michael Plaxton and Carissima Mathen240 echoed some of Chan’s concerns about deference in the
remedial sphere. The authors argued that cases decided by the SCC in 2009-2010 showed that subsection
24(1) can be “easily circumscribed by legislation, Crown prerogative, and institutional function.”241 Plaxton
and Mathen focused their critique of Ward on issues arising from the Court’s comments on deterrence.
Although the SCC cautioned against awarding remedies that could jeopardize the state’s ability to govern,
Plaxton and Mathen argued that this reticence could actually reinforce “institutionalized negligence”.242
Further, the authors noted the Court’s discouragement of large damages awards “except in cases where they
perform a primarily compensatory function.”243 This principle, they argued, hinders claimants from seeking
Charter damages based on deterrence unless they are also seeking significant compensation.244

In 2015, Lawrence David examined the relationship between deference and resource allocation in
the McLachlin Court.245 He argued that, in crafting Charter remedies, the Court was influenced by “the
Gerald Chan, “Remedial Minimalism under Section 24(1) of the Charter: Bjelland, Khadr, and Nasogaluak” (2010)
51 SCLR (2d) 349 at 379.
235
Ibid.
236
The cases discussed by Chan included R v Bjelland, 2009 SCC 38, [2009] 2 SCR 651, Khadr SCC 2010, supra
note 25, and R v Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 SCR 206.
237
Chan, supra note 234 at 349.
238
Ibid at 354.
239
Ibid.
240
Michael Plaxton and Carissima Mathen, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 2009-2010 Term” (2010) 52
SCLR (2d) 65.
241
Ibid at 163.
242
Ibid at 158-59.
243
Ibid at 160.
244
Ibid.
245
David, supra note 57.
234

- 34 -

potential fiscal impact of an adverse judicial decision”246 and recognition of the boundaries of its
institutional role.247 David analyzed the Ward framework, noting that the countervailing factors stage of the
analysis showed that “judicial deference remain[ed] a controlling judicial norm.” 248 He concluded that
deference will be a powerful factor affecting a court’s discretion when a claimant seeks a large damages
award.249 This is due to the careful balancing that must occur when a court attempts to fashion an appropriate
remedy that necessarily involves payment of public funds.250 The deference built in to the Ward framework
was, however, not a problem for David. He argued that “Although deference colours the Court’s receptivity
to positive Charter claims and influences the crafting of remedies, it will never extend to insulating fiscal
considerations from judicial scrutiny.”251

The SCC revisited Charter damages in two cases since Ward: Henry v British Columbia (Attorney
General),252 (“Henry SCC”) and Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator253 (“Ernst”). Henry SCC involved a plea
for Charter damages to remedy a wrongful conviction which stemmed from prosecutorial misconduct.
Ernst raised the issue of whether a regulatory board could rely on a statutory immunity clause to bar a
Charter damages claim resulting from an alleged violation of freedom of expression. The SCC was divided
in both cases, sparking criticism that the majority opinions unnecessarily deviated from the Ward
framework. Specifically, commentators took issue with the high degree of fault being imposed in Henry
SCC and the premature dismissal of the claim in Ernst.254
In Henry SCC, the claimant sought Charter damages from the British Columbia Crown for
misconduct resulting from a failure to disclose. Henry was convicted of ten sexual offences, declared a
dangerous offender, and wrongly imprisoned for nearly twenty-seven years. Lower courts disagreed on the
applicable fault threshold for this type of claim. Although the SCC majority255 acknowledged that malice
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was an excessive standard, the fault threshold deemed appropriate was also a high bar:
…a cause of action will lie where the Crown, in breach of its constitutional obligations,
causes harm to the accused by intentionally withholding information when it knows, or
would reasonably be expected to know, that the information is material to the defence
and that the failure to disclose will likely impinge on the accused's ability to make full
answer and defence.256
The Court was concerned that a low standard could trigger an influx of inconsequential disclosure-based
claims, overburdening prosecutors.257 Adourian described the Henry SCC test “as requiring a Charter
infringement plus intentional action, reasonable foreseeability, as well as causation and harm.”258 Henry
met this onerous standard in Henry BCSC, however, receiving over $8 million in Charter damages.259

In Ernst, decided two years after Henry SCC, the Court was called on to assess the constitutionality
of an immunity clause in the Alberta Energy Regulator’s enabling statute, which lower courts treated as a
complete bar to Ernst’s Charter damages claim. Ernst argued that her right to freedom of expression under
subsection 2(b) of the Charter was breached due to the Regulator’s punitive actions. She alleged that the
Regulator restricted her ability to make complaints regarding oil and gas development and prevented her
from participating in its investigations. This was due to her vocal past criticism of the Regulator’s actions.260
A plurality261 of five SCC judges dismissed Ernst’s appeal while four judges dissented. The
majority opinion found that countervailing factors outweighed what would have been a functionally just
Charter damages award. The majority determined that judicial review was a more effective alternative
remedy for Ernst’s claim262 and that Charter damages could chill the Regulator’s decision-making and
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divert its attention from its quasi-judicial regulatory function.263 The constitutionality of the immunity
clause was not reviewed because of the majority’s sweeping finding that Charter damages could never be
a proper remedy awarded against a regulatory body exercising some adjudicative functions.264

Henry SCC and Ernst complicated the Charter damages analysis and the precedents could affect
how the remedy is used in future cases.265 Roach commented that Henry SCC and Ernst showed a troubling
judicial willingness to “allow contextual good governance concerns…to shape the requirements for Charter
damages.”266 The good governance concerns raised by the majorities in both decisions were largely
speculative; the minority opinions did not agree that the concerns posed serious threats to the proper
functioning of government. The dissenting opinion in Ernst cautioned that “courts must consider good
governance concerns in a manner that remains protective of Charter rights, since the “appropriate and just”
analysis under s. 24(1) is designed to redress the Charter breach.”267

Despite the considerable merit of the claims brought by Henry and Ernst, the majority opinions
imposed barriers to future Charter damages claims against Crown prosecutors and certain regulatory
boards. Although these types of claims are unrelated to the Khadr case, it is important to recognize that a
majority of the SCC embraced a more restrictive interpretation of the evolving Charter damages remedy in
the Court’s two post-Ward decisions. Henry SCC and Ernst showed how theoretical good governance
concerns can limit or bar valid claims.

There is also renewed concern that the Court borrowed too much from private law principles in
Henry SCC and Ernst and diluted what it described as the remedy’s distinct purpose in Ward.268 Adourian
argued that Henry SCC distorted Ward’s interest-balancing framework by imposing a fault requirement on
the claimant at the preliminary stage of the inquiry.269 Lorne Sossin observed that the majority opinion in
Ernst likened Charter damages claims to civil claims for private law damages, which were prevented by
the immunity clause.270 By denying a claimant the very opportunity to present arguments, Ernst

The Ernst majority reasoned that Charter damages could “distract [the Regulator] from its statutory duties,
potentially have a chilling effect on its decision-making, compromise its impartiality, and open up new and undesirable
modes of collateral attack on its decisions.” See ibid at para 55, Cromwell J.
264
Ibid at para 24, Cromwell J.
265
See Adourian, supra note 56 at 79: “The combined effect of Henry and Ernst is that over-generalized private law
tort doctrines can be routinely used to defeat Charter damages claims contrary to Ward.”
266
Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, supra note 17 at para 11.641.
267
Ernst, supra note 90 at para 169.
268
See Adourian, supra note 56 at 5.
269
Ibid at 79.
270
Sossin, “Damaging the Charter”, supra note 254.
263

- 37 -

“misconstrue[d] the place of Charter damages in the context of Canada’s Constitutional architecture”.271

The empirical analysis undertaken by Charles showed that Ward has not encouraged greater judicial
reliance on the Charter damages remedy. Although Charles found that there have been more Charter
damages cases being heard per year after Ward, he observed a declining success rate.272 This was due to a
variety of factors such as failure to prove a Charter breach, not suing the proper party, persuasive
countervailing factors, and the failure to meet a high standard of fault.273 Even with the declining success
rate, however, Charles noted a modest increase in the average quantum of Charter damages awarded.274
Gabriella Jamieson commented that Ward “is likely, but not certainly, on a narrowing trajectory.”275

Relevant Trends in the Post-Ward Jurisprudence
To conclude this chapter, it is helpful to briefly review some of the most significant judgments
released after Ward to illustrate continuing problems. Although there have been victories for certain
claimants where large damages awards were ordered (notably in recent class action proceedings),276 there
are examples where substantial damages awards were overturned by appellate courts.277 In most cases,
courts have exhibited a generally cautious approach toward Charter damages.

I discuss three observations I noted while surveying post-Ward case law, all of which are relevant
271
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to the analysis of the Khadr civil claim. First, there is a disconnect between the gravity of the Charter breach
and the quantum of damages awarded in some cases. This is problematic because small awards arguably
do not promote the objectives laid out in Ward, especially vindication and deterrence. Second, issues
relating to fault still plague the developing remedy. The application of fault requirements outside the
Mackin context typically occur, however, in cases involving police. Finally, the existence of a concurrent
tort claim has the potential to bar or unduly limit the Charter damages claim. Some progressive cases
appreciate the distinction between private and public law damages, awarding both types of damages to
accomplish different functions. Other decisions rely solely on private law damages to resolve a claim
despite the existence of serious Charter breaches.

(i)

Disconnect Between the Gravity of the Charter Breach and the Quantum of Damages
There are several post-Ward cases where courts found significant Charter breaches, yet small sums

were awarded. These cases show that fears about the relatively low $5,000 damages award in Ward
becoming a precedent were justified. It is difficult to comprehend how an inconsequential sum can
compensate, vindicate, or deter serious breaches of constitutional rights. To truly promote these objectives
and shape future cases, courts must depart from some existing Charter damages precedents.

The influence of the $5,000 Charter damages award in Ward was obvious in Lamka v Waterloo
Regional Police Services Board278 (“Lamka”). The plaintiff sought $25,000 in damages based on an
allegedly wrongful arrest. The Court found the arrest lawful, but the overnight detention of Lamka and the
strip search to which she was subjected breached sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.279 The Small Claims
Court found that the violations “easily passe[d] the minimum threshold of seriousness to make an award of
civil damages”.280 Citing the $5,000 damages award in Ward (which also concerned a strip search), the
Court found no reason to increase the quantum in Lamka’s case.281 Roach noted that this case, which
“involved more egregious and pervasive Charter violations”282 than Ward, was “troubling because it
suggest[ed] that the $5,000 award in Ward may be emerging as a starting point if not a cap on Charter
damages”.283
In Mason v Turner,284 the British Columbia Supreme Court found a significant breach of subsection
278
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10(b) of the Charter, which protects an accused’s right to counsel. Mason brought an action for damages
based on allegations that she was unlawfully detained, unlawfully searched, and assaulted by police.
Mason’s boyfriend was stopped by police for a traffic violation which subsequently shifted to a drug
investigation once the detaining officer smelled marijuana. The officer informed all three passengers (one
of whom was Mason) that they would be searched. The officer failed to inform the three passengers of their
right to counsel in subsection 10(b) when the nature of the detention changed.285

The Court in Mason found that this inexplicable failure on the part of the detaining officer was
significant.286 Despite this conclusion, the Court awarded $500 in vindication and deterrence-based Charter
damages because there was no evidence of personal loss.287 Ms. Mason’s various tort claims (which
included assault, false arrest, negligence, and false imprisonment) were unsuccessful.288 Even though the
Court awarded Charter damages to Mason (and did not rely on mere declaratory relief), the $500 quantum
was exceedingly low for a serious breach of a fundamental Charter right. The Court did not appreciate that
the impact of the breach on Mason may have been profound, even though she was unable to show evidence
of specific loss. Further, the Court identified the “need to deter police officers from effectively ignoring s.
10(b) of the Charter”289 as justification for a damages award. $500 was not a proper response to such a
compelling rationale. Mason appealed the decision, arguing that a more appropriate damages figure would
have been in the $25,000 range.290 She was unable to identify a specific error committed by the trial judge,
so the order was upheld.

A more recent example of the disconnect between the severity of a Charter breach and the quantum
of damages is Russell v British Columbia (Public Safety and Solicitor General).291 Russell was charged
with four offences and he spent the night in jail. Due to his aggressive behaviour, Russell was prevented
from speaking with a lawyer until immediately before his bail hearing the following day. The British
Columbia Supreme Court found that the thirteen hour delay in speaking to counsel breached subsection
10(b).292 Despite the considerable length of time that elapsed to secure a fundamental right (that is to be
implemented without delay), the Court ordered $1,000 in vindication and deterrence-based Charter
damages. The Court found that Russell had not suffered any personal loss and the officers did not act in
285
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bad faith, which weighed against a substantial damages award.293 This judgment re-emphasized that
compensation and loss-based awards are still driving the Charter damages analysis. $1,000 was deemed
sufficient to vindicate and deter a decision made by law enforcement to ignore constitutional duties.294

(ii)

Continued Confusion Over Fault Requirements
Although it is seemingly clear from Ward that fault is not required to award Charter damages

(because the Charter breach is the legal wrong giving rise to the claim),295 there is still some confusion in
the case law. This typically appears in cases involving claims against the police. Charter damages are often
claimed together with the tort of malicious prosecution (which requires proof of malice), so it is probable
that courts have been influenced by the high private law fault standard despite the distinction between tort
and Charter claims.296
In Forrest v Kirkland,297 the Ontario Divisional Court upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that bad
faith was needed to justify a Charter damages award against an Ontario Provincial Police officer.298 The
trial judgment was released prior to Ward. The appellant argued that Ward made the trial judge’s conclusion
on bad faith erroneous.299 The Divisional Court disagreed, noting that “Chief Justice McLachlin did not
state [in Ward] that mala fides was not required to prove a breach of a Charter right.”300 Even though the
Court understood that constitutional damages claims are conceptually different from private law claims, it
applied the same standard of fault in both areas.
A similar view of Charter damages was advanced in Farley v Ottawa Police Services Board,301
(“Farley”) which involved allegations of negligence and malicious prosecution against the police. The
claimant also sought Charter damages relating to his being prosecuted twice for murder. He was ultimately
acquitted after a lengthy period of incarceration. Ottawa Police Services moved for summary judgment,
which was granted. The Ontario Superior Court found that the police had reasonable cause to suspect Farley,
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so there was no breach of the Charter.302 The Court commented that Charter damages were “an
extraordinary remedy”303 not to be awarded without proof of fault. Bad faith was necessary for a successful
malicious prosecution claim, so it was also needed for a successful Charter damages claim.304 The Court
relied on Ferri v Root,305 a pre-Ward case, to justify its conclusion.

Certain cases have imposed a bad faith requirement in the context of highly discretionary decisions.
These cases could be problematic for decisions made under Crown prerogative, which are considered highly
discretionary. In MacRae v Feeney,306 (“MacRae”) the Alberta Court of Appeal reviewed the dismissal of
MacRae’s Charter damages claim relating to a police investigation and arrest. Citing Henry SCC, MacRae
argued that he did not have to prove the police acted in bad faith to claim Charter damages.307 The Court
of Appeal found that Henry SCC’s comments about fault (specifically that malice was not the proper
threshold) were “confined to claims of wrongful non-disclosure by prosecutors.”308 The Court cited Henry
SCC for the proposition that the improper purpose standard of fault
is apt when the impugned conduct is a highly discretionary decision such as the decision
to initiate or continue a prosecution, because discretionary decision-making can best be
evaluated by reference to the decision-maker’s motives.309
MacRae’s case involved a discretionary decision whether to investigate or prosecute, so proof of bad faith
or wilfulness was required to support the Charter damages claim.310 The Court of Appeal upheld the trial
judgment, also relying on Ferri v Root for support.
The MacRae case was followed in Naqvi v Canada311 (“Naqvi”). Naqvi (a Canadian citizen)
claimed that her right to freedom of religion under subsection 2(a) of the Charter and her right to equality
under section 15 were infringed by the decision of a visa officer. Naqvi’s application to sponsor her husband
was refused based on questions about the validity of her marriage.312 She sought over a million dollars in
Charter damages. The Federal Crown appealed the prothonotary’s decision not to strike Naqvi’s claim.
The Court noted that the precise sections of the Charter that may have been breached were “not specified in the
pleading but would presumably include the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned, not to be imprisoned
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The Federal Court determined that the visa officer’s decision was highly discretionary, so Naqvi
was required to show that the decision was made in bad faith or for an improper purpose.313 Naqvi did not
plead any facts to show this standard was met, so her claim was struck. Despite the Court’s
acknowledgement that the visa officer’s decision was “poorly made”,314 it did not give rise to Charter
damages absent proof of “an additional, wilful element of wrongdoing, such as bad faith or prejudice”.315
Roach noted that the Naqvi decision was a misunderstanding of Ward’s rejection of per se liability for
Charter damages.316 In his view, although claimants are required to show that damages are functionally
justified, this does not mean that proof of bad faith or malice is necessary.317

(iii)

Concurrent Tort and Charter Damages Claims
It is common for claimants to advance concurrent tort and Charter damages claims relating to the

same set of facts. Although this is efficient and it should theoretically increase a claimant’s chance of
success, Ward allows the tort claim to eclipse the Charter damages claim in some situations due to the
principle of double recovery. The Court in Farley commented that Charter damages could only be awarded
“if Charter rights were violated and if damages and other remedies available at law are inadequate.”318 This
language is rooted in Ward, where the SCC identified the existence of alternative remedies as a
countervailing factor that could weigh against Charter damages.319 If private law damages could properly
address the relevant objectives, there would be no functional need for Charter damages.320 This reasoning
has the potential to undermine the distinct purposes served by Charter damages beyond just compensation.
It could also downgrade Charter damages to what Charney and Hunter referred to as “a consolation
prize”,321 implying that tort damages are the preferred mode of redress for constitutional infringements.
Although the presence of a tort claim could jeopardize a claimant’s entitlement to Charter damages,
it is difficult to predict whether this will occur. There are examples in the post-Ward case law where Charter
damages were not awarded because tort damages were deemed sufficient to dispose of the matter and meet
the functional objectives outlined in Ward. In Dixon v Hamilton (City) Police Services Board,322 private
law damages were ordered to compensate a claimant who had been arrested for breaking and entering,
313
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detained for three and a half days, and then subjected to restrictive bail conditions for nine months before
charges were withdrawn. The claimant (who was African-American) did not match the description of the
suspect (described as Caucasian) and he had a valid alibi. The Court ordered just over $45,000 in private
law damages for false imprisonment, false arrest, and negligent investigation. $10,000 of that award was
for punitive damages. Despite finding a breach of sections 7 and 9 of the Charter, the Court determined
that it could not order Charter damages “when it is concurrent to the tort damages of the case.”323 The Court
did not discuss whether Charter damages could accomplish different objectives.
Similarly, in Price v Kelday,324 just over $40,000 in private law damages was awarded to remedy
negligent investigation and false arrest. Despite finding a breach of section 9 of the Charter, additional
Charter damages were not awarded because there was no bad faith or improper purpose on the part of
police. In Jeremiah v Hamilton-Wentworth Police Services Board,325 nearly $50,000 in private law damages
was awarded to remedy violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter which amounted to an assault on the
plaintiff. Despite the excessive force used by police, the Court determined that the conduct was not
“malicious, high handed, or oppressive”326 which could justify a Charter damages award. In both of these
examples, the courts seemed reticent to order Charter damages unless the conduct at issue rose to a certain
level of blameworthiness.

There are other cases, however, which show courts are willing to award concurrent tort and Charter
damages for different reasons, avoiding the duplication problem mentioned in Ward. In Elmardy v Toronto
Police Services Board,327 the Ontario Divisional Court expanded the damages award made at trial328 based
on evidence of racial profiling that triggered a violation of the claimant’s section 15 equality rights under
the Charter. The Court ordered $25,000 in punitive damages against a particular police officer and $50,000
in vindication and deterrence-based Charter damages against the police board to remedy a pervasive social
problem. The Court noted that the trial judge did not discuss the objectives of Charter damages outlined in
Ward, which was problematic because “deterrence and vindication in the public law context are different
from deterrence and vindication in the private law context.”329
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In Carr v Ottawa Police Services Board,330 the Ontario Superior Court ordered nearly $250,000 in
private law damages to remedy false arrest, false imprisonment, negligent investigation, and excessive use
of force by police. The Court acknowledged that these compensatory awards “put [Carr] in the same
position she would have been had her Charter rights not been infringed.”331 Despite this observation, the
Court ordered $7,500 in deterrence-based Charter damages for the breach of Carr’s section 7 right triggered
by her being left naked in a holding cell for several hours.332 This reflects a proper application of Ward and
a shrewd understanding of the different remedial goals served by public law damages.
Similarly, in Fong v British Columbia (Minister of Justice),333 the British Columbia Supreme Court
granted both private law damages and Charter damages based on different objectives. $2,000 in
vindication-based Charter damages was awarded in addition to $63,000 in compensatory private law
damages. Although the Court’s Charter damages analysis was brief, it acknowledged the distinct purposes
of both awards.334 Regrettably, Fong’s Charter damages award was later varied because the provincial
Attorney General did not receive proper notice of the constitutional remedy being sought.335

CONCLUSION
The brief review of post-Ward cases in the preceding section showed that problems still plague the
Charter damages remedy. Although Ward recognized the multifaceted nature of constitutional damages,
the decision reinforced certain principles that can limit valid claims or reduce the quantum of damages. The
broad countervailing factors analysis in the Ward framework gave the state considerable latitude to argue
against a Charter damages award. The Court’s discouragement of large awards in the name of fairness also
benefitted the state. Although it is important that governments not be overwhelmed by an influx of claims,
it is imperative that individuals receive meaningful redress for the distinct type of harm that results from a
constitutional breach. It is also crucial for the rule of law that the state be held liable when it commits such
a violation. The current landscape within which the Charter damages remedy is developing casts doubt on
whether deserving claimants will receive proper relief.
The Omar Khadr civil claim – which challenged decisions made under Crown prerogative – raises
new issues for the Ward framework. Although the Government of Canada’s 2017 settlement with Khadr
330
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has been discussed at length in the press,336 it has not been subject to comprehensive academic analysis.
There is no scholarly examination of how the Ward framework would have been applied to Khadr’s civil
claim or how Crown prerogative would be dealt with at the countervailing factors stage of the inquiry. The
reason for the lack of scholarship in this specific area, in my view, is because a claim for Charter damages
resulting from an exercise of Crown prerogative has never been fully litigated.337 The research undertaken
in the following chapters seeks to contribute to the growing body of Charter damages scholarship by
examining issues with the Ward framework in a particularized – but fundamentally important – context.

In Chapters Four and Five, I explore potential roadblocks that Ward and the existing Charter
damages case law could pose in the adjudication of Khadr’s civil claim. I discuss both countervailing factors
Ward identified: the existence of alternative remedies and concerns regarding good governance. The
decisions at issue in the Khadr case were discretionary and they were made pursuant to the foreign affairs
prerogative, so I examine whether good governance concerns would be strong enough to warrant creation
of a new limited immunity. I also assess whether the Charter damages jurisprudence is evolved enough to
accommodate and encourage a large, impactful damages award in Khadr’s case. Relatively low awards,
combined with the prioritization of compensatory damages, the influence of private law principles, and
concerns about institutional competence, could hinder a robust Charter damages award even when strong
functional justifications are present.
In the next chapter, I discuss the government’s handling of the Khadr case and I review the judicial
decisions which recognized violations of Khadr’s Charter rights in more detail. I also examine the academic
discussion surrounding the Khadr litigation, Crown prerogative, and the mostly critical response to Khadr
SCC 2010. This is designed to provide greater background about the Khadr case, the influence of previous
judicial findings, and the nature of Canada’s involvement.
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CHAPTER THREE: UNDERSTANDING THE KHADR LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION
Before applying the Ward framework to the Khadr civil claim, it is important to understand Omar
Khadr’s litigation history. Khadr waged a series of legal battles with the Government of Canada throughout
his detention. Decisions on Khadr’s claims were made by the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, and
Supreme Court of Canada. Some judgments were victories for the Khadr legal team while others were
disappointments. Many of these opinions will continue to shape constitutional law jurisprudence for
decades to come. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, I provide background about Canada’s actions
toward Khadr. Reviewing the decisions of successive Canadian governments provides greater clarity about
the perceived level of fault or blameworthiness attributed to the state, which could be a factor in the third
and fourth stages of the Ward analysis. Second, I discuss previous Khadr judgments to understand what
courts already determined – and what they did not consider – in this controversial case.
I argue that previous decisions in the Khadr litigation would undoubtedly influence a court’s
analysis of whether Charter damages are appropriate and just in Khadr’s civil claim. While the SCC
recognized violations of Khadr’s Charter rights in 2008 and 2010, state liability was carefully delineated.
The Court adopted a highly deferential stance in the 2010 decision by ordering declaratory relief instead of
repatriation. Charter damages were never considered by a court pronouncing on the Khadr case; the focus
was on injunctive relief, disclosure, repatriation, or inmate classification. Consequently, no findings were
made with respect to private law or public law damages that could prejudice Khadr’s civil claim.
This chapter is divided into three parts. I begin by examining the Canadian government’s response
to Khadr’s case up to his eventual repatriation in 2012. In Part II, I analyze the most impactful judicial
decisions involving Khadr. Emphasis is given to the 2008 and 2010 SCC judgments. In Part III, I briefly
review the academic literature that discussed the Khadr litigation, the influence of Crown prerogative, and
judicial deference. In Part IV, I outline Khadr’s civil claim and survey limited authorities that commented
on the claim and the 2017 settlement.

PART I: CANADA’S RESPONSE TO KHADR’S DETENTION AND MISTREATMENT
Khadr was captured by US forces in Abu Ykhiel, Afghanistan in July 2002 for allegedly throwing
a grenade that later killed Sgt. Christopher Speer. Khadr suffered serious injuries, having been “shot twice
in the back and once through his left shoulder, struck with shrapnel in his left eye, and wounded in his left
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thigh, knee, ankle and foot.”338 Khadr lost consciousness for a week after the battle and his wounds “were
infected, swollen, and still seeping blood for months following his capture.”339 He was taken to Bagram Air
Base in Afghanistan, where he spent the next few months. Khadr alleged he was tortured at Bagram on
multiple occasions340 and interrogated “approximately forty-two times.”341 He was transferred to
Guantánamo in October 2002 at sixteen years of age and his mistreatment continued. Khadr spent more
than three years at Guantánamo before being charged with an offence342 and more than ten years before
being transferred back to Canada. He was housed with adult inmates and denied access to counsel, consular
assistance, educational opportunities, and contact with family.343 He was subjected to sleep deprivation,
isolation and solitary confinement, intimidation, and the spectre of indefinite detention.344
Regrettably, Khadr is notorious for being the only Canadian prosecuted at Guantánamo,345 the first
person prosecuted for war crimes by the US since the 1940s,346 and the last citizen of a Western democracy
to remain at Guantánamo.347 The Canadian government’s actions were a domestic and international
embarrassment, amounting to complicity in the violation of a minor’s human rights.

Initial Response of the Chrétien Government
When Khadr was transferred to Guantánamo in October 2002, Jean Chrétien was Prime Minister
of Canada and he had taken a firm stance on Canada’s abstention from the US invasion of Iraq. This led to
considerable tension between Canada and the US and the Khadr case presented a further aggravation. 348
Chrétien previously intervened on behalf of Khadr’s father, Ahmed, relating to allegations that he
participated in the 1995 Egyptian embassy bombing in Islamabad. During a visit to Pakistan in 1996,
Chrétien sought assurances from Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto that Ahmed Khadr receive fair
treatment from Pakistani authorities. Ahmed Khadr was later released, but interest in his involvement with
Osama Bin Laden grew in the late 1990s. Ahmed Khadr was eventually placed on a terror watch list in
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2001349 and his “extensive involvement in sympathizing with al Qaeda and supporting terrorist activities,
particularly by arranging financing, later became quite notoriously well known”.350 This was an
embarrassment for Chrétien and it undeniably influenced his government’s position toward Omar Khadr.351
Despite Chrétien’s history with the Khadr family, Shephard noted that the Canadian government
tried to gain access to Khadr in early meetings with US officials.352 The US was adamant, however, that
access would only be granted for intelligence-gathering purposes; consular visits were prohibited at
Guantánamo.353 The first visit did not take place until February 2003, six months after the first diplomatic
note was sent by the Canadian government on August 30, 2002.354 This note “asked that a consular official
be allowed to see Omar at Bagram, requested that Omar’s age be considered and that he not be transferred
to Guantanamo”.355 In a second diplomatic note dated September 13, 2002, Canada again expressed concern
over Khadr’s age and his potential transfer to Guantánamo.356 Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham
emphasized Khadr’s youth status and Canada’s commitment to fight against the use of child soldiers in a
press release.357 Shortly after this statement, however, an advisor from Foreign Affairs recommended that
Canada “claw back”358 references to Khadr’s age.

Concerns about the processes used to detain prisoners at Guantánamo began shortly after the
facility became operational in 2002. In April 2002, Amnesty International sent a memorandum to the US
government discussing the legality of its practices at Guantánamo.359 Amnesty International outlined its
concerns that the US had detained prisoners in conditions that did not meet minimum standards of
international law, denied prisoners legal counsel and basic due process guarantees, and subjected them to
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the possibility of indefinite detention.360 In its 2003 annual report based on events that occurred in 2002,
Human Rights Watch reaffirmed its position that the US was holding Guantánamo detainees “in legal
limbo”361 and it had failed to comply with the Geneva Conventions.362 The prison was inspected by the Red
Cross in 2004 and a leaked report contained findings that the policies used at Guantánamo amounted to
torture.363 Shephard described Canada’s position on Guantánamo at this point as one of “silent consent”364
amidst the growing number of nations who expressed criticism.

The CSIS and DFAIT Interviews
Despite the ongoing controversy surrounding Guantánamo, CSIS and DFAIT agents conducted
interviews with Khadr in February and September 2003. A further interview was conducted by an official
from DFAIT in March 2004. These interviews became the focal point of the constitutional litigation
between Khadr and the Government of Canada. Before being granted access to Khadr, Canadian agencies
had to agree to conditions imposed by the US. The most important restrictions were that interviews with
Khadr would be videotaped and Canada had to provide copies of final reports.365

The February 2003 interview lasted for four days. The duration of the interviews ranged from one
to four hours per day. Although he was initially receptive to questions from CSIS, Khadr’s demeanour
changed on the second day. He told Canadian officials he had been tortured by the US and he asked for
protection.366 Less is known about the September 2003 interview. Two CSIS agents asked Khadr further
questions, but he was uncooperative. He again asked to return to Canada.367 The 2004 visit consisted of two
hour and a half long interviews conducted by a DFAIT official over two days. Again, Khadr refused to
answer questions unless he was brought back to Canada.368 A summary of the 2004 interview referenced
Khadr being placed in the ‘frequent flyer program’ for three weeks leading up to the visit.369 The purpose
360
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of the sleep deprivation technique, which involved a transfer to a different cell every three hours, was “to
make [Khadr] more amenable and willing to talk”.370 The DFAIT official who interviewed Khadr in 2004
noted that his behaviour was a product of repeated abuse by authority figures throughout his life.371

In a 2008 affidavit, Khadr explained how his detention conditions deteriorated after the first
interview with Canadians:
After the Canadians left and I told the Americans that my previous statements were
untrue, life got much worse for me. They took away all of my things except for a
mattress. I had no Koran and no blanket. They would shackle me during interrogations
and leave me in harsh and painful positions for hours at a time. One navy interrogator
would pull my hair and spit in my face.372
Khadr also discussed having his security designation altered following what is assumed to be the 2004
interview, which resulted in a month of isolation spent in a freezing cold room.373

In 2005, Jack Hooper (a high ranking CSIS official who helped coordinate the interviews) was
questioned by Khadr’s lawyers. Khadr’s Canadian legal team sought an injunction to prevent further
questioning of Khadr by Canadian officials. Hooper confirmed that the purpose of the CSIS visits was to
gather intelligence to assist in Canadian terrorism investigations.374 When asked if CSIS sought assurances
from the US about what might be done with statements provided by Khadr in the interviews, Hooper
answered in the negative.375 Hooper was also asked whether Khadr was informed at the outset of the
interview that it would be confidential, in line with CSIS policy. Hooper replied that he was unsure.376
Khadr’s lawyers inquired about whether Khadr was told (a) that his statements would be shared with US
authorities; (b) what the reasons for his detention were; (c) about the possibility he could face the death
penalty or life imprisonment; or (d) that he had a right to have counsel present. Hooper replied that he did
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not know.377 Khadr’s lawyers successfully obtained the injunction barring further questioning of Khadr at
Guantánamo,378 although welfare visits continued to take place.

Growing Pressure and Reports on Canadian Involvement in the Khadr Case
After three years of indefinite detention, Khadr was charged with murder, attempted murder,
conspiracy, and aiding the enemy in November 2005.379 By 2006, it became impossible to ignore what was
occurring at Guantánamo. Hunger strikes, a large-scale riot, and multiple suicides had taken place.380 If
power had not transferred to Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party in 2006, it is possible Khadr may have
been repatriated before 2012. The passive stance of the Harper government was remarkably consistent over
many years despite considerable advocacy efforts brought on Khadr’s behalf.
As Khadr’s case progressed, Canada did not express public concern about the military commission
procedure,381 which was deemed unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court.382 The Canadian government
obtained assurances from the US, however, that the death penalty would not be sought at Khadr’s trial.383
When Khadr’s case was dismissed384 at the beginning of his trial in June 2007, Foreign Affairs Minister
Peter MacKay re-emphasized Canada’s passive stance.385 When the Pentagon announced its intention to
appeal the dismissal, MacKay focused on the need for the commission process “to run its course”.386

Pressure on the Harper government increased in mid-2007. An open letter dated June 14, 2007 was
sent to Prime Minister Harper calling for Khadr’s repatriation to Canada and describing the military
commission process as “fundamentally and irreparably flawed”.387 The letter was signed by a long list of
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government ministers, Members of Parliament, advocacy organizations, law professors, lawyers, and
interested individuals. It closed by emphasizing that Canada lagged behind other Western nations who
intervened to protect their citizens and demonstrate their sovereignty.388 The Canadian Bar Association
(“CBA”) also sent a letter to Prime Minister Harper on August 13, 2007 stressing Canada’s international
treaty obligations with respect to child soldiers.389 The CBA insisted that Canada’s reliance on US
assurances that due process was being provided to Khadr was insufficient.390
Even as concerns about the legitimacy of the allegations against Khadr emerged in early 2008,391
the Harper government remained uninvolved. In February 2008, a coalition of Canadian political parties
joined the advocacy effort to press for Khadr’s repatriation.392 By April 2008, the House of Commons
Subcommittee on International Human Rights began to hold public hearings on the Khadr case. The
Subcommittee heard testimony from a number of witnesses, including Khadr’s military lawyers, the CBA,
and advocacy groups. The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development released
a report containing its findings in June 2008 (“the Standing Committee report”).393 This was issued shortly
after the SCC found that Canada’s refusal to disclose records of the Guantánamo interviews to Khadr
amounted to a Charter breach.394

The Standing Committee report concluded that Khadr should have been treated as a child soldier
entitled to protection.395 Although the military commission system under which Khadr was being tried was
modified after being declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court, the Standing Committee report
noted that there were “serious concerns…about the extent to which the revised process me[t] international
legal and human rights standards.”396 The report recommended that Canada (a) demand Khadr’s military
commission proceedings be terminated; (b) challenge the US’s continued ‘right’ to detain Khadr as an
enemy combatant despite an acquittal or termination of proceedings against him; (c) demand that Khadr be
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released from Guantánamo; (d) honour its commitments under international law; and (e) prepare an
“appropriate rehabilitation and reintegration program”397 for Khadr.398

The Standing Committee report also contained a dissenting opinion written by the governing
Conservative Party. The dissent referred to the “one-dimensional approach”399 used by the subcommittee
that reviewed Khadr’s case, which “upheld an interpretation of Mr. Khadr as a victim.”400 The government’s
position is neatly summarized in the following excerpt:
Mr. Khadr could become a litmus test on Canada’s commitment to impeding global
terrorism and the results of our actions today could result in consequences that are not
in the long-term interest of the country.401
The dissenting opinion referred to Canada’s supposed duty to assist Khadr as a strictly moral, rather than
legal, obligation.402 The government emphasized the possible risk posed by Khadr to Canadian national
security and it stressed the importance of Canada’s international commitments to fight terrorism.403
In July 2008, video footage of the February 2003 interview with Khadr was made public by Khadr’s
Canadian legal team. In the disturbing video, sixteen-year-old Khadr sobbed and begged for protection.404
Controversy erupted within and outside Canada, which triggered an investigation by the Security
Intelligence Review Committee (“SIRC”)405 in September 2008. SIRC was tasked with reviewing the role
played by CSIS in the Khadr matter.
In its July 2009 report, SIRC acknowledged the legitimate purpose of CSIS’s interviews with Khadr
at Guantánamo to gather intelligence. SIRC ultimately concluded, however, that CSIS failed to appreciate
two important factors in deciding to interview Khadr. The first was in relation to the controversy
surrounding human rights abuses at Guantánamo. SIRC found that coverage of the abuses was widespread
in February 2003, but there was no evidence to show CSIS considered this information in its decision-
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making.406 The second factor was Khadr’s age, which was also not taken into account.407 The report noted
that Khadr had not received any advice or guidance prior to the CSIS interviews because “he had been kept
incommunicado and been denied access to legal counsel, consular representation or family members.”408
Although the report criticized aspects of CSIS’s decision-making, it did not conclude that CSIS played a
role in Khadr’s mistreatment.409
Events Leading to Khadr’s Repatriation
The SCC released its second decision on the Khadr matter in January 2010, declaring that the
questioning of Khadr at Guantánamo and subsequent information sharing with the US violated his rights
under section 7 of the Charter.410 The SCC did not order the Harper government to request Khadr’s
repatriation; instead, the Court allowed the executive to determine how to remedy the breach.411 Days after
the ruling was released, Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon stated that the government’s policy
toward Khadr had not changed and repatriation would not be sought.412 In response to the SCC decision,
the Harper government sent a diplomatic note to the US Embassy on February 16, 2010. The note sought
assurances that any evidence or statements shared with U.S. authorities as a result of the
interviews with Mr. Khadr by Canadian agents and officials not be used against him by
U.S. authorities in the context of proceedings before the Military Commission or
elsewhere.413
The US replied on April 27, 2010, stating that military commission prosecutors were governed by
legislation “which provide[d] safeguards against the admission in military commission proceedings of
evidence obtained through improper means.”414 No meaningful assurances were provided.
Khadr’s lawyers applied for judicial review of the government’s response to Khadr SCC 2010,
seeking an order of mandamus to compel the Harper government to request Khadr’s repatriation. The
Federal Court’s decision was released in July 2010. Justice Zinn found that the breach of Khadr’s Charter
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rights had not been adequately remedied.415 Canada was given seven days to inform Khadr of “all untried
remedies that it maintain[ed] would potentially cure or ameliorate its breach of Mr. Khadr’s Charter
rights”.416 Justice Zinn also retained jurisdiction to supervise this process and impose a remedy if Canada
failed to do so.417 Canada sought a stay of enforcement of Justice Zinn’s order pending appeal. The Federal
Court of Appeal granted the stay, finding that Justice Zinn’s order was a potential “affront to the division
of powers”.418 By the time the appeal was heard, it was declared moot because of Khadr’s guilty plea.419
Khadr’s military commission trial began on August 12, 2010 and was set to resume on October 25,
2010. Khadr accepted a pre-trial agreement on October 13, 2010.420 Diplomatic notes were exchanged
between Canada and the US on October 23, 2010 with respect to the deal. The agreement provided that
Khadr could be transferred to Canada after serving one year in US detention.421 The initial note from the
US State Department to Canada indicated that the US would support his transfer to Canada to serve the
remainder of his sentence or a lesser sentence determined by Canadian law.422 Canada responded that the
Harper government would “favourably consider Mr. Khadr’s application to be transferred to Canada”423 if
such a transfer were approved by the US.

The plea agreement imposed an eight year maximum sentence with the possibility of transfer after
one year.424 In early November 2010, Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon indicated that Canada
would implement the terms of the agreement.425 Khadr’s completed transfer application was sent to Public
Safety Minister Vic Toews in April 2012, but Toews requested footage of psychiatric assessments done on
Khadr before the transfer could be approved.426 The footage was released by the Pentagon in September
2012 and Khadr – the last Western detainee still remaining at Guantánamo – returned to Canada on
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September 29, 2012.427 Although Toews agreed to the transfer, he emphasized that Khadr pleaded guilty to
war crimes and was an al Qaeda supporter.428

Canada seemed willfully blind to the abuses occurring at Guantánamo, the conditions of detention,
and how its actions exacerbated Khadr’s extreme vulnerability. Evaluating Canada’s level of
blameworthiness is relevant to the Charter damages analysis. The presence of bad faith or egregious
conduct can impact the Ward analysis in two ways. First, it is relevant to the assessment of whether a limited
immunity is applicable. If the state attempts to rely on an immunity defence to bar or limit Charter damages,
the claimant will need to show the state was at fault. Ward emphasized that the applicable fault standard
will vary depending on the situation.429 Second, fault can be used to help justify an award based on
vindication or deterrence, or to increase the quantum.430

The Canadian government would likely argue that it never intended to harm Khadr and its strategy
was to avoid interfering in an American judicial process. Khadr was being detained by the US, so there
were limits to the assistance Canadians could provide. The US prevented Canadian officials from having
consular visits with Khadr. Canada sent diplomatic notes asking that Khadr not be sent to Guantánamo,
which were ignored. Canada also sought repeated assurances from the US that Khadr was being treated
fairly. Even though these assurances may have had little meaning, they were requested. Finally, Canada
secured a commitment from the US that it would not seek the death penalty for Khadr. Although these
actions reflect a minimal level of consular assistance, the government did take some steps to help Khadr.
These efforts were completely overshadowed, however, by conduct that demonstrated Canada’s
indifference toward Khadr’s human rights and its obligations under domestic and international law. Canada
initiated interviews with Khadr on three occasions, allowed the interviews to be videotaped, and shared
intelligence with the US. Canadian officials were aware of Khadr’s age and the conditions of his detention.
When Khadr was repatriated in 2012, Canada “dutifully respect[ed] and enforce[d] a sentence obtained
with the help of unconstitutionally obtained evidence.”431
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The most glaring events that could give rise to a finding of bad faith were (a) the decision to conduct
the 2004 interview with Khadr despite knowledge that he was tortured beforehand; (b) the lack of
meaningful action taken by the Harper government to address a clear breach of Khadr’s rights after Khadr
SCC 2010 was released;432 (c) the delay in implementing the transfer outlined in Khadr’s plea deal; and (d)
the decision to hold Khadr in maximum security facilities in Canada, which resulted in his further exposure
to solitary confinement. It is reasonable to conclude that Canada knew or ought to have known that these
actions were likely to cause harm to Khadr. These issues will be explored further in Chapter Four.

In the next section, I review the most relevant judicial decisions involving Khadr. It is important to
understand how the Charter breaches in these judgments were framed. In 2008 and 2010, the SCC never
criticized the government’s policy of non-intervention in Khadr’s case. Instead, the Charter violations
stemmed from the 2003 and 2004 Guantánamo interviews. Further, the Court did not comment on a
potential duty to protect Khadr in 2010 even though the Federal Court made this finding433 and it was given
significant attention in the parties’ facta.434 Finally, the issue of Canadian complicity in Khadr’s abuse was
never directly addressed.

PART II: KHADR’S LITIGATION HISTORY IN CANADIAN COURTS
2005-2008: Disclosure and Injunction Victories
The first substantive victories for the Khadr legal team came in 2005. A request for disclosure of
information from the minister of foreign affairs was granted435 and an injunction prohibiting further
interrogation of Khadr by Canadian officials was ordered.436 In the latter case, Khadr’s lawyers argued that
his rights under section 7 of the Charter had been breached by the conduct of CSIS and DFAIT officials –
specifically by their failure to advise Khadr of his right to silence and right to access counsel. Although the
Court did not make any findings with respect to the Charter (this issue was to be addressed at trial), it
granted an interlocutory injunction to prevent further information sharing and thereby reduce the possibility
of Khadr being convicted in US proceedings based on unconstitutionally obtained evidence.437
Ibid at 185: “The Supreme Court’s deferential declaration was also ill-suited to a situation in which the executive
had demonstrated bad faith by failing to take steps to ensure an effective remedy.”
433
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After Khadr was formally charged in November 2005, his lawyers demanded disclosure of
everything in the Crown’s possession that related to the charges.438 The Canadian government refused the
demand, so Khadr’s lawyers brought an application for judicial review of the decision not to disclose. In
2006, the Federal Court denied the request for an order of mandamus to compel disclosure and Khadr’s
judicial review application was dismissed.439 The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in 2007.440
The Court found that the Charter was engaged because Canadian agents who interviewed Khadr and shared
information with the US “assisted U.S. authorities in conducting the investigation against [Khadr] and in
preparing a case against him.”441 The Crown was ordered to produce all material in its possession and the
Federal Court was instructed to determine which documents needed to be disclosed to Khadr under section
7 of the Charter.442
The Federal Court of Appeal decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2008443
(“Khadr SCC 2008”). This was the first time the Khadr matter reached Canada’s highest court. The SCC
determined that the Charter applied where Canadian agents “participat[ed] in a process that was violative
of Canada’s binding obligations under international law”.444 The Court afforded considerable weight to US
Supreme Court decisions concerning the legality of detention procedures at Guantánamo.445 The findings
of the US Supreme Court were sufficient to establish that, at the time CSIS conducted its interviews of
Khadr in 2003, detention and trial procedure at Guantánamo was “a clear violation of fundamental human
rights protected by international law.”446 Canada’s refusal to disclose anything to Khadr following the
charges brought against him breached section 7 of the Charter.447 The appropriate remedy was for the
Crown to disclose interview records and information obtained from those interviews that was shared with
the US.448
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Khadr SCC 2008 was the first time a Canadian court found that Khadr’s Charter rights had been
violated by the actions of Canadian officials. The SCC did not find, however, that the circumstances of
Khadr’s questioning or the subsequent sharing of information with the US triggered the Charter breach.
Canada’s participation in an illegal regime engaged the Charter and the government’s refusal to disclose
breached section 7, so the Court’s remedy was confined to correcting that constitutional violation. The true
issue in the Khadr litigation – the extent of Canadian involvement in Khadr’s mistreatment and continued
detention – was not directly addressed. Further, a court had never considered the appropriate relief to which
Khadr may have been entitled beyond an injunction or disclosure order. The SCC was given a second
chance to review the Khadr matter in 2010 and order a more impactful remedy.

The Path to Khadr SCC 2010
Khadr’s legal team brought an application for judicial review of the Canadian government’s
decision not to request Khadr’s repatriation from Guantánamo. A crucial piece of information had come to
light through Canada’s disclosure: Canadian agents knew that seventeen-year-old Khadr was subjected to
the ‘frequent flyer’ sleep deprivation program prior to the 2004 interview.449 Justice O’Reilly of the Federal
Court found that the state’s “knowing involvement in the mistreatment of Mr. Khadr [was] an even more
compelling basis on which to find that the Charter applied to Canadian officials at Guantánamo Bay.”450
After reviewing Canada’s international treaty obligations,451 Justice O’Reilly determined that the Canadian
government had “a duty to protect persons in Mr. Khadr’s circumstances as a principle of fundamental
justice.”452 This duty was triggered by Khadr’s unique circumstances “and the multiplicity of departures
from international norms that [had] taken place.”453
Justice O’Reilly determined that the appropriate remedy was an order directing the Canadian
government to request Khadr’s repatriation.454 The state could not demonstrate that this request would cause
harm to Canada-US relations or to Canada’s tough anti-terrorism stance.455 Justice O’Reilly concluded that
a repatriation request was “at the lower end of [the] spectrum of diplomatic intervention and, therefore,
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minimally intrusive on the Crown’s prerogative in relation to foreign affairs.”456 The federal government
was ordered to send a request to the US seeking Khadr’s repatriation as soon as possible.457
Justice O’Reilly’s judgment was stayed pending Canada’s appeal, which was dismissed by the
Federal Court of Appeal.458 The appellate court outlined actions taken by the Canadian government with
respect to Khadr, including welfare visits and diplomatic notes.459 The majority upheld Justice O’Reilly’s
judgment, emphasizing that decisions made under the foreign affairs prerogative were not exempt from
constitutional scrutiny.460 Justice Nadon dissented, arguing that Justice O’Reilly’s decision erred in two
respects: first, that Canada had done little to protect Khadr; and second, that Khadr’s repatriation was the
suitable remedy.461 In his view, Justice O’Reilly failed to give proper consideration to Canada’s actions and
“the extent to which Canada’s ability to protect [Khadr] was limited.”462 Justice Nadon concluded that the
lower court’s decision to order the government to request Khadr’s repatriation was “a direct interference
into Canada’s conduct of its foreign affairs.”463 Justice Nadon would have allowed the appeal.

Canada appealed the Federal Court of Appeal decision and the matter was heard by the Supreme
Court of Canada in November 2009. The decision, released in January 2010, was the culmination of over
five years of litigation. The SCC had an opportunity to remedy wrongs done to Khadr by the Canadian
government, yet it unanimously chose to adopt a highly deferential stance to avoid intruding on matters
falling under Crown prerogative. Despite the important considerations at play and the unquestionable
impact of the decision, the Court’s comments were confined to just over ten pages.

The SCC reviewed evidence that had come to light regarding the value of information obtained
from the CSIS and DFAIT interviews. The record before the Court implied that information extracted from
the interviews “provided significant evidence in relation to [the] charges.”464 Further, the “relaxed rules of
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evidence”465 in the Guantánamo military commission process could allow the admission of statements made
by Khadr to Canadians as evidence at his trial.466 The Court found that the actions of Canadian agents at
Guantánamo contributed to Khadr’s continuing detention, triggering a section 7 Charter breach.467 The
violation was not in accordance with fundamental justice because Khadr was a youth at the time of the
interviews, he was denied access to a lawyer, and Canadian officials knew that information arising from
the interviews would be handed over to the US.468 The Court described the violation as ongoing because
information extracted from Khadr during the interviews could still be used against him at trial.469

The first part of the SCC decision establishing the Charter breach was largely unobjectionable. A
considerable shift occurred when the Court addressed whether Justice O’Reilly exceeded his discretion in
ordering the Canadian government to request Khadr’s repatriation. Although the Court found the proposed
repatriation remedy theoretically suitable, it refused to uphold Justice O’Reilly’s order. With minimal
explanation, the Court deemed the order to request Khadr’s repatriation an unjustifiable intrusion into the
realm of Crown prerogative.

The SCC emphasized that the ability of courts to review decisions made under a prerogative power
is limited and courts must “remai[n] sensitive to the fact that the executive branch of government is
responsible for decisions under this power, and that the executive is better placed to make such
decisions”.470 The Court found that Justice O’Reilly did not give proper weight to the executive’s
complicated responsibility to make decisions relating to foreign affairs.471 The SCC noted three concerns
associated with the remedy of repatriation:
Mr. Khadr is not under the control of the Canadian government; the likelihood that the
proposed remedy will be effective is unclear; and the impact on Canadian foreign
relations of a repatriation request cannot be properly assessed by the Court.472
The Court determined that the appropriate remedy was a declaration under subsection 24(1) of the Charter
that Khadr’s constitutional rights had been violated. The declaration was proper given “the limitations of
the Court’s institutional competence, and the need to respect the prerogative powers of the executive.”473
465
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Even though damages were not considered in Khadr SCC 2010, the remedial deference exhibited
by the SCC could affect a court’s analysis of a Charter damages claim based on the same set of underlying
facts. Khadr SCC 2010 protected executive discretion in prerogative decision-making. The follow-up
litigation that arose in response to the Harper government’s inaction was worrisome. Despite the Federal
Court’s finding that Khadr’s Charter rights were not properly remedied after Khadr SCC 2010, its
progressive order requiring the government to develop strategies to cure the breach was overturned by the
Federal Court of Appeal. The appellate court’s intervention was based on the SCC’s comments about
inappropriate interference with Crown prerogative.

It is helpful to briefly canvass the academic response to Khadr SCC 2010 to further appreciate how
the judgment could influence a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim. Understanding the forces that motivated
and constrained the SCC in 2010 helps illuminate the significance of the decision for Khadr’s Charter
damages claim. Scholarly opinions are reviewed in the next section.

PART III: REFLECTIONS ON THE KHADR LITIGATION
The Lack of Meaningful Remedy
One of the most powerful critiques of Khadr SCC 2010 was that it failed to provide a meaningful
remedy for a profound constitutional breach. Scholars described the decision as “appallingly weak”,474
“disappointing”,475 and inadequate.476 Audrey Macklin argued that the SCC “preserve[d] the veneer of the
rule of law, with none of the content.”477 The Court had an opportunity to emphasize the importance of
Charter rights and the urgency of Khadr’s circumstances. Khadr’s legal team sought his repatriation
because it was the only option to prevent him from being convicted of war crimes based on
unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
Repatriation was the only meaningful remedy available to the Court in 2010. The SCC’s decision
not to order the government to request Khadr’s repatriation – and the Harper government’s cavalier attitude
toward the Court’s declaration that Khadr’s rights had been violated – provide support for Khadr’s Charter
damages claim. Khadr could argue that the Charter breaches in his case were never properly remedied,
which helps establish functional justification for damages.
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The Parameters of the Charter Breach and Causation
In 2010, the SCC found that the continued possibility of US reliance on Canadian intelligence
gleaned from the 2003 and 2004 interviews represented an ongoing Charter breach.478 The specific actions
that triggered the violation were quite narrow. The Court did not find that the Harper government’s noninterventionist stance was a cause of the continuing rights deprivation or a contributing factor. Roach noted
that, if the US had given Canada assurances that it would not use Canadian information at Khadr’s trial,
“Such a statement might have broken the causal link between the 2003 and 2004 interviews and Khadr’s
detention and the ongoing effects of Canada’s violations”.479
Although the Court found that Canada played a role in Khadr’s ordeal, it did not conclude that
Canada was a principal violator of Khadr’s rights. Macklin observed that the 2010 SCC decision treated
“the United States as the sole violator of [Khadr’s] right to liberty and security of the person” 480 and
questioned the extent to which Canadian officials “were causally connected to the perpetuation of those
rights deprivations”.481 The Court found that the section 7 breach stemmed from decisions to interview and
share information. Canada’s passive stance towards Khadr’s prosecution was not criticized. The Court also
avoided labelling Khadr’s abuse as torture and applicable international law was not discussed.482
On one hand, the SCC’s reluctance to impose greater liability on the Canadian government for
Khadr’s plight (and its focus on the US as the direct cause of Khadr’s deprivation) could pose problems
during the application of Ward. Even if Khadr were able to make compelling arguments in support of a
large Charter damages award, it is conceivable that a court might find a large award inappropriate given
the scope of the SCC’s previous findings. On the other hand, the narrow framing of the Charter breaches
gives a subsequent court latitude to expand the state’s liability. Khadr SCC 2008 and Khadr SCC 2010 both
addressed the consequences of the 2003 and 2004 Guantánamo interviews. Neither decision analyzed nor
attempted to remedy years of implicit condonation of human rights abuses by the Canadian government.
Khadr could argue that Canada’s unwavering stance of non-intervention, its failure to meaningfully respond
to Khadr SCC 2010, its delay in processing Khadr’s transfer back to Canada, and its decision to house him
in maximum security prisons aggravated the deprivation he experienced.483 If this argument were
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successful, it could result in additional Charter breaches being found.
The Court’s Institutional Role and the Influence of Crown Prerogative
Some commentators noted that the SCC was keen to avoid a looming constitutional crisis in Khadr
SCC 2010. The Court could have ignited conflict if it ordered the federal government to request Khadr’s
repatriation and that order was not obeyed.484 Writing before the case was heard by the SCC, Errol Mendes
argued that the Court would be called on to “demarcat[e]…the limits of executive power in an area that,
before the advent of the Charter in Canada, was substantially beyond the power of the courts to
supervise.”485 Mendes believed the 2010 judgment would make a strong statement about whether Charter
rights should be protected in situations where it was not politically expedient to do so.486
David Rangaviz observed that, although the SCC decision avoided conflict, it eroded the Court’s
apparent power and legitimacy.487 Macklin commented that Khadr SCC 2010 “expose[d] the dual character
of the Supreme Court of Canada as a forum of principle and as an actor in institutional politics.”488 Roach
noted that “The Court appeared to have fundamental concerns about its remedial competence in the foreign
affairs context.”489 The profound effect of the Court’s statements on Crown prerogative and the limits of its
institutional role are captured by Roach’s remarks:
These statements raise the disturbing possibility that the Court has concluded that some
judicial remedies that dictate the exercise of foreign affairs prerogative powers are
permanently out of bounds. Such a conclusion would mean that follow-up litigation
would likely not be effective because the Court would again face limits on its remedial
powers and could only again make declarations about the violation.490
This scenario is exactly what occurred. Although Justice Zinn of the Federal Court attempted to
supervise the Harper government’s progress toward implementing a meaningful remedy after the 2010 SCC
decision, his judgment was stayed by the Federal Court of Appeal on the grounds that it could be perceived
as a threat to the separation of powers.491 Roach noted in a later article that the Federal Court of Appeal
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decision “suggest[ed] that the [Supreme] Court has reintroduced a reflexive deference to the state”492 and
“compromise[d] traditional visions of rights protection”.493 Efforts to promote a meaningful remedy in
response to Khadr SCC 2010 were stymied by the decision itself.
The Impact of the Court’s Deferential Posture
Some scholars voiced concerns about the implications of the Court’s deferential stance in Khadr
SCC 2010. Roach argued that the decision could have endorsed “a partial political questions
doctrine…which may render courts powerless to order remedies that affect the prerogative powers of
government to make diplomatic representations.”494 In simple terms, a political question is best addressed
by a branch of government other than the judiciary because of the question’s politically sensitive nature.
This doctrine is an American creation that implores the judiciary to respect institutional boundaries and
leave political decision-making to the proper branch of government.495 Roach noted that this doctrine was
rejected by the SCC in Operation Dismantle Inc. v R,496 (“Operation Dismantle”) where the Court
determined that “decisions of the federal cabinet are reviewable by the courts under the Charter”.497 Roach
discussed the impactful concurring opinion of Justice Wilson in Operation Dismantle, which emphasized
that the Court’s function “was not to second guess government policy, but to determine whether it violated
the Charter and to provide appropriate and just remedies”.498

Emmett Macfarlane asserted that Khadr SCC 2010 was an example of deference based on
“institutional logic that privilege[d] executive prerogative powers in a manner that [was] wholly
inconsistent with the Court’s overall approach to the Charter.”499 Macfarlane did not argue that deferential
decisions were improper, so long as they were based on sound interpretations of appropriate institutional
divisions.500 In Khadr SCC 2010, however, the Court adopted an extremely deferential approach where it
had the institutional latitude to order a more impactful remedy. This, in Macfarlane’s view, amounted to a
“sizable stain on the Court’s record in balancing rights and security concerns”.501
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The SCC’s deference to the executive in 2010 could influence a court’s analysis of whether Charter
damages are appropriate for Omar Khadr. Although the Court reviewed the actions of the executive for
compliance with the Charter, it exhibited considerable apprehensiveness with respect to remedy. Crown
prerogative could become an influential countervailing factor under the good governance umbrella of Ward.
As shown in Chapter Two, good governance is broadly defined and it is subject to continued interpretation.
Ordering a substantial Charter damages award for decisions made under the foreign affairs prerogative
could be seen as chilling government discretion in a sensitive area, which Ward sought to prevent.

Ordering a large damages award could also be viewed as a court challenging its institutional
competence and disturbing traditional divisions of power. I argue in Chapter Four, however, that an
impactful Charter damages award in Khadr’s case would reaffirm fundamental principles about state
accountability expressed in Operation Dismantle. This kind of groundbreaking decision would
acknowledge the judiciary’s responsibility to provide meaningful redress for breaches of the Charter – even
when those breaches arise in areas that have traditionally commanded deference. To set the stage for the
application of the Ward framework to the Khadr civil claim in Chapters Four and Five, I review the claim
and the 2017 settlement in the next section.

PART IV: THE CIVIL CLAIM AND SETTLEMENT
The allegations against the Government of Canada in Khadr’s civil statement of claim are
extensive. The claim was initiated in 2004 and last amended in 2014. Khadr sought $20 million in
compensatory, Charter, punitive, and aggravated damages. He claimed compensatory private law damages
resulting from the torts of negligent investigation, conspiracy, and misfeasance of public office.502 He also
sought Charter damages and a declaration under subsection 24(1) relating to alleged violations of sections
7, 10(a), 10(b), and 12 of the Charter.503 Finally, Khadr claimed punitive and aggravated damages and an
unspecified amount of special damages which would be particularized before trial.504
Khadr argued that the Canadian government was complicit in the abuses committed by the US.505
Rather than try to protect Khadr and acknowledge his youth status, Canada conspired with the US to set up
intelligence-gathering interviews, gain information about Khadr, and “exploi[t] the circumstances of his
imprisonment”.506 Providing information gleaned from these interviews to US officials was done to “ensure
502
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Omar’s ongoing and indefinite detention.”507 The claim alleged that Canada deliberately placed Khadr in
jeopardy by asking him about sensitive matters that could be used as evidence in a future criminal
prosecution.508 This was made worse by Canada’s failure to seek restrictions on how information provided
to the US might be used.509
The claim referred to Khadr’s guilty plea before the US military commission in 2010 as coerced
and made under duress.510 Khadr was faced with the prospect of further detention at Guantánamo or
pleading guilty and potentially coming back to Canada. The claim discussed the Canadian government’s
inexplicable delay in implementing Khadr’s transfer under the plea agreement.511 A list of US acts taken in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, of which Canada was aware, was also provided. Some of these acts
included denying Khadr access to counsel and contact with family, subjecting him to routine interrogations,
indefinite detention, and torture, using inherently flawed legal procedure to prosecute him, and committing
violations of the Geneva Conventions.512 The claim emphasized that, even with knowledge of these
practices, Canada refused to intervene.513

In early July 2017, the approximately $10.5 million settlement between Khadr and the Government
of Canada was leaked. The government also issued a formal apology to Khadr. The principal justifications
for the settlement communicated to the public were that (a) continuing to litigate the Khadr civil claim
would have been far more expensive; and (b) it was time to bring an end to the Khadr saga and do the right
thing. Opinions on the settlement were fractured along political lines. Garnett Genuis, a Conservative
Member of Parliament (“MP”), argued that the settlement was a regrettable political choice, not a legal
obligation.514 Responding directly to Genuis, Liberal MP Steven MacKinnon defended the settlement as
the proper response to “a case the government had virtually no chance of winning.”515
CBC News published several opinions about the Khadr case from legal commentators.516 Lawyer
Eugene Meehan argued that Canada did not have much choice in deciding to settle with Khadr given the
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SCC’s findings in 2008 and 2010. Treating Charter damages as a foregone conclusion, Meehan cited large
payments in wrongful conviction cases as the probable “upper limit for charter breaches.”517 Howard
Anglin, former deputy chief of staff and senior advisor to the Harper government, highlighted the
complexities of the Khadr case and the legal issues at play. Anglin argued that “[t]here was good reason to
have the courts hear and decide these claims, as they could affect how Canada treats future consular
cases.”518 Finally, Lorne Sossin expressed his view that the civil claim had a reasonable chance of success
at trial. Sossin stressed, however, that protracted litigation would have imposed a high financial cost.519
Macklin praised the government’s decision to settle, noting that litigation “would…force disclosure
of conduct by Canadian officials that would publicly disgrace the government, and potentially lead to
liability and a damages award that would dwarf the amount of a settlement”.520 Craig Forcese emphasized
that two SCC decisions found breaches of Khadr’s section 7 rights, so adjudication of his civil claim would
have focused mostly on quantifying the damages award.521 Forcese commented, however, that he did not
“underestimate the complexities of the Ward case and its standard for damages in Charter cases.”522 Forcese
noted the government’s prudence in settling the claim because of the myriad costs associated with continued
litigation and the real possibility of being held liable for damages and Khadr’s legal costs.523
Asher Honickman cast doubt on the success of Khadr’s claim.524 He argued that some of the tort
allegations would have required proof of intent, which posed evidentiary issues. Honickman also mentioned
the rather uninspiring track record for Charter damages claims following Ward. Notable cases where large
Charter damages awards were made (i.e. Henry BCSC) involved Canada’s direct involvement in cruel and
unusual treatment or wrongful imprisonment. Honickman argued that the SCC did not make these kinds of
findings with respect to Canada’s treatment of Khadr, so his likelihood of obtaining a sizeable Charter
damages award was low.525 Mark Mancini arrived at a similar conclusion, challenging the opinion that
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Khadr would have been entitled to a large Charter damages award at trial.526 In his view, it would have
been difficult for a court to functionally justify a sizeable compensation and vindication-based damages
award (as opposed to a deterrence-based award) because (a) damages could never return Khadr to the
position he enjoyed prior to the Charter breaches; and (b) his losses were not capable of being properly
measured.527 Mancini also noted that the quantification of Khadr’s damages would depend on “an
imaginative judiciary”528 due to the lack of relevant case law.

CONCLUSION
Omar Khadr has an extensive and complicated litigation history with the Government of Canada.
The issues in his case involve national security and terrorism, alleged war crimes, discretionary decisionmaking under Crown prerogative, the extraterritorial application of the Charter, relations between Canada
and the US, the institutional competence of courts, and state accountability. The case has been heavily
politicized since the early years of Khadr’s detention and it remains incredibly divisive to this day.

In Chapters Four and Five, I apply the Ward framework to the Khadr civil claim to assess whether
Khadr should have been entitled to Charter damages and, if so, how those damages ought to be quantified.
I do not share the view that Charter damages would have been automatic. Although the Canadian
government’s handling of the Khadr matter was appalling, past judicial decisions illustrate the complexity
associated with granting remedies in this case. As outlined in Part II of this chapter, the SCC’s findings in
2008 and 2010 were confined to the actions of Canadian officials in specific circumstances. These decisions
were not indictments of the Canadian government’s overall approach toward Khadr.

Critically, no court has pronounced on the suitability of subsection 24(1) damages to remedy the
consequences of Canada’s involvement in Khadr’s case. I argue that Charter damages fulfill all three
objectives outlined in Ward: compensation, vindication, and deterrence. There are several arguments,
however, that could be advanced by the state to limit Khadr’s entitlement to Charter damages at the
countervailing factors stage of the Ward inquiry. These include the existence of alternative remedies,
potential interference with the government’s decision-making under the foreign affairs prerogative, and
concerns about causation and institutional competence. I ultimately argue that the strong functional
justifications supporting Khadr’s Charter damages claim outweigh potential countervailing factors.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ESTABLISHING KHADR’S
ENTITLEMENT TO CHARTER DAMAGES
INTRODUCTION
Chapters Two and Three emphasized two key themes. First, the Charter damages remedy has been
slow to evolve and damages are infrequently ordered in the post-Ward jurisprudence. When claimants are
awarded Charter damages for blatant violations of their Charter rights, the sum is not always commensurate
with the degree of the infringement. Courts still seem focused on compensation as the overarching objective
of the remedy. Vindication and deterrence are often secondary considerations, save for exceptional cases.529
To meaningfully vindicate rights, deter unconstitutional state conduct, and help the Charter damages
remedy progress, damages awards should be higher.

The second theme illuminated in Chapter Three is that the Khadr civil claim is decidedly complex.
Even though some commentators portray Khadr’s likelihood of obtaining a damages award as inevitable,
the claim contains a unique mix of factors that a court has never confronted in the Charter damages context.
Predicting how the Ward framework would be applied to decisions made under a prerogative power is
helpful to understand how far the remedial arm of the Charter can go to protect fundamental guarantees.
This analysis may also be of assistance in future cases involving Canadian complicity in a foreign power’s
mistreatment of detained citizens or Charter damages claims relating to prerogative-based decisions.
Working through the possible stumbling blocks in the Khadr case – concerning Crown prerogative,
causation and blameworthiness, institutional competence, and the applicability of a state immunity –
exposes issues with the Ward framework and how it is being applied. Ward is capable of providing
meaningful relief to claimants, but it can be hindered by its preoccupation with interest-balancing,530 its
reluctance to encourage large damages awards, its allowance of further state immunities to be recognized,
and its lack of emphasis on the vindication and deterrence objectives that arguably separate Charter
damages from private law damages.

This chapter contains a step-by-step application of the first three stages of the Ward framework to
the known facts of the Khadr civil claim. In Part I, I discuss the first step: the claimant’s burden of
establishing that a Charter breach occurred. The Supreme Court of Canada found on two separate occasions
529
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that Khadr’s section 7 Charter rights were breached. I briefly review these findings and discuss additional
Canadian actions that either (a) aggravated the harm Khadr suffered; or (b) amounted to a further breach of
Khadr’s Charter rights.
In Part II, I analyze the functional justifications for Charter damages in Khadr’s circumstances.
Although the SCC described compensation as the primary objective of the Charter damages remedy, there
are compelling vindicatory and deterrent goals that should be promoted in Khadr’s case.
In Part III, I discuss countervailing factors. There are potential obstacles for Khadr’s Charter
damages claim at this stage of the Ward inquiry as the burden shifts to the state to show why damages might
be inappropriate. Khadr could face issues relating to both countervailing factors identified in Ward: the
suitability of alternative remedies (such as a declaration or private law damages) and possible threats to
good governance (such as excessive interference with prerogative decision-making).

A further issue arises at the countervailing factors stage. If genuine concerns about good
governance are evident, a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim could create a new limited immunity for
decisions made under Crown prerogative. This would require that the state must commit some type of fault
before it is liable for Charter damages. I discuss this issue in Part III of this chapter, arguing that it is
inappropriate to create such an immunity based on the extraordinary facts of the Khadr case.
Despite concerns that could be raised by the state at the countervailing factors stage, Khadr’s
Charter damages claim should survive the third step of the Ward inquiry and proceed to the final stage of
quantification. Although private law damages might be able to provide personal compensation for Khadr,
I argue that they are insufficient to properly vindicate and deter the egregious constitutional wrongs that
occurred. I also show that good governance concerns related to chilling decision-making discretion in the
foreign affairs sphere are unfounded. A court ordering Charter damages to Khadr would not be directing
the executive to exercise the foreign affairs prerogative in a specific way. The damages award would be
minimally intrusive, designed to meaningfully respond to proven constitutional violations. The compelling
justifications I outline in Part II of this chapter, particularly with regard to the objects of vindication and
deterrence, should outweigh any apprehension raised by countervailing factors.
I review the factors which would influence quantification – the fourth and final stage of the Ward
inquiry – in Chapter Five. Quantification of damages in a novel case like Khadr’s is a complicated
endeavour in need of detailed analysis. The most relevant cases that could shape the quantification of
- 72 -

Charter damages in Khadr’s case come from wrongful conviction jurisprudence (including Henry BCSC)
and previous settlements paid to Canadians who were detained and tortured abroad. These cases, along with
applicable damages principles from private law, are discussed in the next chapter. I argue that, because of
the extraordinary facts in the Khadr case, a court should draw from all relevant sources in crafting an
appropriate and just award.

PART I: DEFINING THE CHARTER BREACH
The first step of the Ward framework requires the claimant to demonstrate that a Charter breach
occurred.531 Ward did not impose any kind of fault threshold at this stage.532 The state conduct at issue does
not have to rise above a certain level of severity for a damages claim to be advanced. The claimant bears
the burden of showing that a Charter infringement occurred; nothing more is required.
In 2008, the SCC determined that Canada’s refusal to disclose Guantánamo interview records to
Khadr amounted to a section 7 breach.533 The appropriate remedy was to order the government to produce
unredacted copies of all information relevant to Khadr’s charges, which would be reviewed by a judge for
privilege or public interest immunity.534 In 2010, the SCC found that Canada’s decision to interview the
teenaged Khadr in 2003 and 2004 and share intelligence with the US amounted to a continuing breach of
section 7.535 The Court concluded that the appropriate remedy was a declaration of unconstitutionality. The
declaration acknowledged that Canada’s active participation in the Guantánamo regime “contributed to Mr.
Khadr’s ongoing detention”,536 violating his rights to liberty and security of the person.
It is possible the state could argue that res judicata or issue estoppel537 should bar a court’s
consideration of a further remedy under subsection 24(1) of the Charter because constitutional remedies
were previously ordered. It is important to note, however, that the SCC never considered the suitability of
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Charter damages in 2008 or 2010. These decisions focused squarely on disclosure and repatriation requests
sought through judicial review. Further, neither previous remedy meaningfully addressed the extent of
Canada’s role in Khadr’s harm. It cannot be said that the question before a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim
would be the same as it was in 2008 or 2010. Even if a court found merit to res judicata or issue estoppel
arguments in relation to the previous violations, I argue that there are other potential sources of rights
breaches upon which Khadr’s Charter damages entitlement can be grounded.

As discussed in Chapter Three, the SCC limited the scope of the 2008 and 2010 Charter breaches
to the consequences flowing from the CSIS and DFAIT interviews and the subsequent information sharing.
Although the Court concluded that Canadian officials actively participated in an illegal process that
deprived Khadr of his human rights, the SCC emphasized that the US was the principal architect of the
rights deprivation.538 At no point did the Court question the non-interventionist stance of successive
Canadian governments or their repeated failure to provide any kind of protection to Khadr as a juvenile.
Macklin noted that Khadr SCC 2010 did not discuss Canadian complicity in the US’s actions.539
Instead, Canada’s role was framed as that of a limited participant. In Macklin’s view, this avoidance of the
real issue (Canadian complicity in Khadr’s mistreatment), was “the fundamental issue lying at the heart of
[the] case.”540 Depending on the kind of evidence produced in Khadr’s civil claim and the justiciability of
the issues,541 a court could have found additional Charter breaches. These potential further violations are
discussed below.
Canada’s Complicity in Khadr’s Detention and Mistreatment
The Khadr claim alleged that the Canadian government clearly knew about the abuse occurring at
Guantánamo and the harm that had befallen Khadr.542 Mining a youth suspect for intelligence (rather than
attempting to protect him from further mistreatment) amounted to Canada’s knowing participation in an
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illegal regime.543 Khadr made the same arguments about Canada’s complicity at the Supreme Court of
Canada in 2010. In his factum, Khadr argued that Canada’s decision to proceed with the 2004 interview,
despite its knowledge that Khadr had been sleep deprived, triggered Canadian complicity in breaches of
international law.544
The SCC did not address Canada’s alleged complicity in Khadr’s torture or mistreatment in 2008
or 2010, so this issue is likely justiciable. The state could again raise arguments based on res judicata or
issue estoppel, but these are unlikely to succeed. There has never been proper judicial analysis of this issue,
let alone a final decision. The SCC did not draw any direct conclusions about Khadr’s personal experiences
at Bagram or Guantánamo except with regard to the sleep deprivation techniques used by the US prior to
the 2004 interview.545 If a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim received evidence about the complicity issue
and the conditions at Guantánamo, it should be free to make its own findings about the nature of Khadr’s
detention, his allegations of torture and mistreatment, and Canada’s involvement.

Although Canada may not have directly inflicted harm on Khadr while he was detained at
Guantánamo, the government became implicated in Khadr’s mistreatment beginning in February 2003 with
the first interview. Section 7 case law has established that Canada cannot escape liability under the Charter
because a third party commits the violative acts.546 The SCC already found in 2010 that Canada’s sharing
of information with the US contributed to Khadr’s continued detention.547 If a court hearing Khadr’s civil
claim made specific findings about the detention conditions and torture allegations in Khadr’s case, Canada
could be implicated in a further, even more profound breach of Khadr’s section 7 interests.
The SCC also did not consider Canada’s obligations under international treaties in 2008 and 2010.
In 2009, Justice O’Reilly of the Federal Court reviewed the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(“CRC”), and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
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Children in Armed Conflict (“Optional Protocol”).548 Justice O’Reilly found that Canada had duties and
responsibilities under these treaties which were ignored.549 Specific findings were made with respect to
Khadr’s status as a child soldier under the Optional Protocol:
Clearly, Canada was obliged to recognize that Mr. Khadr, being a child, was vulnerable
to being caught up in armed conflict as a result of his personal and social circumstances
in 2002 and before. It cannot resile from its recognition of the need to protect minors,
like Mr. Khadr, who are drawn into hostilities before they can apply mature judgment
to the choices they face.550
The 2009 Federal Court of Appeal judgment also discussed these international obligations. It was therefore
striking that none of the treaties were cited in Khadr SCC 2010, especially given Khadr’s age and level of
vulnerability. If a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim confronted the question of Canadian complicity in
Khadr’s torture and mistreatment, it is expected that these treaties would be reviewed and Canada’s
behaviour would fall dramatically short of acceptable standards.

Even if a court chose not to engage with the complicity issue (which would be difficult to avoid given
Khadr’s conspiracy claim), it should address Canada’s conduct following the SCC’s declaration of
unconstitutionality in Khadr SCC 2010. Canada’s decisions after this judgment are critical. The Harper
government’s continued stance of non-intervention arguably contributed to Khadr’s decision to plead guilty.
The delay in processing Khadr’s transfer back to Canada and the decision to house him in maximum security
facilities also contributed to the harm he suffered. These decisions aggravated the baseline level of harm Khadr
experienced as a result of indefinite detention, abuse, and isolation. Instead of working to meaningfully remedy
a continuing Charter breach and mitigate Khadr’s suffering, Canada’s behaviour caused further damage.

The Lack of Meaningful Response to Khadr SCC 2010
The Harper government did not change its position with respect to Khadr’s repatriation in light of
a declaration from the highest court in Canada that Khadr’s rights had been violated. The only action taken
by the Harper government was to send the aforementioned diplomatic note to the US.551 The muted
Canadian response to Khadr SCC 2010, combined with Khadr’s lack of success in the follow-up litigation,
undoubtedly influenced his decision to plead guilty before the military commission in October 2010.

Although the executive branch must comply with judicial orders, the SCC did not order the
548
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executive to take any specific action in 2010. The Court’s decision to grant Khadr a declaration was
designed to “provide the legal framework for the executive to exercise its functions and to consider what
actions to take in respect of Mr. Khadr, in conformity with the Charter.”552 Following the 2010 ruling, the
Harper government did not make any statements or give any assurances that it would repatriate Khadr.
Communications to the media emphasized that the decision not to repatriate Khadr had not changed.553

The limited action taken by the Harper government following Khadr SCC 2010 was scrutinized in
Khadr FC 2010, released in July 2010. Although this decision was stayed by the Federal Court of Appeal,
it contained some significant findings. One of Justice Zinn’s most striking conclusions was that the
existence of an ongoing Charter breach “impose[d] on Canada a duty to intervene by diplomatic or other
means to cure the breach if possible and, if it is not possible to cure it, to attempt to ameliorate it.”554 Justice
Zinn found that the 2010 SCC declaration gave Khadr a legitimate expectation555 that Canada would do
something to cure the breach. Khadr was entitled to receive a degree of procedural fairness and natural
justice as the executive branch determined what action to take.556 In granting a stay of Justice Zinn’s
decision, the Federal Court of Appeal found that he exceeded his discretion in an area “where the Supreme
Court has recognized its limited role”.557
Given the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision to stay Justice Zinn’s judgment, it is questionable
whether a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim would find that the lack of meaningful action taken by the
government after Khadr SCC 2010 triggered another violation of the Charter. Although the state left an
existing Charter breach unremedied, it did not defy a court order or misrepresent itself. Khadr SCC 2010
showed considerable deference toward the executive branch’s discretion over foreign affairs and the
government was not compelled to take specific action. It is critical to note, however, that Canada’s inaction
presumably influenced Khadr’s decision-making as his military commission trial proceeded. His
receptiveness to a guilty plea (and an eight year prison sentence) was likely coloured by Canada’s
behaviour.558 At the very least, Canada’s conduct aggravated harm Khadr experienced from an ongoing
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Charter violation that was never remedied. This should influence the quantification of vindication and
deterrence-based Charter damages, which evaluate the seriousness of the state conduct and its impact on
the claimant.
The Delay in Implementing Khadr’s Transfer to Canada
The transfer portion of Khadr’s plea deal suffered from many delays. Even though he was eligible
for transfer to Canada in November 2011, Khadr was not repatriated until September 2012. In July 2012,
Khadr’s Canadian legal team applied for judicial review of Public Safety Minister Vic Toews’s delay in
processing Khadr’s transfer application.559 The government’s responding affidavit in September 2012
provided two reasons for the delay: first, the transfer was not approved by the US until April 2012; and
second, Toews had requested sealed videos of psychiatric assessments done on Khadr.560 Although Khadr’s
transfer had been processed by the Canadian Correctional Service and the file was sent to Toews in
November 2011, it was not accepted by the minister’s office at that time. This was based on a policy that
transfer applications from prisoners in the US were not considered until the US had indicated its approval.561
Khadr’s transfer to Canada took place under the International Transfer of Offenders Act562
(“ITOA”). The ITOA requires that the detainee, the detaining country, and the receiving country consent
to the transfer.563 The statute does not appear to prevent the receiving country from beginning to process
the transfer until consent from the detaining state is given. The US’s consent should not have been in doubt
given the terms of the plea agreement. Upon taking office in January 2009, former US President Barack
Obama issued an executive order requiring the closure of Guantánamo. Although this goal was hindered
by many factors (including congressional opposition and difficulty persuading foreign states to accept
detainee resettlement plans), the Guantánamo inmate population dropped from 240 to 45 by the end of
Obama’s second term.564

Once Toews received the completed transfer application from the US in April 2012, it still took
five months to repatriate Khadr back to Canada. As stated above, Toews was preoccupied with viewing
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psychiatric assessments of Khadr which were conducted on behalf of the military commission prosecution
in 2010. Toews believed these assessments would help him determine if Khadr posed a threat to Canadian
national security.565 The videos were sealed and therefore difficult to obtain, but Toews insisted that
unedited versions of the footage were necessary.566 Toews did not receive the videos until early September
2012, adding several months to the delayed repatriation timeline.
Although Khadr’s legal team challenged Toews’s handling of the transfer in 2012, no decision
appears to have been made with respect to that judicial review application. It was likely abandoned after
Khadr was repatriated to Canada in September 2012. If no final decision was made on this issue, a court
hearing Khadr’s civil claim could make findings about the delay and whether it was reasonable.567 To find
a breach of the Charter, the state’s delay must have caused prejudice or harm to the claimant.568
There are no facts pleaded in Khadr’s civil claim suggesting that he suffered particular harm while
his transfer was being processed. The torment of continued detention, however, (and its impact on Khadr’s
mental and physical health) persisted. The delay also meant that Khadr spent more time incarcerated
without access to appropriate rehabilitation. In July 2012, the United Nations Special Representative for
Children and Armed Conflict insisted that the transfer be implemented so Khadr could return to Canada for
“proper reintegration”.569 Even though the US was at least partially responsible for the delay,570 the US was
not the party tasked with remedying the breach of Khadr’s Charter rights. Canada’s role in prolonging
Khadr’s Guantánamo ordeal in the face of a constitutional violation intensified the continuing harmful
effects of his detention. It is open to a court to find that this delay constituted a further Charter breach.
Khadr’s Experience with Solitary Confinement in Canada
Ryan Liss explained that, when Khadr was ultimately repatriated to Canada in September 2012,
Canada’s obligation under the Optional Protocol to “provide appropriate assistance to ensure the recovery
and reintegration of former child soldiers within its jurisdiction”571 was triggered. Sniderman argued that,
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once Khadr was under Canadian control, the government could have remedied the 2010 Charter breach by
“annul[ing] Khadr’s conviction”.572 Although controversial, this decision “would have terminated the
connection between unconstitutionally obtained evidence and Khadr’s section 7 rights violation.”573
Instead, Canada housed Khadr in a maximum security facility where he spent months in segregation.574
This decision was based on a flawed reading of the ITOA and Khadr’s inmate status.

Section 20 of the ITOA stipulates that an offender who was a youth at the time he or she committed
the offence, whose foreign sentence could have been a youth sentence in Canada, and who was at least
twenty years old at the time of the transfer, is to be detained in a provincial jail.575 The Canadian government
treated Khadr’s eight year sentence for multiple crimes as consecutive sentences, which justified his
detention in a federal institution. Khadr’s lawyers fought the government’s determination, arguing that the
ITOA required his sentence to be served in a provincial facility. In 2014, the Alberta Court of Appeal found
Canada’s interpretation of the ITOA was “wrong in law”576 and the Court granted Khadr’s habeas corpus
application to be transferred to a provincial facility. This decision was upheld by the Supreme Court of
Canada in 2015.577
In a statement to the media, Khadr’s lawyer explained that Khadr spent the first seven months of
his incarceration in Canada in solitary confinement.578 He was allegedly placed in solitary confinement due
to threats from another inmate.579 Khadr could argue that the government’s erroneous decision threatened
his physical and psychological security, causing further harm. Khadr’s civil claim mentioned his previous
exposure to isolation and solitary confinement in Guantánamo.580 The use of these practices at Guantánamo
is well documented.581
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Recent judicial decisions struck down sections of federal corrections legislation which authorized
administrative segregation,582 a practice akin to solitary confinement. Inmates subjected to this treatment
were entitled to Charter damages awards in the Brazeau583 and Reddock584 class actions. It is clear from
these cases that the profoundly damaging effects of solitary confinement are being acknowledged. The
Ontario Court of Appeal recognized that “[t]he distinguishing feature of solitary confinement is the
elimination of meaningful social interaction or stimulus. It has the potential to cause serious harm which
could be permanent.”585 The Canadian government’s decision to place Khadr in a maximum security facility
with dangerous inmates, despite his history of torture and mistreatment, was highly questionable. The
decision was even more striking given that breaches of Khadr’s constitutional rights were left unremedied.
To trigger a breach of the Charter, Khadr would have to show that the government’s decision to
incarcerate him in maximum security facilities violated his section 7 rights to liberty and/or security of the
person. Given the recent developments in the solitary confinement case law, Khadr has a foothold to argue
that his exposure to solitary confinement in Canada caused further harm to his already fragile mental state.
Although it does not appear that Khadr was diagnosed with a psychological condition at the time of his
repatriation, it can be presumed that ten years of indefinite detention and abuse would have exacted a toll
on his mental health. Further, Khadr can argue that, based on a proper interpretation of his sentence and the
ITOA, he should not have been placed in a maximum security facility in the first place. A causal link is
present between the government’s decision-making and the further harm Khadr suffered.

Khadr satisfies the first step of the Ward framework. Charter breaches were established in 2008
and 2010 and although remedies were ordered (disclosure of records in 2008 and a declaration of
unconstitutionality in 2010), the full extent of Canada’s role in violating Khadr’s rights was never
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meaningfully addressed. The SCC’s analyses in 2008 and 2010 were confined to disclosure and repatriation.
Further, the discussion in the preceding paragraphs shows that a court could find additional breaches of
Khadr’s rights after the 2010 SCC decision depending on how far the court is willing to take the analysis.
It is probable that the government’s conduct following Khadr SCC 2010 would be discussed in any
fault analysis that could take place at the countervailing factors stage of the Ward inquiry. The lack of
meaningful steps taken to remedy a serious constitutional breach, the delay in repatriating Khadr, and
Khadr’s exposure to further solitary confinement in Canadian prison show that the state disregarded
Khadr’s Charter rights and the importance of protecting those rights. This behaviour should also support a
higher vindication and deterrence-based damages award at the quantification stage. In the following section,
I move on to the second step of the Ward framework: showing that compensation, vindication, and
deterrence-based Charter damages are functionally justified.

PART II: THE FUNCTIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR CHARTER DAMAGES
After a Charter breach has been established, the second step of the Ward framework requires that
the claimant demonstrate why Charter damages are functionally justified.586 The damages award must serve
a purpose: to compensate the claimant, vindicate Charter rights, and/or deter offensive state conduct.587
There are compelling justifications for damages based on all three objectives in the Khadr case.

Compensation
The SCC emphasized in Ward that compensation is “usually the most prominent function”588 of
Charter damages designed to remedy personal loss stemming from the Charter breach. The loss does not
have to be physical or pecuniary; psychological harm is included.589 The Court noted that distinct harms
caused by Charter breaches, such as “distress, humiliation, embarrassment, and anxiety”590 should be
evaluated. The goal of compensatory damages is corrective: to restore the claimant to the position he or she
enjoyed prior to the Charter breach.591 Though this is difficult to do for Khadr, compensatory damages
should still be ordered to acknowledge and address his personal suffering.

Khadr experienced life-altering personal losses during his imprisonment at Guantánamo. He was
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deprived of his liberty for over ten years and denied access to counsel, education, employment,
socialization, and family. He alleged he was tortured on multiple occasions, mistreated, and routinely
interrogated. Although he ultimately pleaded guilty to war crimes in 2010, Khadr insisted that this decision
was made under duress because it was the only way to secure his eventual release.592 The physical and
psychological harm resulting from these experiences and lost opportunities is immense. If the Khadr civil
claim had not settled in 2017, Khadr would not have received any form of compensation from the
Government of Canada for its role in his ordeal.

To award compensatory Charter damages, a causal link must be present between the Charter
violation and the claimant’s loss.593 The typical causal standard used in private law injury cases is the ‘but
for’ test. Applied in the context of Charter damages, this test would require that the plaintiff’s harm would
not have occurred but for the violative state conduct.594 Although the SCC majority endorsed this standard
for Charter damages claims relating to wrongful non-disclosure in Henry SCC, the Court noted that the test
could “be modified in situations involving multiple alleged wrongdoers.”595 The majority used an example
where a wrongful conviction could stem from failures by police and the Crown. This situation would only
require the claimant to prove that the conduct at issue “materially contributed to the harm suffered”.596

In 1984, Pilkington suggested that strict application of private law standards of causation could
compromise a court’s ability to provide appropriate constitutional remedies to claimants.597 She argued that
Tests of causation, designed to achieve the compensatory purposes of common law tort,
should not be applied to constitutional wrongs without assessing their efficacy as a
means of effectuating constitutional policy.598
The root of Pilkington’s concern was that applying causation requirements to determine the extent of
compensatory relief could obscure the necessity of providing redress for the constitutional infringement.
Her underlying view was that the profound effect of the Charter breach itself was deserving of
compensation regardless of any corresponding loss.599 Adourian advanced a similar view, arguing that
“[r]equiring elements of harm and causation shifts the focus from the constitutional injury to meandering
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inquiries about compensable harm.”600

Applying the but for test to assess compensatory Charter damages in the Khadr case is
inappropriate. It would be very difficult for Khadr to prove that the harm he suffered from prolonged
detention would not have occurred without Canada’s breaches of the Charter. The SCC’s description of the
US as the “primary source”601 of Khadr’s deprivation in 2010 illustrates the complexity of this issue.
Applying the but for standard to the Khadr case could produce the result Pilkington described above:
focusing too much on clear causal connections at the expense of addressing a serious breach of
constitutional rights. A more fitting causal standard for the Khadr case would be the material contribution
test mentioned by the majority in Henry SCC. This reflects the reality that two state actors were involved
in Khadr’s detention and mistreatment.
Based on the findings in Khadr SCC 2010, a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim should have no
difficulty concluding that Canada’s actions materially contributed to the harm Khadr suffered. Canadian
liability under the Charter was triggered by the 2003 and 2004 interviews, which were required to be taped
and shared with the US. The Court noted in Khadr SCC 2010 that “[t]he record suggests that the interviews
conducted by CSIS and DFAIT provided significant evidence in relation to [the] charges.”602 Canada did
not attempt to control how this information would be used by the US. The Court inferred “that the
statements taken by Canadian officials [were] contributing to the continued detention of Mr. Khadr, thereby
impacting his liberty and security interests.”603

Although Canada was not the party directly responsible for inflicting harm on Khadr at
Guantánamo, the Canadian government was inextricably linked to Khadr’s suffering because of its
conscious decision to become involved in his Guantánamo prosecution, which ended in a guilty plea. Any
kind of participatory role in the indefinite detention and abuse of a youth prisoner (in a regime widely
viewed as illegal under international law) should satisfy the material contribution test and provide
functional justification for compensatory Charter damages.
As outlined in Part I of this chapter, Canada’s actions following Khadr SCC 2010 should be
addressed by a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim. A court could find that further Charter breaches resulted
from the Canadian government’s lack of response to the SCC declaration in 2010, the delay in repatriating
600
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Khadr to Canada, and the decision to hold him in maximum security facilities. The causal link between
Canada’s actions and the continued harm Khadr likely suffered is more direct in these instances, especially
after Khadr was transferred back to Canada in 2012. If a court found that additional violations of the Charter
occurred after 2010, further compensatory damages would be functionally justified.

Vindication
The SCC described the vindication objective of Charter damages as “affirming constitutional
values”

604

and “focus[ing] on the harm the infringement causes society.”605 Vindication is not concerned

solely with the impact of the breach on the claimant; it attempts to remedy a loss of public confidence in
the effectiveness of constitutional guarantees.606

Roach noted that the influence of causation on vindication or deterrence-based Charter damages is
less clear.607 The concurring judgment of Chief Justice McLachlin (as she then was) and Justice
Karakatsanis in Henry SCC concluded that the Ward framework did not require a causal connection to
award vindication or deterrence-based damages.608 Roach argued that a causation requirement for
vindication and deterrence was inappropriate “because the purposes of Charter damages go beyond the task
of attempting to restore applicants to the position that they would have occupied but for the Charter
violation”.609 Vindication or deterrence-based damages “are concerned with vindicating the Charter as
supreme law and deterring its violation.”610 The infringement itself causes harm. The vindication and
deterrence objectives focus on the impact of the constitutional breach on Canadian society; the analysis
shifts from the claimant to broader concerns. Imposing any kind of causation requirement for vindication
or deterrence-based damages would therefore be improper.
The Charter breaches in Khadr’s case arose from section 7, which is a core guarantee protecting
fundamental entitlements to life, liberty, and security of the person. State interference with these rights is
significant. The section 7 breaches of Khadr’s rights stemmed from conduct that would be considered
appalling if it occurred in Canada:
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Canadian officials questioned Mr. Khadr on matters that may have provided important
evidence relating to his criminal proceedings, in circumstances where they knew that
Mr. Khadr was being indefinitely detained, was a young person and was alone during
the interrogations. Further, the March 2004 interview, where Mr. Khadr refused to
answer questions, was conducted knowing that Mr. Khadr had been subjected to three
weeks of scheduled sleep deprivation, a measure described by the U.S. Military
Commission…as designed to “make [detainees] more compliant and break down their
resistance to interrogation”.611
Canada’s decisions to interrogate a youth suspect detained under extremely controversial conditions – and
share the fruits of that interrogation – inflicted harm on the integrity of Charter guarantees. The advocacy
efforts discussed in Chapter Three are evidence of the domestic backlash that ensued in response to
Canada’s behaviour.
In Brazeau, the Ontario Superior Court commented on the federal government’s failure to
acknowledge decades of research and recommendations that had been made with regard to ending solitary
confinement for prisoners suffering from mental illness.612 This intransigence helped justify Charter
damages to vindicate the rights of the claimants.613 In the Khadr case, Canada adopted an unwavering stance
of non-intervention even after the SCC found it had breached Khadr’s Charter rights. Canada’s refusal to
publicly recognize valid arguments about Khadr’s status as a child soldier (and his need for protection and
rehabilitation) provides further support for a vindication-based damages award. The federal government’s
attitude of indifference implied that it was unwilling to defend Charter guarantees and give meaning to
Charter remedies. A “collective lack of concern”614 for a claimant’s Charter rights justified vindication and
deterrence-based damages in Carr v Ottawa Police Services Board.615

Awarding vindication-based Charter damages would further support the notion that Charter
guarantees must be upheld when they are engaged by Canada’s actions in foreign countries. It is important
to emphasize that the existing breaches of Khadr’s Charter rights were triggered by interviews that took
place outside of Canada. The Charter has been interpreted to apply only within Canada, subject to narrow
exceptions.616 The SCC found that the Charter applied to Canadian officials in Cuba in 2008 and 2010
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because of their active participation in an illegal regime.617 The state could not evade its constitutional
responsibilities just because the activities in question occurred outside Canada. Vindication-based Charter
damages would affirm that the state will be held to constitutional account where Charter-protected interests
are violated, regardless of territorial boundaries.

Deterrence
A deterrence-based Charter damages award “seeks to regulate government behaviour…in order to
achieve compliance with the Constitution.”618 The deterrence function is forward-looking, targeting future
state action. It is similar to the vindication objective because it is also concerned with “public faith in the
efficacy of constitutional protection.”619 Due to this connection, vindication and deterrence are sometimes
discussed together in the Charter damages jurisprudence.

Deterrence-based damages serve powerful functions in the Khadr case. The Canadian government
chose to become involved in an illegal process that violated a minor’s human rights. Despite its contributory
role in Khadr’s continuing detention, Canada steadfastly refused to intervene on his behalf. Canadians also
interviewed Khadr in 2004 with knowledge that he had been subjected to extensive sleep deprivation.620
Khadr was seventeen years old at the time of this interview, which meant that he was still classified as a
child under the CRC.621 Although the Court did not refer to sleep deprivation as torture in 2010, the practice
meets the definition of torture laid out in the CAT.622 Canada’s behaviour effectively condoned this
exercise, which provides strong justification for deterrence-based damages.
A deterrence-based damages award would also address the government’s unresponsiveness to what
the Court described as a continuing Charter violation in Khadr SCC 2010.623 This inaction signalled that
the government felt it was unnecessary to work toward implementing a meaningful remedy. The
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government’s indifference to a declaration from Canada’s highest court was worrisome, raising legitimate
concerns about the rule of law and the effectiveness of Charter remedies. A deterrence-based damages
award would show that judicial declarations of unconstitutionality must always be taken seriously by the
state and that inaction is not an appropriate response.

As I discuss the third step of the Ward framework in Part III, the evidentiary burden shifts from the
claimant to the state. The government is given the opportunity to show why Charter damages are
inappropriate at the countervailing factors stage. The following section demonstrates that there are
potentially significant countervailing considerations at play in the Khadr case. I work through these issues
and ultimately argue that none of them are powerful enough to outweigh the compelling functional
justifications outlined above.

PART III: THE INFLUENCE OF COUNTERVAILING FACTORS
The third stage of the Ward framework gives the state the ability to defeat a Charter damages claim
or limit a claimant’s entitlement to damages. Ward outlined two countervailing factors that could affect the
damages award: “the existence of alternative remedies and concerns for good governance.”624 The
discussion of alternative remedies is rooted in functionalism. The Court wanted to avoid the prospect of
awarding damages in tort and under the Charter if the latter award would be duplicative. If the state can
show private law damages or some other remedial option (like a declaration) accomplish compensatory,
vindicatory, or deterrent functions, Charter damages may be deemed unnecessary.625

Good governance is a more nebulous concept. The concern behind this countervailing factor is that
Charter damages could negatively affect the proper functioning of government, unduly constrain the
actions of state officials, or hinder the development of certain programs or policies. These consequences
are commonly referred to as the potential “chilling effect”626 of Charter damages. If the government can
show that a Charter damages award would produce this result, it could defeat the claim.

The state can also argue that, where compelling good governance issues are raised, it should only
be held liable for conduct that “meets a minimum threshold of gravity.”627 This permits the creation of new
defences or immunities to Charter damages claims (similar to Mackin) which impose a certain fault
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requirement. Ward did not offer much guidance on this issue. The Court stated that the applicable fault
threshold would vary depending on the nature of the claim.628

The SCC devoted considerable time to the countervailing factors analysis in Henry SCC and Ernst.
The Court was fractured in these decisions as it defined the parameters of state liability for Charter damages
in two specific contexts. The majority decisions have been criticized for complicating the Ward framework
and potentially discouraging reliance on the Charter damages remedy.629 The Court was heavily influenced
by good governance concerns in both cases, which led to the imposition of a high threshold fault
requirement for Charter damages claims relating to prosecutorial misconduct in Henry SCC and the
creation of an absolute immunity for Charter damages claims against a regulatory board in Ernst.
The majority decision in Henry SCC described good governance as “a compendious term for the
policy factors that will justify restricting the state’s exposure to civil liability.” 630 The majority was
concerned that a low fault threshold for Charter damages in the area of prosecutorial misconduct could
affect “the ability of prosecutors to discharge their important public duties”,631 causing “adverse
consequences for the administration of justice.”632 Specifically, the majority feared that a tidal wave of
Charter damages claims could be brought for improper disclosure if the fault standard were too low.633
Further, a low standard could result in “defensive lawyering”,634 where prosecutors would face constant
fear of liability. These concerns justified the majority’s decision to modify the Ward framework by
requiring the claimant to prove a high degree of fault at the first stage of the test.635

In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice McLachlin (as she then was) and Justice Karakatsanis
focused on disclosure as a legal obligation under the Charter rather than a matter of prosecutorial
discretion.636 Consequently, there was no need to impose a fault requirement in this area.637 The majority’s
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preoccupation with countervailing factors did not resonate with the concurring justices, who found that
allowing Henry’s claim to proceed was the just outcome. The concurring justices noted that Henry could
be denied a remedy for a profound violation of his constitutional rights if the Charter damages claim was
not allowed to continue.638 The concurrence stressed that Henry only needed to show a Charter breach was
present (step one of Ward) and that Charter damages were functionally justified (step two).639

Henry SCC showed how good governance concerns can overshadow a meritorious claim. Brooke
Mackenzie argued that the majority decision “veered off track…when it allowed policy concerns to steer it
away from the Ward framework, rather than addressing those policy considerations within the
framework.”640 The majority relied on good governance arguments to modify Ward and require claimants
alleging prosecutorial misconduct “to pre-emptively refute a possible countervailing consideration by
showing the Crown’s conduct was sufficiently serious”.641 By imposing a threshold fault requirement, the
Court inexplicably shifted what should be the state’s burden (at step three of Ward) to the claimant.642
Although the Henry SCC fault requirement was tailored to Charter damages cases involving Crown
disclosure, the judgment showed that the Ward framework was subject to revision and good governance
concerns could wield considerable influence.

Given that the state conduct at issue in the Khadr case was discretionary and it was afforded
considerable deference by the SCC in 2010, it is important to analyze whether Khadr’s Charter damages
claim would be limited by countervailing factors. In Part A of the following section, I discuss possible
alternative remedies available to Khadr. I then review potential good governance concerns that could
threaten the success of the Charter damages claim in Part B. Finally, I analyze in Part C whether good
governance concerns are sufficiently serious to warrant creation of a new immunity.

(A) Alternative Remedies
The SCC emphasized in Ward that an alternative remedy must “adequately meet the need for
compensation, vindication, and/or deterrence”.643 An alternative remedy will not be sufficient unless it
fulfills the required functional objectives. It is possible that private law damages might fulfill a
compensatory objective while Charter damages are still needed to vindicate Charter rights or deter
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egregious state conduct. A court is permitted to order tort and Charter damages if they are not duplicative.644

Other Remedial Options Under the Charter
Khadr sought a declaration in his civil claim in addition to tort and constitutional damages.645 The
state could argue that declaratory relief under subsection 24(1) of the Charter is the most appropriate
remedy due to the discretionary nature of executive decision-making in the Khadr case. This argument
should not succeed, however, because the 2010 declaration issued by the SCC did not facilitate any kind of
meaningful remedial action. It was unresponsive and ineffective. Khadr was not repatriated until 2012, and
only after he pleaded guilty to war crimes.
Further, the SCC noted in Ward that declaratory relief is most appropriate in situations “where the
claimant has suffered no personal damage.”646 Khadr suffered profound harm during his detention and a
declaration would not provide proper compensation, vindication, or deterrence. As discussed above, the
Canadian government’s actions toward Khadr undermined the integrity of the Charter. The rule of law was
also threatened by behaviour that implied the executive was beyond the reach of the judiciary. The
government largely ignored the 2010 declaration, so it clearly did not influence state behaviour. A truly
adequate remedy for Omar Khadr needs to be robust and impactful.

Private Law Damages
Khadr claimed that the Canadian government was liable for damages resulting from the torts of
negligent investigation, conspiracy, and misfeasance of public office.647 While Khadr could make some
convincing arguments to support his allegations, he faced considerable difficulty proving many of the
constituent elements.

(i)

Negligent Investigation
A successful claim for negligent investigation must show that the actions of police caused

compensable damage to the plaintiff which was causally connected to a breach of the duty of care that exists
between investigating police officers and suspects.648 The appropriate standard of care used to evaluate the
claim is based on “a reasonable police officer in similar circumstances.”649 For Khadr to succeed, a court
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hearing his claim would have to find that CSIS and DFAIT agents owed him a duty of care. Although
Canadian officials were engaged in a national security investigation when they interviewed Khadr, it is not
clear whether diplomatic or intelligence officials would be equated with police officers for the tort of
negligent investigation. The SCC emphasized in Khadr SCC 2010 that the purpose of the CSIS and DFAIT
interviews “was for intelligence gathering and not criminal investigation.”650

In a 2014 decision which granted Khadr leave to proceed with amendments to his civil statement
of claim,651 (“Khadr FC 2014”) the Federal Court acknowledged that determining whether a novel duty of
care exists between intelligence and diplomatic officers and terrorist suspects was a “live issue”.652 The
Court also noted that identifying the applicable standard to assess the behaviour of these officials could be
difficult, requiring “complex evidence to determine what amounts to reasonable conduct for diplomatic and
intelligence officers working on national security matters with foreign colleagues.”653

(ii)

Conspiracy
Conspiracy is a complicated tort to prove in Canada. The Court noted in Khadr FC 2014 that two

types of conspiracy exist in Canada: predominant purpose conspiracy and unlawful means conspiracy. 654
The former requires that
(1) the defendant entered into an agreement with one or more other parties; (2) the
defendant committed actions (either lawful or unlawful in themselves) pursuant to that
agreement, with the predominant purpose of causing injury to the plaintiff; and (3) the
plaintiff did in fact suffer loss caused by the defendant's conduct.655
Unlawful means conspiracy has two requirements which separate it from predominant purpose conspiracy:
(a) the defendant’s conduct must be unlawful; and (b) the defendant “knew or should have known that
injury to the plaintiff was likely to result”.656 Khadr pleaded both types of conspiracy in his civil claim.657

The conspiracy claims rest on the notion that Canada worked with the US to mine Khadr for
intelligence and keep him detained rather than provide protection in line with domestic and international
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obligations. As such, the claim alleged a conspiracy between states, which a Canadian court had not
recognized.658 Given that Canada’s goal in conducting the Guantánamo interviews was to gather
intelligence, it would be difficult for Khadr to prove that the predominant purpose of Canada’s actions
pursuant to the alleged conspiracy was to cause him injury.659

Khadr may have had stronger arguments with respect to the alleged unlawful means conspiracy,
although it was still very difficult to prove. Khadr could have relied on the 2008 and 2010 SCC findings to
establish that Canada’s participation in an illegal US regime was unlawful because it triggered violations
of the Charter. If a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim found that Canada was complicit in torture, this could
add another dimension to Khadr’s arguments. Given that Canadian officials knew Khadr had been
indefinitely detained and mistreated by the US yet chose to go ahead with intelligence-gathering interviews,
it is possible that a court could find Canada had the requisite knowledge that its unconstitutional actions
were likely to harm Khadr. Proving the existence of a conspiratorial agreement between Canada and the
US – the bedrock of the conspiracy claim – would, however, be quite challenging.

(iii)

Misfeasance of Public Office
To prove misfeasance of public office, a claimant must show that
(1) the defendant is a public official or a public body exercising its public functions; (2)
the defendant deliberately engaged in unlawful conduct in the exercise of those
functions; (3) the defendant acted either with the actual intention of harming the plaintiff
or with the constructive intention of harming the plaintiff (the public officer must have
been aware that the conduct was unlawful and that it was likely to harm the plaintiff);
and (4) the plaintiff suffered loss caused by the defendant's conduct…660

The tort clearly requires that the public official have some form of intent to injure the plaintiff. To succeed
with a misfeasance claim, the plaintiff must prove that the official “deliberately engage[d] in conduct that
he or she [knew] to be inconsistent with the obligations of the office.”661 Further, the plaintiff must prove
that the impugned conduct caused harm. As with Charter claims, a causal nexus is required.662
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Khadr could have encountered difficulty proving that Canadian officials knew their actions were
unlawful and designed to cause harm. It is not always clear when the Charter will apply in foreign countries
and Canadian agents may have viewed themselves as visitors subject to US law. Further, it was common
for Canada to share intelligence information with the US in the post-9/11 environment and Canada was
required to do so in order to access Khadr at Guantánamo.

Despite some cogent arguments that could be made, Khadr faced considerable difficulty meeting
the high thresholds required to prove the negligent investigation, conspiracy, and misfeasance allegations.
Even if he had been successful with these tort claims, I argue in the next section that private law damages
(on their own) would be insufficient to properly remedy the distinct type of harm Khadr experienced.

The Suitability of Private Law Damages
If Khadr were successful with one or more tort claims, a court must question whether private law
damages would adequately promote the compelling functional justifications for Charter damages in
Khadr’s case. I contend that private law damages are inadequate to fulfil the distinctive functions that
Charter damages would serve for Omar Khadr, the Charter, and Canadian society. It is possible that
aggravated and/or punitive damages could serve vindicatory and deterrent functions, but these types of
damages are only awarded in exceptional cases for egregious conduct. Aggravated damages, a type of
compensatory award, can be made to address behaviour that is “particularly high-handed or oppressive”663
that added to the plaintiff’s injury. Punitive damages, designed solely to punish the defendant, can be
ordered when the conduct is “so malicious, oppressive and high-handed that it offends the court’s sense of
decency.”664 The standards for awarding these types of damages are high.

As shown above, Khadr faced significant challenges proving the tort allegations in his civil claim.
Novel issues were raised by the claims which would have expanded state liability and stretched the existing
boundaries of certain torts. This would have been the case for the conspiracy claim (arising between two
states) and the negligent investigation claim (requiring the creation of a duty of care between intelligence
and diplomatic personnel and suspects accused of terrorism). Further, issues with proving causation and
meeting high fault thresholds could have posed additional problems.665
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It must be remembered that private law damages and constitutional damages serve distinct
purposes. Private law damages are designed to provide redress for the plaintiff’s harm that can be causally
attributed to the defendant. These damages are not concerned with enforcing constitutional guarantees or
“vindicating the social harm of the violation”.666 Although Ward emphasized that the dominant function of
Charter damages is to provide compensation,667 the Court’s acknowledgement of the vindication and
deterrence objectives should not be downplayed. The vindication and deterrence functions underscore the
public character of the Charter damages remedy. The harm caused by a serious Charter breach is not
confined to just the claimant. The vindication and deterrence objectives acknowledge that the violation
affects society, the constitutional framework, and the rule of law. It is therefore difficult to accept that
private law damages – focused squarely on the claimant and limited by causal standards, fault requirements,
and caps668 – would adequately address all of the different objectives damages should serve in one of the
most compelling constitutional cases of the last two decades.

As I argued in Chapter Two, Charter damages send a clear message when they are awarded. A
court can hold the state accountable for constitutional breaches using the framework of the Charter.
Imposing a constitutional remedy for a constitutional violation is symbolic, showing that the remedial
mechanism of the Charter is responsive and effective.669 Using only private law damages to remedy conduct
that has public consequences risks diluting the purpose and importance of subsection 24(1) of the Charter.
If private law damages are consistently ordered to provide redress for constitutional violations, the
legitimacy of the Charter damages remedy is threatened. Consequently, tort law may never provide a
complete remedy where serious constitutional infringements are present. Private law damages were not
created to respond to the kind of individual and societal harm that arises from constitutional wrongs; this is
why Ward acknowledged three broad remedial objectives that animate the Charter damages remedy.
The circumstances of the Khadr case – involving multiple constitutional breaches and a pattern of
neglect toward a vulnerable youth detainee – require a constitutional remedy to address the many forms of
harm that resulted from Canadian actions: to Khadr, to the Charter, and to Canadian society. Although it
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might be possible for Khadr to receive adequate personal compensation through private law damages, the
compelling vindicatory and deterrent functions should be addressed by a public law remedy focused
specifically on those goals.

(B) Good Governance Issues
As outlined in Chapters Two and Three, there are potential good governance issues that could be
raised by the state during the countervailing factors analysis. First, the influence of Crown prerogative must
be addressed. The state could argue that ordering Charter damages to remedy decision-making in the
foreign affairs sphere would chill the exercise of government discretion on matters of foreign policy and
diplomacy or trigger an influx of claims brought by Canadians detained abroad. Further, the state could
argue that, based on Khadr SCC 2010 and the follow-up litigation, ordering a large damages award in this
area would exceed a court’s institutional competence. Second, the government could raise concerns about
causation issues in the Khadr case. The state could argue that, because the US was the direct cause of
Khadr’s detention and mistreatment, Canada should not bear the sole responsibility of providing remedial
compensation. Finally, if a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim found that the state raised significant good
governance concerns, it could create a new limited immunity. The state would only become liable for
conduct rising above a certain fault threshold. These issues are analyzed below.

The Influence of Crown Prerogative
Much of the federal government’s decision-making in the Khadr case fell under the foreign affairs
prerogative because it concerned Canada’s relations with another state. This area has been afforded historic
deference based on the notion that it is inappropriate for the judiciary to review the substance of foreign
policy decisions or matters of diplomacy. In her concurring opinion in Operation Dismantle (the
foundational case establishing that prerogative decisions were reviewable by courts in limited
circumstances), Justice Wilson affirmed that it is improper for the judiciary to “second guess the
executive”.670 It was entirely appropriate, however, for a court to determine whether executive decisionmaking amounted to a constitutional breach.671 Justice Wilson referred to subsection 24(1) of the Charter,
acknowledging that the remedial provision compelled a competent court to address this issue.672

Although courts can review decisions made under Crown prerogative for compliance with the
Charter, Khadr SCC 2010 demonstrated that courts adopt a cautious approach to remedies. The SCC was
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concerned about its institutional competence to order the executive to exercise the prerogative power in a
particular way. Declaratory relief was much less intrusive than ordering the executive to seek Khadr’s
repatriation. In the follow-up litigation, Justice Zinn of the Federal Court attempted to hold the Harper
government to task for its failure to take remedial action in response to the SCC declaration. The judgment
was stayed by the Federal Court of Appeal on the basis that it strayed beyond the court’s institutional role.

Crown prerogative is in tension with fundamental principles of modern government. Jennifer
Klinck noted that the prerogative power “sits uncomfortably with contemporary conceptions of democratic
legitimacy and the rule of law.”673 Similarly, Lorne Sossin commented that arbitrary decision-making “for
which a public official cannot be held accountable represents an important erosion of some of the most
basic and fundamental tenets of our legal and political systems.”674 Philippe Lagassé argued that, while
prerogative powers may seem like a vestige of history, they have endured in Canada due to ambivalence
that exists between the three branches of government.675 In his view, the ambivalence is revealed through
imprecise parliamentary statute drafting and insistence from the SCC that explicit statutory wording is
necessary to displace or limit a prerogative power.676 Ambivalence is also apparent in the way courts have
approached remedies in this area. Lagassé argued that judicial remedies affecting prerogative powers have
been “cautious and sparse”,677 with Khadr SCC 2010 signalling that deference and ambivalence have
become more profound.678
It is expected that Crown prerogative would have some influence over the adjudication of Khadr’s
civil claim. Khadr SCC 2010 looms in the background as a reminder that courts should tread lightly in this
area. It is crucial to note, however, that the focus of a court’s remedial analysis in Khadr’s civil claim would
be on damages, not repatriation. This is a critical distinction. A court would not be second guessing policy
choices or ordering the government to perform a specific prerogative function; it would be requiring the
state to pay money based on the effects of decisions it already made. This should reduce a court’s reticence
to order an impactful remedy for an unconstitutional exercise of prerogative power.
Lawrence David’s research shows, however, that a new set of concerns emerge when courts
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consider whether to order remedies that involve public funds. David argued that deference was built in to
the Ward framework at the countervailing factors and quantification stages “precisely because resource
allocation will often be involved.”679 David believed that a court’s discretion “will be tempered by
deference”680 in cases where a claimant seeks a large damages award. The uninspiring state of the Charter
damages remedy, save for exceptional cases, lends support to David’s conclusion. I revisit this issue in the
fourth step of the Ward analysis – quantification of damages – in Chapter Five.

The federal government could argue that a large Charter damages award to remedy Charterinfringing conduct in the foreign affairs sphere would chill the exercise of executive discretion. The
majority in Henry SCC was fearful that a Charter damages award could compromise the ability of
prosecutors to perform their duties. It could also threaten the public interest if prosecutors were constantly
fearful of triggering civil liability.681 The majority acknowledged that Charter damages were awarded
against the state (not individuals), but this did not alleviate the good governance concerns.682
To limit Khadr’s Charter damages claim, the state could rely on Henry SCC to argue that similar
concerns would arise in the foreign affairs sphere. The government would likely stress that discretion is
essential in an area as delicate as state-to-state relations; that is why the foreign affairs prerogative continues
to exist. A large Charter damages award could affect or alter the way public officials perform certain
functions in this sensitive area, amounting to excessive interference with prerogative decision-making. The
strength of these arguments is diminished, however, by the existence of two previous SCC decisions that
established violations of a minor’s constitutional rights.683

Even though Crown prerogative is still protected by courts, it is unlikely to pose an insurmountable
hurdle to Khadr’s Charter damages entitlement. A court hearing Khadr’s civil claim would not be
compelling the government to exercise a prerogative power in a particular way nor would it be replacing a
government decision with a more suitable alternative. These were the issues that plagued the SCC in Khadr
SCC 2010. The question at this stage of the countervailing factors analysis is: what exactly is at risk of
being chilled by a large Charter damages award? In Mackin, the SCC was concerned that public officials
would become fearful of liability for performing duties under what was, at the time, valid legislation. This
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fear could then jeopardize the manner in which officials carried out their duties.684 Part of the majority’s
concern about good governance in Henry SCC was that a flurry of inconsequential Charter damages claims
could result from a fault standard that was set too low. This would divert prosecutors from their core
responsibilities and turn their focus to defending themselves against lawsuits.685

The number of potential claims that could be brought by Canadians in similar circumstances to
Khadr is much lower than potential claims relating to the effects of unconstitutional legislation (the concern
in Mackin) or Crown disclosure (the concern in Henry SCC). Fortunately, cases like Khadr’s are uncommon
and a Charter damages award would not encourage a deluge of similar claims to come forward. Although
there are many examples where Canadians have been detained abroad by a foreign regime, there are few
cases where the Canadian government actively breached the Charter rights of individuals held in foreign
detention. It is unlikely that a Charter damages award would trigger a serious shift in the behaviour of
public officials based on fear of prospective liability, nor would it prompt a diversion of focus resulting
from a tidal wave of potential claims.
Charter damages would promote good governance in Khadr’s case rather than pose any kind of
threat. A robust damages award would accomplish all of Ward’s objectives and it would send a strong
message about the necessity of Charter compliance. The SCC noted in Ward that adherence to the Charter
“is a foundational principle of good governance.”686 Interpreting this quote, Adourian maintained that “good
governance is a reason to comply with the Charter, not an excuse to breach it.”687 Even if a large Charter
damages award affected the behaviour of public officials in the foreign affairs sphere, it should not be
assumed that the effect would be negative. Damages could trigger a change in the way certain detainee
cases are handled, especially when the individual is a youth. The award would also emphasize that no
constitutional infringement, regardless of the realm in which it arises, should evade the remedial arm of the
Charter.

Causation
Throughout the Khadr litigation, the federal government repeatedly relied on causation issues to
limit its liability. Khadr was apprehended by the US, detained by the US, and abused by the US. The SCC
recognized in 2010 that the US was “the primary source of the deprivation of Mr. Khadr’s liberty and
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security of the person.”688 Canada could argue that, based on this finding, it should not be held liable for
damages resulting from actions taken by another state. Although the Court only defined two countervailing
factors in Ward, it acknowledged that these factors would develop along with the Charter damages case
law.689 It is therefore possible that a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim could treat causation as a
countervailing factor unique to this case.

The influence of causation is largely dependent on the Charter breaches relied on by a court hearing
Khadr’s claim. If a court confined itself to remedying the previous Charter breaches established by the
SCC in 2008 and 2010, causation could play a role. Although the SCC found Charter violations on two
occasions, the scope of government liability was relatively narrow. Canadian participation in an unlawful
American regime was what triggered the Charter and satisfied the required causal connection.690 Even
though Canadians interviewed Khadr under extremely controversial circumstances and shared intelligence
with the US, Canada could argue that it should not be held financially responsible to remedy harm that was
inflicted by the US. If a court found further Charter breaches relating to Canada’s conduct after Khadr SCC
2010, causation is less relevant because Canada had more direct control over Khadr.

Although it is possible that the Canadian government would try to exploit some causal issues in the
Khadr case to minimize its liability, it is unlikely that these arguments would threaten Khadr’s Charter
damages claim. The government’s involvement in Khadr’s case violated the Charter on at least two
occasions and it showed complete disregard for Khadr’s status as a minor. Canada agreed to play by US
rules to gain access to Khadr, effectively endorsing the illegal practices used at Guantánamo. Canadian
officials made informed choices to visit Guantánamo, interview Khadr, and share intelligence with their
US counterparts. These were not passive decisions. It is inappropriate for Canada to rely on causation
arguments to shield itself from liability at the countervailing factors stage when it willingly participated in
the violation of a teenager’s fundamental rights.

(C) Good Governance, Fault, and the Creation of an Immunity
As described in Chapters Two and Three, fault is a complicated part of the Charter damages
analysis after Ward. The SCC did not state that fault was required in Ward and the Court acknowledged
that the Charter breach was “the wrong on which the claim for damages is based.”691 Notably, however,
the Court did not uphold the $100 Charter damages award compensating Ward for the seizure of his car
688
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because no injury or loss occurred.692 The Court could have awarded $100 for non-compensatory reasons
to remedy the section 8 Charter violation, but a declaration was deemed sufficient to vindicate the right at
issue and deter future illegal car seizures.693 Roach explained that some post-Ward decisions treat the SCC’s
rejection of the per se theory of Charter damages as evidence that ‘something more’ is required.694 The
‘something more’ usually involves the imposition of a fault requirement such as bad faith or malice and
this typically occurs in cases involving police. Roach argued that this is an incorrect application of the Ward
framework; all a claimant must do under Ward is establish that damages are functionally justified.695
Despite the SCC’s recognition in Ward that the Charter breach was the legal wrong committed by
the state, the Court noted that fault requirements might be necessary in cases where the state raises valid
concerns about good governance. The Court offered the following guidance:
By analogy to Mackin and the private law, where the state establishes that s. 24(1)
damages raise governance concerns, it would seem a minimum threshold, such as clear
disregard for the claimant’s Charter rights, may be appropriate. Different situations
may call for different thresholds, as is the case at private law.696
As discussed in the previous section, the Government of Canada could have raised good governance
concerns. The most prominent would likely relate to Crown prerogative. Arguments were advanced
throughout the Khadr litigation that government decisions made under Crown prerogative should be
afforded deference.697
It is possible that a fault requirement could have been imposed on Khadr’s Charter damages claim
given the type of governmental decision-making at issue. Crown prerogative still commands considerable
deference in Canadian law, particularly when it involves foreign affairs. If a court hearing Khadr’s claim
found that Canada’s good governance arguments had merit, it could create a new immunity similar to the
way Mackin operates. This would mean that the state could only become liable for Charter damages in
cases involving decisions made under the foreign affairs prerogative if a certain level of fault is present. An
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immunity is designed to provide limited protection to the state “when it is performing certain legislative
and policy-making functions that only the state can perform.”698

It is unknown how profound good governance concerns must be to trigger the creation of a limited
immunity. Relatively few immunities exist, so it is assumed that the threats to good governance must be
significant. As shown above, the possible good governance concerns relating to Crown prerogative raised
in the Khadr case are not particularly worrisome. A Charter damages award is much more likely to promote
good governance in this case than it is to hinder discretionary policy-making functions. A court ordering a
monetary remedy is not directing the government to exercise a prerogative power in a certain way nor is it
reviewing the soundness of a prerogative decision and substituting a superior one. The purpose of a Charter
damages award in the Khadr case is straightforward: to remedy conduct that violated Charter rights.

If an immunity were carved out for Charter damages claims relating to Crown prerogative, it would
be difficult to predict the standard of fault that would be required. A court hearing Khadr’s civil claim could
have followed the SCC’s guidance in Ward and imposed the ‘clear disregard for the claimant’s Charter
rights’ standard. This is a relatively low bar, especially for the Khadr case. Khadr should have had no
difficulty demonstrating that CSIS and DFAIT officials (and successive Canadian governments)
disregarded his Charter-protected interests. CSIS conducted interviews at a time when practices used at
Guantánamo were subject to international scrutiny. The 2009 SIRC Report, which reviewed the actions of
CSIS in the Khadr matter, found that the agency failed to consider and appreciate Khadr’s potential
mistreatment and his youth status.699 Further, the 2004 DFAIT interview occurred with knowledge that
Khadr had been subjected to intensive sleep deprivation.
A court could also take guidance from Hinse v Canada (Attorney General)700 (“Hinse”). In this
case, the SCC had to determine the appropriate standard of fault that applied to the federal Minister of
Justice’s discretion to exercise the prerogative power of mercy. The power was being examined at a period
in history where no procedural framework was available to guide the processing of mercy applications.701
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The Court concluded that the exercise of this power at the time “was a true policy decision”702 that triggered
a qualified immunity. The minister would only be civilly liable if his or her actions amounted to a breach
of the duty to meaningfully review the mercy application, which would amount to bad faith or serious
recklessness.703 The Court stated that
The fact that the Minister's power derives from the royal prerogative of mercy attests to
the broad discretion that is conferred on him or her. Although the fact that a decision is
discretionary is not on its own sufficient to justify finding that a public law immunity
applies, it is nonetheless a helpful criterion.704
The MacRae and Naqvi cases, both involving Charter damages claims, could also be used to
support a higher fault requirement being imposed. Both of these judgments show that highly discretionary
decisions may attract fault requirements on a higher standard of bad faith or improper purpose.705 It is
possible that a court hearing Khadr’s claim could be influenced by these cases because of the delicate nature
of decisions made under the foreign affairs prerogative.

Critically, neither MacRae or Naqvi involved the exercise of prerogative powers. Further, neither
decision dealt with serious Charter breaches that had already been established. There is no case that is truly
analogous to Khadr’s circumstances involving a Charter damages claim for an unconstitutional exercise of
a prerogative power involving a minor. Although Hinse suggested that discretionary policy decisions should
benefit from a limited immunity, Hinse did not involve a claim for Charter damages; it concerned Québec
civil law and it examined a different prerogative power. Even if a court followed Hinse and imposed a
higher standard of fault (such as bad faith), I argue that Khadr could meet that threshold.
As I explained earlier in the section discussing Khadr’s tort claims, it can be difficult to prove that
government decision-makers acted with improper intent. Canada would likely argue that its behaviour never
rose to the level of bad faith, improper purpose, or recklessness because it provided the minimum level of
consular assistance to Khadr.706 The Canadian government sent diplomatic notes when Khadr was first
detained to prevent his transfer to Guantánamo, sought assurances that the death penalty would not be
requested in his military commission proceedings, conducted welfare visits, fulfilled its disclosure
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obligation in 2008, and ultimately repatriated Khadr in 2012.

Although true, this chronology of Canadian actions obscures critical incidents which could trigger
a finding of bad faith. The most glaring example is the decision to conduct the 2004 interview with Khadr
despite having knowledge that he was subjected to prolonged sleep deprivation. It is reasonable to conclude
that Foreign Affairs personnel ought to appreciate that interviewing someone who has been tortured – and
then sharing information about that interview – is entirely inappropriate. Second, the Harper government
did not take meaningful steps to remedy a declaration from Canada’s highest court in 2010. The diplomatic
note sent by Canada to the US after Khadr SCC 2010 did not secure any kind of remedy. It is likely that
Canada’s indifference to the continuing rights violation influenced Khadr’s decision to plead guilty to war
crimes.707 Third, the delay in processing Khadr’s transfer application and Canada’s decision to hold him in
maximum security facilities (which was a statutory misinterpretation) could be viewed as further examples
of bad faith designed to stigmatize Khadr and exacerbate his suffering.708

A further concern associated with the creation of a new immunity for prerogative decision-making
relates to how these decisions are already treated by courts. Decisions made under the foreign affairs power
already attract a significant level of deference from the judiciary when they are being reviewed. This
deference functions similarly to an immunity: it is only when decisions threaten the rights or legitimate
expectations of a claimant that they become reviewable and the state can be held liable.709 When a decision
made under the foreign affairs prerogative leads to a serious constitutional infringement, that should be
enough to trigger state liability. There is no need to impose a fault requirement such as bad faith to protect
the exercise of state discretion in this area. Decision-making with respect to foreign affairs already has a
layer of insulation because it takes place under a prerogative power.

Creating new immunities that allow the state to mount further defences to Charter damages claims
is a dangerous possibility. Justice Linden cautioned that Canada “must be careful not to follow the U.S.
jurisprudence where various immunities have greatly weakened the impact of their constitutional torts over
the years.”710 Although immunities arguably serve a purpose in the private law realm, their applicability is
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more difficult to justify in the Charter damages context where the objective is to provide a remedy for a
proven constitutional violation. The Charter damages remedy is struggling to define itself and become a
reliable source of redress for aggrieved claimants. Imposing further restraints will tilt the balance that Ward
attempts to strike even more toward the state.

CONCLUSION
The analysis in this chapter demonstrated that Charter damages are functionally justified in the
Khadr case to promote powerful compensatory, vindicatory, and deterrent goals. Although there are
potential countervailing factors, they are not serious enough to defeat Khadr’s claim or render Charter
damages inappropriate. Khadr would have faced considerable difficulty proving the tort allegations
contained in his civil claim. Even if he were successful and a court determined that he would be properly
compensated through private law damages, I contend that Charter damages are still necessary to promote
the compelling vindicatory and deterrent functions outlined in Part II. Canada believed it did not have to
meaningfully respond to the declaration issued by the SCC in 2010. This stance sent the message that
Khadr’s Charter rights were not worthy of protection and that a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality
could largely be ignored. Constitutional damages are needed to vindicate the importance of Charter
guarantees and to deter the state from behaving in a similar fashion in the future.

It is undisputed that decisions made under Crown prerogative attract deference from Canadian
courts. When a citizen’s rights have been infringed and a monetary remedy is the subject of the judicial
analysis, however, the reasons to justify deference become weaker. Historically, courts have shied away
from ordering the executive to take specific action under a prerogative power because it would challenge
the separation of powers. A court hearing Khadr’s civil claim would not be ordering the executive to
exercise a prerogative power in a certain way, which was described as excessive in Khadr SCC 2010 and
the follow-up litigation. Instead, a court would be providing a constitutional remedy well within its sphere
of institutional authority to promote government accountability and the rule of law.

In the next chapter, I assess the fourth and final step of the Ward framework: how a court should
quantify Charter damages in the Khadr case. I emphasize that a large damages award is necessary to
promote Ward’s objectives and increase reliance on the remedy. Locating relevant precedents to assist with
quantification of damages for Omar Khadr is, however, a challenging endeavour. Charter damages case
law is developing at a rather slow pace and the most similar cases are found in wrongful conviction
jurisprudence and previous government settlements with Canadians who were detained and tortured abroad.
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It is unlikely that Khadr would be treated as a victim of wrongful conviction by a Canadian court.
Although Khadr is challenging his 2010 guilty plea in the US (and there are many reasons to doubt its
legitimacy),711 he remains a convicted war criminal. He has not been exonerated through any judicial
process. Although previous federal government settlements with detainees tortured in foreign countries are
highly relevant, they are not binding on a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim. Despite their limitations, I rely
on these authorities together with private and public law cases to map out how damages should be quantified
in such a novel case.

Leaked classified material cast doubt on the US military’s version of events involving Khadr’s role in the death of
Sgt. Speer – see supra note 21. Further, controversy surrounded the decision of Khadr’s military commission judge
to allow the prosecution to submit evidence at trial of confessions and statements given by Khadr that were allegedly
obtained through torture and threats. See Anna Mehler Paperny, “Khadr’s confessions admissible, military judge
rules”, The Globe and Mail (9 August 2010), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/khadrsconfessions-admissible-military-judge-rules/article1376518/>.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE QUANTIFICATION OF CHARTER DAMAGES
FOR OMAR KHADR
INTRODUCTION
Chapter Four demonstrated that, although Khadr encountered obstacles at the countervailing factors
stage of the Ward inquiry, the functional justification for his Charter damages claim was strong enough to
proceed to quantification. Attempting to quantify Charter damages for an unconstitutional exercise of a
prerogative power is a novel endeavour. This involves calculating the monetary value of harm stemming
from Canada’s active participation in the violation of a minor’s human rights. I advance a normative
argument in this chapter, focusing on what the Charter damages quantification analysis should look like in
the Khadr case and in the broader Charter damages jurisprudence. To provide the most comprehensive
assessment, I proceed on the assumption that Khadr would have been unable to prove any of the tort
allegations he advanced in his civil claim. As shown in the previous chapter, Khadr faced considerable
difficulty meeting the thresholds required to succeed with these claims.

I present two general arguments in this chapter. First, I emphasize that courts should draw from all
relevant sources in developing a quantification model for Charter damages claims. In Khadr’s case, the
most relevant sources are settlements with wrongfully convicted persons and individuals who were detained
and tortured in foreign countries. Although these settlements do not have precedential authority, they should
serve as guides for the quantification of vindication and deterrence-based damages. The second argument I
make is that the remedial timidity exhibited in many post-Ward cases needs to be challenged. Despite there
being legitimate reasons to limit damages awards in some cases (where the infringement is minor and harm
to the claimant was minimal), sizeable awards should be ordered on a more consistent basis to truly
vindicate rights, promote state accountability, and encourage reliance on the remedy.

I do not attempt to calculate the damages Khadr would have been awarded if his civil claim
proceeded to trial. This is impossible given the unknown evidence. Instead, I discuss issues that could arise
at different stages of the quantification process. I argue that a court should not be unduly influenced by
private law principles. Further, a court should not be constrained by the sluggish evolution of the Charter
damages remedy and Ward’s discouragement of large damages awards. Although cases like Henry BCSC,
Brazeau, and Reddock are exceptional in the Charter damages jurisprudence, they are examples of courts
pushing the boundaries of the Ward framework to provide meaningful redress in circumstances where
claimants suffered distinct kinds of harm. These progressive decisions should encourage a court to order a
substantial damages award in Khadr’s case.

- 107 -

I separate the discussion into compensation-based Charter damages and vindication and
deterrence-based Charter damages (because different concerns animate both areas). In Part I, I discuss how
Khadr’s pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensatory damages ought to have been assessed. I argue that
certain private law principles, such as strict causal standards and damages caps, should not be applied
because of the extraordinary circumstances of the case.

In Part II, I examine past Charter damages cases where vindication and deterrence-based damages
were ordered. These decisions do not provide much guidance, so I consult sources outside the public law
realm. I discuss wrongful conviction settlements and previous Government of Canada settlements with
individuals who were detained and tortured abroad. The detainee settlement cases share the greatest
similarity to Khadr’s experience in terms of harm suffered. Notwithstanding key distinctions, I argue that
these figures should influence the quantification of Khadr’s vindication and deterrence-based Charter
damages. Finally, I address whether Khadr may have been entitled to punitive damages, which are rarely
awarded together with Charter damages.

In Part III, I revisit the issue I describe as remedial timidity in the post-Ward case law. I examine
why judges might feel reticent to award large damages awards, focusing on institutional competence and
the separation of powers. I discuss how Ward gave courts the latitude to order robust damages awards, yet
effectively circumscribed this power by discouraging large awards and classifying a $5,000 award as
“moderate”.712 While judges must be cautious to avoid draining the public purse to remedy fleeting Charter
breaches that had minimal impact, they should not feel restricted to order large damages awards where they
are required to meaningfully achieve Ward’s objectives – especially when the rule of law is threatened.

PART I: COMPENSATION-BASED CHARTER DAMAGES
Compensatory Charter damages are focused on corrective justice: “to restore the claimant to the
position she would have been in had the breach not been committed”.713 The SCC was clear in Ward that
compensatory Charter damages will not be awarded unless the claimant can show proof of physical,
psychological, or financial loss.714 This is why the $100 damages award given to Ward at trial for an
unreasonable seizure of his car was not upheld by the SCC. Ward never suffered compensable loss relating
to the impoundment; he was driven to pick up his car after being released by police.715 The SCC found that
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a damages award did not serve any functional objectives and was unnecessary. With these principles in
mind, I discuss how pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensatory damages should have been quantified in
the Khadr case.

Pecuniary Damages
Pecuniary losses involve money and are typically easier to quantify than non-pecuniary losses.
Examples include loss of income and costs the plaintiff incurred relating to the incident in question. Khadr
alleged in his civil claim that he suffered damages relating to lost educational opportunities, loss of income,
and loss of opportunity for future income.716 In Ward, the Court commented that “prolonged detention may
result in loss of earnings.”717 It is presumed that the Court was referencing the plight of a wrongfully
convicted individual or someone who had been detained and then ultimately released.718 The SCC
determined in British Columbia v Zastowny719 (“Zastowny”), a private law case, that a person “is not entitled
to compensation for periods of unemployment due to incarceration for conduct which the criminal law has
determined worthy of punishment”.720 Exceptions to this general rule may be made in extraordinary
circumstances, such as wrongfully convicted persons.721

In private law, quantification of pecuniary damages for loss of income follows a corrective
approach. The claimant is compensated for his or her actual losses which flow from the defendant’s conduct.
The impact of the injury is important to the analysis. In BMG v Nova Scotia (Attorney General),722 (“BMG”)
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal commented that “decided cases do not provide benchmarks as to an
appropriate range of pecuniary damages for loss of past income or income earning capacity.”723 The award
in each case is based on the evidence of financial loss.724 In cases where a claimant was employed prior to
an injury, quantifying the loss is a simpler task. In cases where a young person without an employment
history suffered abuse that altered the course of his or her life (as in BMG), the analysis is more complex.
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Ward encouraged reliance on private law to help quantify compensatory Charter damages. The
more flexible approach used in BMG should be applied in the Khadr case to reflect the distinct harm suffered
and the claimant’s age. In BMG, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision to order $500,000 in
pecuniary damages for loss of income to an individual who had been sexually assaulted as a teenager by a
probation officer. The trial judge noted that the claimant’s losses were “not amenable to precise arithmetical
calculation.”725 Although the judge relied on actuarial figures to help quantify the award, he recognized that
“too many imponderables”726 were present.

There are few cases in the Charter damages jurisprudence where compensatory awards have been
made for loss of earnings. In Henry BCSC, Henry was awarded $530,000 to compensate for loss of income
during a twenty-seven year period of incarceration for a wrongful conviction. Henry had been imprisoned
prior to his wrongful conviction for different crimes and he was therefore unable to work during certain
periods. The Court determined that Henry was likely to re-offend during the period of his wrongful
incarceration if he had not been imprisoned. The approximate time Henry would have spent in prison if he
re-offended was deemed to be one-third of the twenty-seven year sentence he served.727 Adourian criticized
this approach, arguing that the trial judge’s application of private law doctrine – particularly with regard to
causation – was disturbing.728 Henry’s constitutional remedy was reduced based on a purely hypothetical
scenario about his potential to re-offend.

In McTaggart, the Ontario Superior Court awarded $10,000 per year over a six year period for loss
of income. The plaintiff’s section 7 Charter right was violated by a police officer’s failure to disclose
material information. The Court struggled to determine the proper quantum due to the plaintiff’s inability
“to demonstrate any significant or consistent income prior to [incarceration]”.729 McTaggart was a singer
whose ability to make a living was significantly impacted by his incarcerations and parole restrictions,
which related to criminal charges that were eventually withdrawn. The Court was troubled by the lack of a
reliable benchmark to help gauge what McTaggart’s income would have been during the period in question.

Omar Khadr is not likely to be treated as a victim of wrongful conviction. Although he suffered
profound harm as a youth detainee, he ultimately pleaded guilty to war crimes. Even if he had not done so,
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the military commission under which he was being tried was poised to issue a forty year prison sentence.730
Given the extraordinary circumstances of Khadr’s case, however, a court should acknowledge that his
pecuniary losses were – and continue to be – pronounced. Khadr’s detention began when he was fifteen
years old. He was denied educational opportunities that affected his future earning capacity and he was
subjected to prolonged periods of isolation which affected his development. Khadr suggested in his civil
claim that he did not receive proper medical attention for his injuries while at Bagram, which led to “severe,
chronic pain and rendered him susceptible to painful infections and other health related problems.”731
Khadr’s claim listed a “lack of adequate medical treatment”732 in the description of the mistreatment he
suffered. Khadr was subjected to different forms of torture and abuse over a large period of his youth. These
experiences leave an indelible mark on a person, undoubtedly influencing his or her ability to lead a normal
life.
Canada’s active participation in the Guantánamo process played a role in Khadr’s continuing
detention and it satisfies the material contribution test for causation. A court hearing Khadr’s civil claim
should find that damages for loss of earnings during periods of his imprisonment are appropriate. It is
probable that these damages would only be awarded for time Khadr spent at Guantánamo after the Charter
breach was triggered in February 2003 (the first interview) up to his guilty plea in October 2010. Awarding
damages for time Khadr was incarcerated following his guilty plea could run afoul of the principle in
Zastowny. A court might be reluctant to award damages for loss of earnings or earning capacity while Khadr
was serving a criminal sentence. Arguments can be made, however, to suggest that Canadian involvement
set in motion a chain of events that culminated in Khadr’s guilty plea, which he maintains was coerced. 733
The charges brought against Khadr and his prosecution by military commission have also been heavily
criticized, raising doubts about the legitimacy of his plea and conviction.

One of the main difficulties associated with quantifying a loss of earnings award for such a young
claimant is that Khadr had no previous employment history. Estimating his damages award would be
entirely speculative and likely based on statistical models. Khadr was a teenager during a significant portion
of the relevant assessment period. He was also living outside Canada at the time he was captured and it is
unknown what, if any, educational opportunities he would have pursued in the Middle East or in Canada.
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As I argued above, if private law cases are used as guides to help quantify Khadr’s estimated loss
of earnings and the damage to his earning capacity, the more flexible approach used in BMG is most
appropriate. This case showed that the pecuniary losses flowing from life-altering instances of abuse are
very difficult to quantify using statistical measurements. The actuarial models relied on by the trial judge
in BMG “provide[d] only limited insight into BMG’s individual circumstances.”734 The trial judge also
acknowledged the complexity of determining how “negative contingencies such as job loss, unemployment
or injury”735 would have affected BMG’s earnings. A more holistic approach was used by the trial judge,
relying on actuarial calculations as a reference point and focusing on the totality of the evidence to
determine what opportunities BMG would have pursued had he not experienced the assault.

Although actuarial analysis and other economic and/or medical evidence can help guide a court to
a rough approximation of the claimant’s income-related losses, it is important in Charter damages cases to
appreciate that the claimant’s harm stemmed from a constitutional violation. The events that gave rise to
income-related losses in Khadr’s case were not the result of an accident or negligence, where obvious causal
links are apparent between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s harm. Khadr’s losses were a result
of multiple state actors breaching fundamental human rights. Consequently, a court hearing Khadr’s claim
should not feel constrained by mathematical formulae or strict causation standards when assessing
pecuniary damages. Given the distinct harm Khadr suffered (made even worse by his young age), a court
is justified in exercising greater discretion to craft an appropriate pecuniary damages award based on the
evidence Khadr could provide.

Non-pecuniary Damages
Non-pecuniary loss falls into a more imprecise category, focusing on the intangible losses
associated with the claimant’s injury. Quantification of non-pecuniary loss involves a degree of theoretical
guesswork and “is a philosophical and policy exercise more than a legal or logical one.”736 Even though
Ward has been in existence for nine years, there is no model judgment from the Charter damages case law
that can guide the quantification of non-pecuniary Charter damages. Ward recommended that courts look
to private law for guidance.737 Although there are some private law principles that are useful to the
quantification of non-pecuniary Charter damages, others are ill-suited to the constitutional realm. These
issues are explored below.
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In private law, a non-pecuniary damages award “is determined by placing a particular victim and
set of circumstances within a range of conventional and, in a sense, arbitrary awards as determined largely
by precedent.”738 Non-pecuniary damages are designed to provide “reasonable solace for [the plaintiff’s]
misfortune.”739 Although there are multiple heads of damages that fall under non-pecuniary damages (such
as pain and suffering, psychological trauma, and loss of expectation of life), the SCC has instructed courts
to “favour a composite award for all non-pecuniary losses.”740 A list of factors to consider in the
quantification of non-pecuniary damages has developed in the private law jurisprudence. These include the
age of the plaintiff, the nature of the injury, the severity and duration of the plaintiff’s pain, the existence
of a disability, emotional suffering, loss or impairment of life, impairment of family, marital, and social
relationships, impairment of physical and mental abilities, loss of lifestyle, and the plaintiff’s stoicism.741

Although these factors are relevant and helpful, there is a critical distinction to keep in mind. The
unique harm caused by a constitutional violation does not have a tort law equivalent.742 Constitutional
infringements often involve a profound sense of intrusion because core human rights and freedoms –
enshrined in supreme law – have been breached. Pilkington argued that constitutional violations could cause
“damage of the most fundamental sort”,743 which justified her conclusion that damages should be awarded
for per se infringements. Breaching the Charter is, on its own, a harmful act. The SCC recognized this in
Ward when it acknowledged that a breach “is the wrong on which the claim for damages is based.”744 There
is no formula or model in private law to measure the harm that flows from a constitutional violation. It is
the responsibility of courts applying Ward to craft a damages model that is responsive to the distinct harms
present in constitutional cases, such as a violation of an individual’s security of the person.

One of the issues to confront when assessing constitutional non-pecuniary damages is whether a
cap ought to be imposed. There is a cap on the amount of non-pecuniary damages a court can order in
personal injury cases.745 The cap has fluctuated since its imposition to account for inflation. It was
determined to be approximately $360,000 in Henry BCSC.746 The SCC did not directly comment on the
applicability of the private law damages cap in Ward even though the Court encouraged reliance on tort
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law during the quantification of compensatory Charter damages.747 Citing Andrews v Grand & Toy748
(“Andrews”), a foundational negligence case, Ward affirmed that Charter damages could provide
compensation for pain and suffering.749 The Court cautioned, however, that this compensation “is fixed at
a fairly modest conventional rate, subject to variation for the degree of suffering in the particular case.”750

Although the SCC may have indirectly referenced the private law damages cap in Ward, no
subsequent case has definitively addressed whether the cap should apply to limit compensatory nonpecuniary Charter damages. The Court in Henry BCSC found that imposing the cap was inappropriate for
such an exceptional case.751 The Court did not, however, award non-pecuniary damages to Henry. It
preferred to deal with non-pecuniary issues through vindication-based damages.752 The high damages award
in Brazeau was also based on vindication and deterrence. Although $9 million in compensatory Charter
damages was ordered in Reddock,753 this case was a class action and the Court did not discuss the damages
cap. It is therefore not settled whether the cap should apply to limit non-pecuniary Charter damages for
individual claimants.

I argue that a non-pecuniary Charter damages model should not include a damages cap. As outlined
above, Charter damages claims are distinct. The purpose of the private law damages cap, articulated in
Andrews, was to address rising non-pecuniary damages awards and act as a stabilizing measure.754 The
majority of post-Ward Charter damages awards are low and there is no trend developing where excessive
non-pecuniary awards need to be curtailed. If anything, larger awards are needed in this area to truly provide
responsive and effective remedies. Further, it would be difficult to determine an appropriate non-pecuniary
damages cap given the relative scarcity of Charter damages precedents. The Court in Andrews had a deluge
of case law from which to draw. If the cap were set too low for non-pecuniary Charter damages, it could
reduce the likelihood of claimants coming forward to seek redress for constitutional violations.

Conflating non-pecuniary compensatory damages with vindication or deterrence-based damages
(the Court’s decision in Henry BCSC) should also be avoided. Ward explicitly authorized non-pecuniary

747

Ward, supra note 4 at para 50.
Supra note 668.
749
Ward, supra note 4 at para 50.
750
Ibid.
751
Henry BCSC, supra note 16 at para 421.
752
Ibid at para 408.
753
The $9 million award was designed to compensate class members for mental suffering and “the assault on their
Charter rights.” See Reddock, supra note 16 at para 396.
754
Andrews, supra note 668 at 264.
748

- 114 -

damages awards.755 The SCC stated that courts should not shy away from ordering these damages just
because they are difficult to quantify.756 In Henry BCSC, the Court determined that it was duplicative to
order non-pecuniary damages and vindication and deterrence-based damages.757 The Court relied on
comments made in Andrews where the SCC cautioned against ordering large non-pecuniary awards in cases
where the claimant has already received proper compensation for future expenses.758 Although the Court in
Henry BCSC did not provide detailed reasons why it chose not to order non-pecuniary damages, it is likely
the Court believed Henry’s non-pecuniary harm would be properly addressed by the $7.5 million
vindication-based award.

Transferring what should be a non-pecuniary award into the vindication or deterrence column is
inappropriate based on Ward’s functional approach. If there is functional justification for non-pecuniary
damages, they should be awarded. This type of award acknowledges that the claimant experienced personal
suffering as a result of the Charter breach. The compensatory objective of Charter damages is focused
squarely on the claimant. The vindication and deterrence objectives are focused on the integrity of the right
itself and broader societal harm. The analysis of non-pecuniary damages should remain separate from the
analysis of vindication or deterrence-based damages to ensure the claimant’s harm is properly addressed.

Omar Khadr should receive a substantial non-pecuniary damages award. He suffered significant
breaches of his liberty and security of the person. CSIS and DFAIT officials interviewed Khadr when he
was a teenager detained in extremely controversial conditions without access to a lawyer. The third
interview was conducted in 2004 with knowledge that Khadr had been subjected to extensive sleep
deprivation, which meets the international definition of torture.759 Potential evidence obtained in the
interviews was shared with the US, yet Canada refused to disclose this information to Khadr. The SCC
determined in 2010 that Canadian intelligence contributed to Khadr’s continued detention.760 Canada’s
constitutional breaches are linked to a range of harm Khadr experienced: the psychological ramifications
of torture and the prospect of indefinite detention, lack of contact with family, lack of social development,
and immense pain and suffering over a prolonged period.
Quantifying Khadr’s non-pecuniary damages is a complicated endeavour. This is due, in part, to
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the relatively small number of Charter damages cases that can guide the determination. In Ward, the Court
effectively endorsed a $5,000 award to remedy harm resulting from a strip search. The Ontario Superior
Court also ordered $5,000 for an unnecessary strip search in Lamka.761 This was designed to accomplish
compensatory, vindicatory, and deterrent objectives.762 In McTaggart, a pre-Ward case discussed above,
the claimant was awarded $150,000 in general Charter damages for “pain, suffering, loss of dignity, mental
anguish, humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life”.763 This harm stemmed from a section 7 breach caused
by a police officer’s failure to disclose material information, which resulted in convictions and twenty
months of imprisonment. In Elliot v Waterloo (Regional Municipality) Police Services764 (“Elliot”), the
claimant was awarded $25,000 in general Charter damages relating to an unconstitutional search, arrest,
and detention. The Ontario Superior Court acknowledged the “pain, suffering, and humiliation”765 that the
claimant experienced as a result of intrusive police behaviour.

In his comparative analysis of constitutional damages cases from other jurisdictions, CooperStephenson noted that “significant emphasis has been given to the idea that “loss of dignity” is very much
at the heart of many constitutional damages claims.”766 Justice Grant Hammond, formerly of the New
Zealand Court of Appeal, acknowledged that “common experience suggests that the reality of physical and
emotional suffering is the very thing that has most concerned victims.”767 Attempting to restore dignity
should be given more of a focus in the quantification of compensatory Charter damages. Constitutional
violations – particularly of sections 7 (life, liberty, and security of the person) and 15 (equality) – can
profoundly affect a person’s dignity. Regrettably, Ward did not discuss the affront to dignity that can result
from a Charter breach. Although it is difficult to quantify the loss of dignity stemming from a Charter
infringement, it should be a relevant concern in the analysis of pain and suffering.

Varuhas acknowledged the difficulty with quantifying non-pecuniary damages in cases where
human rights have been infringed.768 Drawing from what he described as vindicatory torts,769 Varuhas
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separated non-pecuniary damages into two categories: normative damages and consequential losses.770
Normative damage refers to the harm suffered as a result of the underlying interest protected by the right
or freedom having been infringed.771 Varuhas provided an example: “An individual, banned from voting in
breach of her right to vote, may actually be relieved at not having to choose…But she ought to receive
damages for being denied the most fundamental of democratic rights.”772 The overarching concern in
assessing normative damages is the severity of the intrusion.773 Varuhas argued that consequential losses
flowing from the breach should only be ordered if the but for standard of causation is satisfied.774 He noted,
however, that “often there will be no hard evidence to verify whether such losses were indeed suffered, and
causally connected to the wrong.”775 Varuhas recommended the use of “a ‘common sense’
approach…[where] the court draw[s] reasonable inferences from the facts.”776
Although Varuhas’s vindicatory tort model is persuasive, it must be remembered that injury in the
Charter context is based on harms flowing from constitutional breaches which may not have a tort law
counterpart. Adourian acknowledged the helpfulness of Varuhas’s model, though he noted that “intentional
torts may not be able to cover all aspects of Charter damages, especially where the facts are dissimilar to
intentional torts.”777 I share this concern. Although private law is equipped to help quantify Khadr’s nonpecuniary damages for loss of liberty or pain and suffering, there is no tort that captures the distinct harm
caused by torture or the trauma associated with the state’s failure to protect a vulnerable minor. It is likely
that, out of necessity, the award would be somewhat arbitrary to respond to these harms. Given the lack of
available precedents directly on point, a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim would be responsible for crafting
an appropriate figure.

Some assistance may be found in Canadian human rights tribunal decisions. Ranjan Agarwal and
Joseph Marcus made this suggestion for Charter damages cases involving racial profiling.778 The authors
argued that human rights tribunal damages case law “is well developed”779 compared to the slow evolution
of Charter damages jurisprudence. Although human rights tribunals do not address constitutional
protected in the United Kingdom. Both are concerned with defending basic interests, challenging executive power,
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violations, they provide remedies for harm resulting from discrimination. Discrimination also has no tort
law equivalent780 and it causes a distinct type of harm to claimants that can be difficult to quantify. Most
human rights tribunals can order damages to compensate claimants for the infringement of their right to be
free from discrimination, which includes injury to dignity.781 There is criticism that human rights tribunal
damages are inadequate (particularly for instances of racial profiling), but commentators observed that the
ceiling for these general damages awards appears to be rising.782

Writing just after the Ward decision was released, Roach expressed concern that the $5,000
compensatory award could become the yardstick for Charter damages claims.783 He argued that, if this
occurred, Charter damages awards would fall behind damages ordered pursuant to human rights codes.784
The Ontario Human Rights Tribunal typically orders between $5,000 and $15,000 in general damages,
though there is no cap on the award.785 The Divisional Court of Ontario acknowledged in ADGA Group
Consultants Inc. v Lane786 that tribunals “must ensure the quantum of general [non-pecuniary] damages is
not set too low, since doing so would trivialize the social importance of the Code by effectively creating a
“licence fee” to discriminate.”787 The Court noted that tribunals should consider the following factors in the
quantification analysis: “humiliation; hurt feelings; the loss of self-respect, dignity and confidence by the
complainant; the experience of victimization; the vulnerability of the complainant; and the seriousness of
the offensive treatment”.788
If a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim applied Varuhas’s ‘common sense’ model and assessed the
factors described above, it is clear Khadr suffered extensive non-pecuniary harm stemming from Canada’s
actions. Canada chose to involve itself in an illegal process that violated basic human rights and it chose to
ignore the plight of an extremely vulnerable citizen. It is difficult to imagine a claimant more deserving of
personal compensation than a teenager who was tortured, mistreated, indefinitely detained for more than
three years, denied access to counsel, subjected to a questionable military prosecution that ended in a guilty
plea, and denied protection to which he was entitled under international law. The trauma associated with
780
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these experiences is beyond comprehension or precise quantification, but it is important that Khadr receive
non-pecuniary damages to acknowledge the pain, trauma, loss of dignity, and helplessness he experienced.

PART II: VINDICATION AND DETERRENCE-BASED CHARTER DAMAGES
Although the SCC emphasized the importance of compensation in Ward, the Court acknowledged
that “cases may arise where vindication or deterrence play a major and even exclusive role.”789 Chapter
Four outlined the compelling functional justifications for vindication and deterrence-based damages in the
Khadr case. It is critical that Charter guarantees are defended and a pattern of objectionable behaviour is
denounced.790
The SCC commented in Ward that private law is “less useful”791 in helping to quantify vindication
and deterrence-based Charter damages. The Court noted that the quantification analysis for these objectives
would be “an exercise in rationality and proportionality…guided by precedent.”792 To assess whether
vindication or deterrence-based damages are appropriate, a court must examine the seriousness of the
Charter violation and its impact on the claimant. The SCC reasoned that severe state misconduct that had
a profound effect on the claimant should warrant a higher award, which is logical.793 The Court cautioned,
however, that damages awards should be fair to the claimant and the state. Large awards paid out of the
public purse “may serve little functional purpose in terms of the claimant’s needs and may be inappropriate
or unjust from the public perspective.”794 This statement does not acknowledge that a sizeable award may
be necessary to resolutely defend the Constitution and deter violative conduct when egregious Charter
breaches have occurred and the rule of law has been compromised.

Khadr was deeply affected by Canadian actions. Canada chose to interview Khadr, share
intelligence about him with the US, and refuse to intervene on his behalf despite his age. These decisions
were made with knowledge of the conditions under which Khadr was being held. Khadr looked to
Canadians for help and he initially believed Canadian officials would provide assistance, which never
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occurred.795 Khadr’s delayed repatriation to Canada pursuant to the plea agreement and his exposure to
further solitary confinement in Canadian prison aggravated existing harm. Canada’s violations were serious
infringements of core Charter rights that had a destructive impact on the course of Khadr’s young life.

In attempting to quantify a vindication or deterrence-based Charter damages award for Khadr, a
court would review Charter damages cases where these types of damages were ordered.796 The quantums
vary widely and there is currently no model to guide the assessment of these damages. Past vindication and
deterrence-based awards show that (a) the presence of bad faith can increase the quantum; (b) the sum will
be low where there is no actual loss proven and the perceived impact of the breach on the claimant is minor;
and (c) courts are capable of ordering much higher awards – albeit in exceptional circumstances – when
egregious violations have occurred.
A sizeable vindication and deterrence-based award is justified in Khadr’s case given the impact
and severity of Canada’s actions. Determining what that quantum should be, however, is difficult to
ascertain without comparable cases. The Charter damages case that most resembles Khadr’s plight is
Henry, although there are differences between the two. In the following section, I analyze Henry BCSC
more closely along with its reliance on wrongful conviction settlements. I also examine Government of
Canada settlements with individuals who were detained and tortured abroad. Despite key distinctions
between these examples and Khadr’s experience, I argue that the detainee settlements are the most relevant
sources to help guide the quantification of Khadr’s vindication and deterrence-based Charter damages.

Henry BCSC and Wrongful Conviction Settlements
In Henry BCSC, the Court referenced a number of wrongful conviction settlements paid by the
federal government, several of which stemmed from public inquiries: Guy Paul Morin (given $1.25 million
for nearly sixteen months in prison); Gregory Parsons (given several payments totalling $1.5 million for
sixty days in prison and seven years of bail restrictions); David Milgaard (given $10 million for over twentytwo years in prison); Thomas Sophonow (given just over $2 million for forty-five months in prison); and
Steven Truscott (given $6.5 million for ten years in prison and forty years on parole).797 Despite its reliance
on these settlements as a guide, the Court noted that they were determined based on “the advice of eminent
lawyers and former judges, and were not the result of litigation.”798 The settlements held no precedential
value and were not binding on the Court.
795
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It is possible that these wrongful conviction cases could influence a court’s analysis of Khadr’s
civil claim because there are clear similarities. Khadr suffered many of the same harms that wrongfully
convicted individuals might experience: psychological trauma, post-traumatic stress disorder, impaired
social functioning, loss of reputation, and declining physical and mental health.799 Further, given the
controversy over whether Khadr actually threw the grenade that killed Sgt. Speer (and whether this was a
violation of the law of war),800 the charges against him have been questioned. Khadr was fifteen years old
when he was captured, which rendered him a child under international law.801 One of Khadr’s former
Guantánamo lawyers commented that “children who were indoctrinated into war can’t be expected to
understand the laws of armed conflict.”802 There are also reasons to question the legitimacy of Khadr’s
prosecution by the US because of the lax rules of evidence used in military commission procedure. Khan
noted that, during Khadr’s trial in 2010, the military commission judge allowed evidence that had been
“obtained under duress”.803 Further, the US did not give any assurances that Canadian information (which
would have been unconstitutional under the Charter) would not be used as evidence at Khadr’s trial.

There is Canadian case law to support the notion that a guilty plea, though informed and voluntary
at the time it was made, can be set aside. This can happen when fresh evidence discredits the original
evidence that influenced the accused’s decision to plead guilty.804 In this situation, the guilty plea would
“no longer be said to be informed.”805 Roach commented that Khadr’s guilty plea could be compared to
guilty pleas in wrongful conviction cases.806 Khadr was mistreated and indefinitely detained, which led to
psychological fragility and a lack of faith in the judicial process under which he was being tried.807 The
eight year sentence in the plea deal was a powerful inducement to a vulnerable individual.808

Although Khadr might be able to prove his innocence in the future (or establish that he should not
have been prosecuted for war crimes),809 he has not yet done so. According to historic guidelines developed
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in the late 1980s,810 a wrongfully convicted person is required to demonstrate factual innocence to receive
compensation in Canada. The Court in Henry BCSC noted, however, that these guidelines are not binding
law and more recent compensation awards (particularly in the Truscott case) departed from some guideline
principles.811 Further, Henry’s case for compensation was based on a 2010 British Columbia Court of
Appeal decision812 that quashed his convictions and entered acquittals. Critically, the Court of Appeal did
not conclude that Henry was innocent.813
I do not recommend that wrongful conviction settlement figures be applied directly to Khadr’s case.
This is improper because different concerns influenced the quantification of the settlements and they were
not awarded as constitutional remedies under the Charter. Further, the SCC cautioned against using private
wrongful conviction settlements as precedents or models for judicial damages awards. In Hinse, the SCC
endorsed the Québec Court of Appeal’s comments that these settlements “did not result from judicial
awards and were based on considerations that are very different from those on which damages are based”.814

I suggest that these settlement figures be used as a reference to show how individuals who suffered
egregious deprivations of their liberty have been compensated by the state. It is unwise to ignore these
settlements given the lack of resources available to help quantify vindication and deterrence-based damages
for Khadr. The Court in Henry BCSC was influenced by the figures as it calculated Henry’s $7.5 million
vindication-based damages award. The Court noted that, although negotiated settlements between private
parties were of limited assistance, government settlements were “of considerably greater assistance, as the
factors that are applied in reaching settlement figures by governments are more principled and informed.”815

Canadian Settlements with Detainees Tortured Abroad
Previous Government of Canada settlements with individuals detained and tortured abroad are
relevant to the quantification of Khadr’s vindication and deterrence-based damages. Like the wrongful
conviction settlements discussed above, detainee settlements are not binding authorities. They are
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instructive in the Khadr context, however, because of similarities related to the consequences of intelligence
sharing. Prominent settlements were given to Maher Arar in 2007 and Muayyed Nureddin, Abdullah
Almalki, and Ahmad El Maati in 2017. These cases are examined below.

Maher Arar was detained by US authorities at JFK airport in September 2002, declared
inadmissible, and deported to Syria. Arar held dual Canadian and Syrian citizenship. He was jailed in Syria
for a year where he was tortured and held in appalling conditions.816 Arar was released in October 2003.817
Questions arose about intelligence sharing between Canada and the US and whether Canada played a role
in the events. A public inquiry, led by Justice Dennis O’Connor, was commissioned in 2004. The final
report was released in September 2006.818 The report concluded that Arar did not commit an offence nor
did he pose a threat to Canada.819 The inquiry also revealed that Canada shared inaccurate information with
the US (which was likely relied on), did not take steps to ascertain whether Syrian intelligence about Arar
was extracted through torture, and leaked confidential information to the press to undermine Arar’s
credibility.820 On January 26, 2007, the Harper government settled Arar’s lawsuit for approximately $11.5
million (including $1 million in legal fees) and Arar was offered a formal apology.821
A second inquiry, led by Justice Frank Iacobucci, began in 2006 to investigate Canada’s potential
role in the detention and torture of three additional men in Syria. Muayyed Nureddin, Abdullah Almalki,
and Ahmad El Maati were separately detained and tortured by Syrian authorities. El Maati spent a total of
twenty-six months in detention in Syria and Egypt, Almalki spent twenty-two months in detention in Syria,
and Nureddin was detained in Syria for thirty-three days. None of the men were charged with any terrorismrelated offence. The inquiry released its final report in October 2008.822 It concluded that Canada’s actions
likely contributed indirectly to the detention and mistreatment of El Maati and Nureddin, and the
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mistreatment of Almalki.823

Examples of Canadian conduct at issue in the report included information sharing with the US and
other foreign agencies about suspected terrorist involvement, the RCMP’s decision to send questions to
Syrian officials which would be posed to El Maati and Almalki while in Syrian custody, and DFAIT’s
failure to provide proper consular assistance in certain situations and be aware of potential detainee
mistreatment.824 Despite the breadth of the Iacobucci Inquiry, the report did not express an opinion on
whether Canadian investigation into El Maati, Almalki, and Nureddin was proper. Justice Iacobucci
determined that this question was outside his mandate.825 A formal apology was issued to the three men and
a $31 million settlement was negotiated in 2017, though it is unknown how the funds were split.826

Canada played a role in the initial detention of three out of the four men who received
compensation. These individuals were tortured and mistreated while in detention. None were ever charged
with an offence. There is a clear link between Canadian actions and the harm that befell the detainees in
these cases, even where Canadian involvement was indirect. Without Canadian information sharing, it is
possible that some of the men who received settlements would never have been detained. The same cannot
be said for Omar Khadr. The Canadian government did not play a role in the US’s initial detention of Khadr
and his subsequent transfer to Guantánamo.
Even though Canadians were not connected to Khadr’s capture, Canada’s decision-making
triggered a sequence of events that helped keep Khadr imprisoned for more than a decade. Khadr was held
in detention for much longer than Arar, El Maati, Almalki, or Nureddin, which exacerbated the negative
physical and psychological harm he experienced. As a child under international law, Khadr was entitled to
protection from his home state.827 Instead, Canadian officials repeatedly interviewed Khadr and shared
intelligence with the US while condemnation of Guantánamo intensified. Canada had a close diplomatic
relationship with the US and could have taken steps to help Khadr the same way other Western nations
secured the repatriation of their nationals from Guantánamo.828
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Although courts have been cautioned to avoid using private settlements as damages precedents,829
I encourage reliance on the detainee settlements in the quantification of Khadr’s vindication and deterrencebased damages. There is a lack of relevant judicial decisions and the SCC admitted in Ward that private
law is less helpful in the vindication and deterrence realm.830 The Khadr case shares similarities with the
detainee settlement cases, especially regarding the issue of Canadian complicity in torture. Although the
detainee settlements were undoubtedly politicized and influenced by complex sets of factors, they are the
closest thing Canada has to guidelines in this area. A court should avail itself of all relevant sources in
crafting an appropriate vindication and deterrence-based award in such a novel case.

A vindication and deterrence-based award in the Khadr case should be substantial. Canadian
officials interrogated a youth suspect who had been tortured, denied access to counsel and family members,
and subjected to indefinite detention. When Canada was called on to intervene in Khadr’s case by domestic
and international actors, it did not take action. When Canada’s highest court determined on two occasions
that the government’s conduct breached the Charter, it still did not trigger a change of course. If a robust
vindication and deterrence-based award were made to Omar Khadr, it would be a proper response to the
severity of the state conduct and its effect on an extremely vulnerable individual, the Charter, and the rule
of law. A large award would also be a step toward greater recognition for the Charter damages remedy and
the goals it can accomplish when given proper credence.

The final area to consider in the quantification analysis is punitive damages, which Khadr sought
in his civil claim.831 Given the nature of the government’s conduct, it is possible that a court could award
punitive damages in addition to Charter damages. I briefly discuss this possibility in the next section.

Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are designed to punish a defendant for “advertent wrongful acts that are so
malicious and outrageous that they are deserving of punishment on their own.”832 The precise relationship
between punitive damages and Charter damages is still developing in the jurisprudence. In Ward, the SCC
discussed the “general reluctance in the international community to award purely punitive damages”.833 The
Court noted, however, that vindication and deterrence-based Charter damages “may assume a punitive
829
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aspect.”834 In Charles’s view, the Court’s comments suggested that punitive damages are unnecessary given
the new framework developed in Ward.835 Charles acknowledged that any need for punitive damages after
Ward would “now be built into the general damages award as part of the vindication or deterrence
function.”836 Finally, Roach stated that the Court’s “disapproving statements in Ward about punitive
damages will make such awards rare in the future.”837

To date, punitive damages have been awarded (in addition to Charter damages) in very few cases.
In Elmardy, the Ontario Divisional Court raised the punitive damages award from $18,000 to $25,000. The
Court found that the trial judge erred by using punitive damages to promote vindicatory and deterrent
functions. This “failed to recognize the important public objectives of Charter damages, which are different
from the objectives of punitive damages that may be awarded against a private individual.”838 Given the
Divisional Court’s finding that the claimant was a victim of racial profiling, a substantial Charter damages
award ($50,000) was required to vindicate Charter rights and deter the state, not just individual actors.839
Punitive damages were still necessary, however, to punish a police officer’s “high-handed and
oppressive”840 conduct, which amounted to battery.

Punitive damages were also awarded in Elliot, although the quantum was much lower than
Elmardy. The Ontario Superior Court acknowledged in Elliot that punitive damages were “only to be
awarded in exceptional cases.”841 The Court found that the behaviour of the police toward the claimant in
this case would have “shock[ed] the community.”842 A $2,500 punitive damages award was ordered along
with $25,000 in Charter damages.

In both cases, punitive damages were ordered against police for truly disturbing conduct. Gonsalves
and O’Hearn Davies commented that, even though Charter damages and punitive damages overlap,
punitive damages can still be used for specific deterrence against a particular defendant.843 The punitive
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damages award in Elmardy was structured with that goal in mind,844 while the Charter damages award was
designed to promote broader deterrence of racial profiling in Canada. The award in Elliot, though quite low,
was ordered to send a message to police that their approach in executing a warrant was unjustifiable.845 This
message could have been sent through vindication or deterrence-based Charter damages, but the Court
presumably used punitive damages to emphasize the objectionable nature of the conduct at issue.
Despite the seriousness of Canada’s actions in the Khadr case, it is unlikely that punitive damages
would be awarded. I argued in the preceding section that Khadr’s vindication and deterrence-based award
should be significant. It is probable that punitive objectives would be subsumed into the deterrent portion
of the award. Punitive damages are rarely awarded in conjunction with Charter damages and, as shown
above, they are often designed to deter specific individuals. If evidence came to light to show that the
behaviour of certain officials was particularly egregious toward Khadr, it could justify a separate punitive
damages award. It is likely that, based on the known facts of the Khadr case, a large deterrence-based award
would properly penalize the state.

Although a substantial Charter damages award is necessary in the Khadr case, a quantum in the six
or seven figures could raise issues about institutional competence. Despite having the authority to order a
robust award, a court could be held back by Ward’s comments about fairness and its general discouragement
of sizeable awards. A court might also be concerned about the perceived legitimacy of such an award given
Khadr’s controversial status. I explore these issues in the final part of this chapter.

PART III: CHALLENGING REMEDIAL TIMIDITY POST-WARD
Although the SCC commented in Ward that Charter damages “must represent a meaningful
response”846 to unconstitutional conduct, the decision encouraged restraint with respect to quantum. This
dicta from the SCC, along with the general trend of caution exhibited by post-Ward courts, helps explain
why most Charter damages awards have not been significant. The awards in the jurisprudence also
reference and build off one another, so the doctrine of precedent has helped quantums stay relatively low.

Another factor influencing quantification is the potentially uncomfortable reality that public funds
are used to pay out the awards. Lawrence David argued that judicial deference will be “presumptively

844

The punitive damages award in Elmardy was ordered against a specific constable and the police services board.
Elliot, supra note 764 at para 87.
846
Ward, supra note 4 at para 54.
845

- 127 -

involved in any case where remedial action entails the judicial order of public funds.”847 A court ordering
a large damages award is theoretically in tension with the traditional separation of powers among the three
branches of government. Conventionally, courts have refrained from ordering the Crown to spend public
money, absent statutory authorization.848

Ward clearly established that courts can award Charter damages in appropriate cases. There should
be no question that the judicial branch has the institutional competence to craft damages awards tailored to
the facts of each case. The Court emphasized in Ward, however, that an appropriate and just award must be
fair to the claimant and the state.849 David reasoned that “the concern for judicial competence over resource
allocation is most prevalent where the amount sought or required to fully vindicate the breach is
elevated.”850 I argue that a large Charter damages award is necessary in the Khadr case, so concerns related
to the separation of powers and institutional competence could emerge. Further, as discussed in Chapter
Four, a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim could be apprehensive about its perceived interference with
executive prerogative power.

Even though the assessment of countervailing factors occurs at step three of the Ward framework,
it could infiltrate the quantification analysis at step four. Citing Roach, Adourian argued that countervailing
factors not powerful enough to defeat a Charter damages claim could re-emerge at the quantification stage
to “act as a deductible”.851 Influential countervailing factors could put pressure on a court to reduce the
damages award. Adourian noted that this could lead to excessive deference at the quantification stage “and
not enough emphasis on the Charter injury.”852

I argued in Chapter Four that the potential countervailing factors relating to Crown prerogative and
causation were not strong enough to defeat Khadr’s claim. It is possible, however, that these concerns could
resurface at the quantification stage. The perceived tension between a large damages award, institutional
competence, and Crown prerogative could result in a reduced award. Further, Khadr is politically divisive
and controversial among citizens. To many, the Khadr name is synonymous with terrorism. The legitimacy
of a sizeable award, paid using public funds, would inevitably be questioned by segments of Canadian
society. There was considerable backlash to the 2017 settlement between Khadr and the Government of
847
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Canada. Ward briefly touched on the legitimacy issue, noting that large awards “may serve little functional
purpose in terms of the claimant’s needs and may be inappropriate or unjust from the public perspective.”853

The idea of holding Canada responsible for US misdeeds in the Khadr case could elicit public
concern. A large Charter damages award could be viewed as Canada taking the brunt of responsibility for
Khadr’s harm. It must be remembered, however, that Canada chose to involve itself in an illegal process.
Canada made calculated decisions to repeatedly participate in a regime that detained and abused a sixteenyear-old child. The SCC found that Canada’s actions amounted to a continuing infringement of Khadr’s
Charter rights.854 This was a severe violation that was never remedied. Canada’s steadfast refusal to
intervene on Khadr’s behalf compounded the harm he suffered. Arguments about causation should not be
used to curtail Canada’s liability under the Charter or reduce the quantum of damages. Canada violated the
fundamental rights and freedoms of a minor and must be held fully accountable to uphold the rule of law
and the integrity of the Canadian Constitution.

As noted above, the SCC stressed in Ward that a Charter damages award should be fair to the
claimant and the state. Although courts must avoid imposing unduly harsh damages awards on the state,
they should not be constrained to order robust awards where appropriate. Unique issues are at play in public
law cases that justify treating the state differently from private actors who commit wrongs. In Charter
damages cases, a court is responsible for enforcing Canada’s supreme law. Pilkington argued that
constitutional violations “may be qualitatively different from ordinary civil wrongs”855 because of the
power asymmetry in the state-citizen relationship. The state exercises control and influence over society
and it can cause “substantially greater harm than the ordinary person.”856 Making significant reductions to
a Charter damages award in the name of fairness defers to the constitutional wrongdoer, reinforces the
power imbalance, and weakens the Charter’s enforcement mechanism.

Ward acknowledged that an appropriate and just award must meaningfully respond to serious
breaches.857 Roach argued that the state “should not be able to make casual and routine claims that damages
awards will be costly and disruptive or invoke a rigid rule that damages awards should always be
modest.”858 This could lead to what is described as ‘conventionalizing’ Charter damages awards, which
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involves determining a standard sum to be paid for a breach of each Charter right or freedom. Gonsalves
and O’Hearn Davies stressed that conventionalizing awards (similar to the way certain bodily harms have
been quantified in personal injury cases) is inappropriate because it “risks unduly restricting the discretion
of judges”.859

Conventionalizing Charter damages awards could streamline the quantification analysis and
provide predictability to claimants, but the practice is questionable. Although there are similarities between
constitutional breaches, they are not created equal. The effect of a violation could range dramatically from
case to case. This is likely why Ward did not endorse the idea of conventionalizing awards. Roach noted
that the Court rejected “a conventional, per se or minimum award for all Charter violations.”860 The SCC
preferred to give judges discretion in this area, recognizing the diversity of potential claims.
Ward’s discouragement of large awards and its emphasis on fairness encouraged subsequent courts
to tread lightly with the quantification of Charter damages. To move the remedy forward and support its
important function, judges must recognize the power they were given by Ward and under the constitutional
structure. It is the judiciary’s responsibility to provide meaningful remedies for constitutional violations
and uphold the rule of law. Pilkington argued that the financial burden of enforcing constitutional
guarantees “must be accepted as a cost of the government enterprise conducted for [the taxpayers’] benefit
and as a justifiable expenditure in recognition of rights which are, by definition, fundamental.”861 Ordering
a robust Charter damages award in the Khadr case would be an important step toward advancing the
remedy. If judges begin to award larger, more meaningful damages awards, others might follow suit. The
issues at stake – upholding constitutional rights and ensuring that the state is held accountable for violations
– are too vital to succumb to ill-founded concerns about deference or institutional competence.

CONCLUSION
This chapter argued for an expansive and flexible approach to quantifying Charter damages in the
Khadr civil claim. The Charter damages remedy is still very much in its infancy; it was only nine years ago
that the SCC acknowledged its independent existence from private law and crafted an assessment
framework. Although Ward contained many positive developments and it has encouraged more claims to
come forward, the remedy is not living up to its full potential in the majority of cases. Ward instructed
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judges to rely on private law as a quantification guide and to keep damages awards generally low. To date,
only a handful of cases since Ward involved damages awards above the four figure range.
Although there will be many cases where a large damages award is inappropriate (when the state’s
actions do not infringe a core Charter right, are not intrusive, and do not have a considerable impact on the
claimant), there will be instances where large awards are necessary. Courts should not feel apprehensive to
make substantial awards when they are functionally justified. Ward confirmed that judges can order Charter
damages under subsection 24(1); there should be no doubt about a court’s institutional competence in this
area. Nevertheless, concerns about deferring to the legislative or executive branches of government can
surface at the countervailing and quantification stages of the Ward inquiry. Although some level of
deference might be warranted due to the use of public funds, this should not be used as a justification to
limit a robust damages award in cases where clear harm occurred or the rule of law was threatened.

The type of harm Omar Khadr experienced during his detention and imprisonment has never been
thoroughly reviewed by a Canadian court. Although the Khadr case presents challenges for the Ward
framework, a substantial damages award is possible and necessary to provide suitable compensation to
Khadr, promote the importance of core human rights enshrined in the Charter, and deter inexcusable state
behaviour. I did not quantify a precise amount to which Khadr would have been entitled, but an award in
the six or seven figures would have been appropriate. The severity of the harm Khadr suffered over such a
lengthy period and the impact of Canadian actions on his plight as a vulnerable minor support a large sum.

In the next chapter, I conclude my analysis.
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CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUDING REMARKS
This thesis analyzed one of the most politically divisive and legally complex constitutional cases
in recent Canadian history. It is difficult to find a more polarizing individual than Omar Khadr. Many
Canadians believe that the $10.5 million settlement between Khadr and the Government of Canada in July
2017 was unfair and excessive. The Khadr story has been subjected to endless spin by those who see him
as an unrepentant terrorist. It is impossible for many to look past Khadr’s experience fighting for al Qaeda,
even though this occurred while he was a child influenced by the philosophies of his father. Some believe
that Khadr murdered Sgt. Speer in cold blood, even though there is reason to doubt that he threw the
grenade. Finally, those critical of the settlement feel that Canada should not have to pay for harm inflicted
by the US, even though Canada actively participated in a process that deprived Khadr of basic human rights.
Few of Khadr’s critics understand the degree of harm he suffered for thirteen years. He was
tortured and mistreated by his American captors and subjected to a legally dubious military prosecution,
which concluded with a questionable guilty plea. Khadr’s only hope for assistance was from Canadians,
who contributed to his detention and ignored his pleas for help. Instead of criticizing US procedure or
intervening on Khadr’s behalf to request his repatriation, Canada made two disastrous choices. The first
was to send Canadian officials to Guantánamo on three occasions to mine Khadr for intelligence, which
was subsequently shared with the US. This implicated Canada in profound breaches of international law
and triggered violations of the Charter. After an injunction prohibited further questioning of Khadr,862
Canada’s second regrettable decision was to adopt an unrelenting stance of non-involvement in Khadr’s
case. This amounted to tacit condonation of the US’s highly objectionable practices.

The research in previous chapters demonstrated that Khadr had a strong entitlement to Charter
damages. I argued that, if his civil claim had progressed to trial (instead of settling), Khadr should have
received a sizeable damages award. I did not attempt to calculate the sum a court might have awarded. This
is not possible without an assessment of the evidence presented by both parties. Although Khadr received
subsection 24(1) remedies in 2008 and 2010, neither the disclosure order nor the declaration of
unconstitutionality was effective in curing a serious breach. Neither remedy was a meaningful response to
Canada’s involvement in an illegal regime and its abandonment of a vulnerable youth detainee. Canada’s
actions contributed to Khadr’s continued detention863 and compounded his feelings of utter helplessness.
Macfarlane aptly described Khadr’s guilty plea (which resulted in an eight year sentence on top of eight
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years’ detention) as “the final fruit of a poisonous tree, tainted by the events and processes that necessitated
it in the first place.”864
Canada’s behaviour did not improve after Khadr pleaded guilty to war crimes. Khadr’s transfer was
delayed and he was held at Guantánamo longer than he should have been. When he finally returned to
Canada, he was held in maximum security facilities based on an improper reading of the ITOA and he was
subjected to solitary confinement. It is open to a court hearing Khadr’s civil claim to determine that these
actions amounted to further breaches of the Charter.

There is no more fitting remedy to address the harm Khadr suffered than Charter damages. This
distinct public law remedy can provide compensation to affected claimants and acknowledge the unique
type of harm that occurs from a constitutional violation. Examples of this harm include loss of dignity, a
profound sense of intrusion, and feelings of victimization or helplessness865 because of the power imbalance
in the state-citizen relationship. Charter damages also address the societal harm resulting from a Charter
breach. Although the SCC acknowledged in Ward that compensation is still the driving force behind the
remedy,866 I argued that the vindication and deterrence objectives should be given substantial weight. This
is critical in cases where state accountability and the rule of law are at issue.

Over the past nine years, Ward has produced only a handful of impactful Charter damages
awards.867 Although the Ward framework was a positive development and it has encouraged more Charter
damages claims to come forward,868 it suffers from continuing problems. The analysis in Chapters Four and
Five discussed potential issues that could negatively affect Khadr’s claim, some of which stem from the
structure of Ward itself. The framework gave the state considerable power to argue against a valid claim at
the countervailing factors stage. The loosely defined good governance factor was used to justify a reworking
of the Ward test in Henry SCC and the dismissal of a meritorious claim in Ernst. Ward also condoned the
creation of further immunity defences that could limit Charter damages claims in future cases. Finally, the
decision discouraged courts from ordering large damages awards in most cases because (a) public funds
would be used; and (b) the public could perceive a high award as being inappropriate.869
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There are additional pressures and constraints outside the Ward framework that would likely affect
a court hearing Khadr’s claim: Crown prerogative, institutional competence, and public opinion. The
government relied on Crown prerogative throughout the Khadr litigation to protect itself from liability.
Although the judiciary can review executive decisions made under a prerogative power for compliance with
the Charter,870 courts have been hesitant to order remedies touching on the exercise of this power. In Khadr
SCC 2010, the Court did not order the government to seek Khadr’s repatriation because it amounted to
excessive interference with the foreign affairs prerogative.871 The Court sought to preserve proper
institutional separation between the judicial and executive branches. Despite the compelling arguments
made in support of the repatriation remedy, ordering the government to exercise a prerogative power in a
specific way was viewed as an unjustifiable intrusion into the realm of executive power.

I argued in Chapter Four that ordering damages under the Charter would not amount to excessive
interference with Crown prerogative. Damages involve a straightforward payment of money to an aggrieved
claimant to remedy a proven constitutional violation. Ordering damages is not the same as ordering the
executive to take specific action to cure a breach, which was the Court’s concern in Khadr SCC 2010. The
SCC majority emphasized in Doucet-Boudreau that a truly purposive approach to subsection 24(1) of the
Charter will “giv[e] modern vitality to the ancient maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium: where there is a right, there
must be a remedy.”872 That remedy must also be responsive and effective.873 A large Charter damages
award is responsive to the life-altering harm Khadr experienced and the disturbing sequence of choices
made by Canadian officials, which “besmirche[d] the Charter”.874 It is also an effective remedy that
compensates the claimant, vindicates the right at issue, and deters unconstitutional conduct. Finally, a large
damages award shows the strength of the Charter’s remedial clause and its critical function as a check on
state power. The majority in Doucet-Boudreau stressed that the overall purpose of subsection 24(1) must
be promoted when a remedy is ordered.875

Ward unanimously determined that courts can award damages under subsection 24(1). Although
the decision encouraged quantums to stay low, the Court acknowledged that “the more egregious the
conduct and the more serious the repercussions on the claimant, the higher the award for vindication or
deterrence will be.”876 Consequently, there should be no concern about a court’s institutional competence
870
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to order a large damages award where it is appropriate. Influential decisions in Henry BCSC, Elmardy,
Brazeau, and Reddock show that courts can make sizeable awards to address harmful conduct that had a
profound effect on the claimant.

Finally, public perception is an undeniable factor that could influence a court poised to award
Charter damages to Khadr. His unpopularity with many Canadians is palpable. Considerable backlash
would likely occur if Khadr were given a substantial award. Although Ward referred to the public’s
perception of damages awards as a relevant concern in the quantification analysis,877 the Court did not
suggest that unpopular claimants should receive smaller sums. It is trite to note that even the most
controversial individuals should not be denied a constitutional remedy. The Charter exists to protect
fundamental rights and freedoms from state encroachment. Although it is possible that a majority of
Canadians would not support a sizeable damages award for Khadr, this should not be a valid reason to
reduce his entitlement to relief. As shown above, the Khadr case is often misunderstood. Regardless of
Khadr’s past, Canada made decisions to become involved in an abhorrent regime that tortured, mistreated,
and prosecuted a minor.
Ultimately, I argued in Chapter Four that potential countervailing factors in Khadr’s case were not
powerful enough to defeat or limit his claim. Another declaration of unconstitutionality would not be a
responsive or effective alternative remedy. Khadr also faced considerable difficulty proving the three tort
claims he advanced, so it is possible Charter damages may have been a court’s only option to provide
redress. With respect to good governance, I argued that a large damages award would not compromise the
ability of foreign affairs personnel to perform their duties, nor would it prompt an influx of related claims
to come forward. If a court determined, however, that good governance issues were compelling, I discussed
how an immunity and a corresponding fault requirement could have been imposed. Even if this occurred, I
maintained that Khadr could present valid arguments showing that the state acted in bad faith.

Developing a quantification model for the Khadr case is a difficult endeavour. Part of the
quantification problem is the lack of available precedents to guide the analysis. This is undoubtedly why
Ward encouraged judges to rely on private law principles, particularly for the assessment of compensatory
damages. Although some private law principles can help quantify specific types of harm (for example, pain
and suffering), I reiterated Pilkington’s view that, in some instances, there is no private law equivalent for
the distinct harm suffered as a result of a particular constitutional breach.878 This is why I encouraged
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examination of all relevant sources that may be of assistance, not just private law. I confined my
recommendations to domestic examples (such as human rights tribunal cases, wrongful conviction
settlements, and previous detainee settlements), but further research in this area could examine approaches
used in comparable jurisdictions. Examples include the US, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, or South
Africa. In Ward, the Court referred to judgments from all four countries in its reasoning. Decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights could also provide additional insight into quantification practices for
specific injuries such as torture.879

As the Charter damages case law continues to evolve, it is crucial that judges undertake an analysis
that appreciates the distinct purpose of the remedy. Constitutional damages are not private law damages
and, as such, they should not be bound by the same constraints that operate in the private law realm. Even
when private law damages are ordered, courts should conduct a meaningful review of whether Charter
damages can accomplish different objectives. If courts blindly follow decisions where small Charter
damages awards were ordered (or none were ordered at all), the legitimacy of the remedy will be threatened.
Damages under subsection 24(1) of the Charter serve a vital purpose in a democratic society beyond
providing compensation to individual claimants. This remedy holds the state accountable for constitutional
violations and enforces Canada’s supreme law.

Diminishing the strength of the Charter damages remedy weakens the constitutional protection
afforded to Canadians. Although there are other constitutional remedies available under subsection 24(1),
the Khadr case shows that an injunction, disclosure order, or declaration is not enough to fully address the
destructive impact of Canada’s actions. More is required to meaningfully and effectively compensate,
vindicate, and deter. Even though the 2017 settlement was laudable, it did not accomplish the same level
of deterrence that would occur in the adjudication of a Charter damages claim, where a court exposes and
highlights the state’s misdeeds.880 Failing to provide Khadr with a robust Charter damages award would
send a dangerous message that Canadian conduct was not particularly objectionable. This could reinforce
the mistaken view held by many Canadians that the US was the only actor responsible for Khadr’s harm.
By ordering a substantial damages award, a court would acknowledge the extent of Canada’s role in Khadr’s
suffering over a thirteen year period. It would also be a powerful affirmation of the remedy’s ability to
promote the rule of law and serve as a mechanism for state accountability, even in the most controversial
circumstances.

879

See for example Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland, No 7511/13, [2014] ECHR 834, where the claimant was
awarded €100,000 in damages relating to Poland’s complicity in detention and torture at US ‘black sites’.
880
See Jamieson, supra note 275 at 96.

- 136 -

BIBLIOGRAPHY
LEGISLATION
An Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and Another Act, SC 2019, c 27.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December
1984, [1987] Can TS No 36 (entered into force 26 June 1987).
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, [1992] Can TS No 3 (entered into force 2 September
1990).
Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19.
International Transfer of Offenders Act, SC 2004, c 21.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,
25 May 2000, [2002] Can TS No 5 (entered into force 12 February 2002).

JURISPRUDENCE
ADGA Group Consultants Inc. v Lane, (2008), 91 OR (3d) 649, 2008 CanLII 39605 (Div Ct).
Aleksic v Canada (Attorney General), (2002), 215 DLR (4th) 720, 2002 CanLII 63926 (Div Ct).
Andrews v Grand & Toy, [1978] 2 SCR 229, 83 DLR (3d) 452.
Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 78, [2004] 3 SCR 657.
Baker v Canada, [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174 DLR (4th) 193.
Black v Canada (Prime Minister), (2001), 54 OR (3d) 215, 2001 CanLII 8537 (Ont CA).
Blencoe v British Columbia Human Rights Commission, 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 SCR 307.
BMG v Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2007 NSCA 120, 260 NSR (2d) 257.
BMG v Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2007 NSSC 27, 250 NSR (2d) 154.
Bowden Institution v Khadr, 2015 SCC 26, [2015] 2 SCR 325.
Boyd v Harris, 2004 BCCA 146, 237 DLR (4th) 193.
Brazeau v Attorney General (Canada), 2019 ONSC 1888, 2019 ONSC 1888 (CanLII).
British Columbia v Zastowny, 2008 SCC 4, [2008] 1 SCR 27.

- 137 -

British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 BCCA 228, 2019 BCCA 228
(CanLII).
British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v British Columbia, 2016 SCC 49, [2016] 2 SCR 407.
British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v British Columbia, 2015 BCCA 184, 384 DLR (4th) 385.
British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v British Columbia, 2014 BCSC 121, 2014 BCSC 121 (CanLII).
Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 SCR 1101.
Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 2015 SCC 7, [2015] 1 SCR 401.
Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134.
Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 SCR 44.
Canadian Civil Liberties Association v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 ONCA 243, 144 OR (3d) 641.
Carter v Canada, 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331.
Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique v British Columbia (Education), 2018 BCCA 305,
425 DLR (4th) 230.
Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique v British Columbia (Education), 2016 BCSC 1764,
2016 BCSC 1764 (CanLII).
Danyluk v Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44, [2001] 2 SCR 460.
Dixon v Hamilton (City) Police Services Board, [2011] OJ No 3836 (QL) (Ont Sup Ct).
Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 SCR 3.
Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Department of Education), 2001 NSCA 104, 194 NSR (2d) 323.
Elliot v Waterloo (Regional Municipality) Police Services, 2011 ONSC 6889, 2011 ONSC 6889 (CanLII).
Elmardy v Toronto (City) Police Services Board, 2017 ONSC 2074, 136 OR (3d) 471 (Div Ct).
Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1, [2017] 1 SCR 3.
Farley v Ottawa Police Services Board, 2016 ONSC 7817, 2016 ONSC 7817 (CanLII).
Ferri v Root, 2007 ONCA 79, 279 DLR (4th) 643.
Fong v British Columbia (Minister of Justice), 2019 BCSC 263, 2019 BCSC 263 (CanLII).
Fong v British Columbia (Minister of Justice), 2019 BCSC 1003, 2019 BCSC 1003 (CanLII).
Forrest v Kirkland, 2012 ONSC 429, 2012 ONSC 429 (CanLII) (Div Ct).
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security, [1997] ZACC 6, 1997 (3) SA 786 (S Afr Const Ct).

- 138 -

Guimond c Québec (Procureur general), [1996] 3 SCR 347, 138 DLR (4th) 647.
Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 126 S Ct 2749 (USSC) (2006).
Harris v GlaxoSmithKline Inc. et al, 2010 ONCA 872, 106 OR (3d) 661.
Hawley v Bapoo, 2007 ONCA 503, 2007 ONCA 503 (CanLII).
Hawley v Bapoo, (2005), 76 OR (3d) 649, 2005 CanLII 36451 (Ont Sup Ct).
Henebry v Ontario, 2018 ONSC 6584, 2018 ONSC 6584 (CanLII).
Henry v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2016 BCSC 1038, 2016 BCSC 1038 (CanLII).
Henry v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2016 BCSC 2082, 2016 BCSC 2082 (CanLII).
Henry v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 24, [2015] 2 SCR 214.
Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130, 126 DLR (4th) 129.
Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41, [2007] 3 SCR 129.
Hinse v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 35, [2015] 2 SCR 621.
Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland, No 7511/13, [2014] ECHR 834.
Jeremiah v Hamilton-Wentworth Police Services Board, 2018 ONSC 5762, 2018 ONSC 5762 (CanLII).
Keays v Honda Canada Inc., 2008 SCC 39, [2008] 2 SCR 362.
Khadr v Canada, 2014 FC 1001, 2014 FC 1001 (CanLII).
Khadr v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2008 SCC 28, [2008] 2 SCR 125.
Khadr v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2007 FCA 182, 280 DLR (4th) 469.
Khadr v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2006 FC 509, 2006 FC 509 (CanLII).
Khadr v Canada (Prime Minister), 2009 FCA 246, [2010] 1 FCR 73.
Khadr v Canada (Prime Minister), 2009 FC 405, [2010] 1 FCR 34.
Khadr v Canada (Prime Minister), 2010 FC 715, [2010] 4 FCR 36.
Khadr v Canada (Prime Minister), 2010 FCA 199, [2012] 1 FCR 396.
Khadr v Canada (Prime Minister), 2011 FCA 92, 333 DLR (4th) 303.
Khadr v Edmonton Institution, 2014 ABCA 225, 385 DLR (4th) 647.
Khadr v Warden of Bowden Institution, 2019 ABQB 207, 372 CCC (3d) 219.
Khadr (Next Friend of) v Canada, 2005 FC 1076, [2006] 2 FCR 505.

- 139 -

Khadr (Next Friend of) v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs), 2005 FC 135, 249 DLR (4th) 515.
Lamka v Waterloo Regional Police Services Board, 2012 CanLII 98291, 2012 CarswellOnt 14587 (WLNext
Can) (Ont Small Cl Ct).
Mackin v New Brunswick, 2002 SCC 13, [2002] 1 SCR 405.
MacRae v Feeney, 2016 ABCA 343, 2016 ABCA 343 (CanLII).
Mason v Turner, 2016 BCCA 58, 2016 BCCA 58 (CanLII).
Mason v Turner, 2014 BCSC 211, 2014 BCSC 211 (CanLII).
McTaggart v Ontario, (2000), 48 WCB (2d) 234, 2000 CarswellOnt 4808 (WL Next Can) (Ont Sup Ct).
Naqvi v Canada, 2017 FC 1092, 2017 FC 1092 (CanLII).
Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, [2003] 3 SCR 263.
Ogiamien v Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2017 ONCA 667, 416 DLR
(4th) 124.
Ogiamien v Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2016 ONSC 3080, 132 OR (3d)
376.
Ontario v 974649 Ontario Inc., 2001 SCC 81, [2001] 3 SCR 575.
Operation Dismantle v The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 441, 18 DLR (4th) 481.
Price v Kelday, 2017 ONSC 6494, 2017 ONSC 6494 (CanLII).
Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v Microsoft Corporation, 2013 SCC 57, [2013] 3 SCR 477.
R v Bjelland, 2009 SCC 38, [2009] 2 SCR 651.
R v Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 SCR 96.
R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 SCR 353.
R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 SCR 292.
R v Henry, 2010 BCCA 462, 262 CCC (3d) 307.
R v Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 SCR 206.
R v O’Connor, [1995] 4 SCR 411, 130 DLR (4th) 235.
R v Shepherd, 2016 ONCA 188, 2016 ONCA 188 (CanLII).
Rasul v Bush, 542 US 466, 124 S Ct 2686 (USSC) (2004).
RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada (AG), [1994] 1 SCR 311, 111 DLR (4th) 385.

- 140 -

Reddock v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 ONSC 5053, 2019 ONSC 5053 (CanLII).
Russell v British Columbia (Public Safety & Solicitor General), 2018 BCSC 1757, 2018 BCSC 1757 (CanLII).
Schachter v Canada, [1992] 2 SCR 679, 93 DLR (4th) 1.
Smith v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FC 228, [2010] 1 FCR 3.
Stapley v Hejslet, 2006 BCCA 34, 263 DLR (4th) 19.
Taunoa v Attorney-General, [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429.
Taylor v London (City) Police Services, 2016 ONSC 5839, 2016 ONSC 5839 (CanLII).
Tétreault-Gadoury v Canada, [1991] 2 SCR 22, 81 DLR (4th) 358.
United States v Burns, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] 1 SCR 283.
Vancouver (City) v Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 SCR 28.
Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493, 156 DLR (4th) 385.
Ward v Vancouver (City), 2009 BCCA 23, 304 DLR (4th) 653.
Ward v Vancouver (City), 2007 BCSC 3, 2007 BCSC 3 (CanLII).

SECONDARY MATERIAL: MONOGRAPHS
Adourian, Peter. Charter Damages: Private Law in the “Unique Public Law Remedy” (LLM Thesis, Osgoode
Hall Law School, York University, 2018) [unpublished].
Banham, Cynthia. Liberal Democracies and the Torture of Their Citizens (Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing,
2017).
Charles, W.H. Understanding Charter Damages – the Evolution of a Charter Remedy (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2016).
Cooper-Stephenson, Ken. Charter Damages Claims (Toronto: Carswell, 1990).

———. Constitutional Damages Worldwide (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2013).
Dodek, Adam M. The Charter Debates: The Special Joint Committee on the Constitution, 1980-81, and the
Making of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018).
Hogg, Peter W. Constitutional Law of Canada, 2018 Student ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2018).
Roach, Kent. Constitutional Remedies in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2019) (accessed online
through Thomson Reuters ProView November 6, 2019).
Sharpe, Robert J. & Kent Roach. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 6th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2017).
Shephard, Michelle. Guantanamo’s Child (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd., 2008).

- 141 -

Varuhas, Jason. Damages and Human Rights (Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2016).

SECONDARY MATERIAL: ARTICLES
Agarwal, Ranjan & Joseph Marcus. “Where There is No Remedy, There is No Right: Using Charter Damages
to Compensate Victims of Racial Profiling” (2015) 34 NJCL 75.
Anand, Raj. “Damages for Unconstitutional Actions: A Rule In Search of a Rationale” (2009-2010) 27 NJCL
159.
Attaran, Amir & Jon Khan. “Solving the "Khadr Problem": Retention of Jurisdiction - A Comparative Analysis”
(2015) 34 NJCL 145.
Chan, Gerald. “Remedial Minimalism under Section 24(1) of the Charter: Bjelland, Khadr, and Nasogaluak”
(2010) 51 SCLR (2d) 349.
Charney, Robert E. & Josh Hunter. “Tort Lite? – Vancouver (City) v. Ward and the Availability of Damages for
Charter Infringements” (2011) 54 SCLR (2d) 393.
Cooper-Stephenson, Ken. “Tort Theory for the Charter Damages Remedy” (1988) 52:1 Sask L Rev 1.
Daly, Paul. “Royal Treatment: The Crown’s Special Status in Administrative Law” (2017) 22:1 Rev Const Stud
81.
David, Lawrence. “Resource Allocation and Judicial Deference on Charter Review: The Price of Rights
Protection According to the McLachlin Court” (2015) 73 UT Fac L Rev 35.
Gibson, Dale. “Enforcement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Section 24)” in The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms Commentary, Walter S. Tarnopolsky and Gérald-A. Beaudoin, eds,
(Toronto: Carswell, 1982).
Gonsalves, Andrea & Tiffany O’Hearn Davies. “Ward v Vancouver and the Availability of Concurrent Private
Law Damages and Charter Damages in Canada” (Paper delivered at the 16th Annual Charter
Conference, Toronto, 2 October 2017) [unpublished].
Hammond, Grant. “Beyond Dignity?” in Jeff Berryman & Rick Bigwood, eds, The Law of Remedies: New
Directions in the Common Law (Toronto: Irwin, 2010).
Jamieson, Gabriella. “Using Section 24(1) Charter Damages to Remedy Racial Discrimination in the Criminal
Justice System” (2017) 22 Appeal 71.
Khan, Sheema. “Politics over Principles: The Case of Omar Khadr” in Janice Williamson, ed, Omar Khadr Oh
Canada (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012).
Klinck, Jennifer A. “Modernizing Judicial Review of the Exercise of Prerogative Powers in Canada” 54:4 Alta
L Rev 997.
Lagassé, Philippe. “Parliamentary and judicial ambivalence toward executive prerogative powers in Canada”
(2012) 55:2 Can Pub Admin 157.
Linden, Allen M. “Charter Damage Claims: New Dawn or Mirage?” (2012) 39 Adv Q 426.

- 142 -

Liss, Ryan. “The Abuse of Ambiguity: The Uncertain Status of Omar Khadr under International Law” (2012)
50 Can YB Intl Law 95.
Macfarlane, Emmett. “Failing to Walk the Rights Talk? Post-9/11 Security Policy and the Supreme Court of
Canada” (2012) 16:2 Rev Const Stud 159.
MacKenzie, Brooke. “Backpedalling on Charter Damages: Henry v British Columbia (Attorney General)”
(2016) 45 Advoc Q 359.
Macklin, Audrey. “Comment on Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr (2010)” (2010) 51 SCLR (2d) 295.
McGregor, Lorna. “Are Declaratory Orders Appropriate for Continuing Human Rights Violations - The Case of
Khadr v Canada” (2010) 10:3 Hum Rts L Rev 487.
Mendes, Errol P. “Dismantling the Clash Between the Prerogative Power to Conduct Foreign Affairs and the
Charter in Prime Minister of Canada et al v. Omar Khadr” (2009) 26:1 NJCL 67.
Mullan, David J. “Damages For Violation of Constitutional Rights – A False Spring?” (1995) 6:1 NJCL.
Otis, Ghislain. “Constitutional Liability for the Infringement of Rights Per Se: A Misguided Theory” (1992) 26
UBC L Rev 21.
Pardy, Gar. “The Saga of Omar Khadr” in Janice Williamson, ed, Omar Khadr, Oh Canada (Montreal &
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012).
Pilkington, Marilyn L. “Damages as a Remedy for Infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms” (1984) 62 Can Bar Rev 517.

———. “Monetary Redress for Charter Infringement” in Robert Sharpe, ed, Charter Litigation (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1987).
Plaxton, Michael & Carissima Mathen. “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 2009-2010 Term” (2010) 52
SCLR (2d) 65.
Rangaviz, David. “Dangerous Deference: The Supreme Court of Canada in Canada v. Khadr” (2011) 46 Harv
CR-CLL Rev 253.
Rankin, Micah B. “The Improbable Rise and Fall of Auckland Harbour Board v The King” (2019) 97 Can Bar
Rev 43.
Roach, Kent. “A Promising Late Spring for Charter Damages: Ward v. Vancouver” (2011) 29 NJCL 135.

———. “Defining Miscarriages of Justice in the Context of Post 9/11 Counter Terrorism” (14 August 2017)
[unpublished], available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3018691>.
———. “Developments in Charter Damages” (Paper delivered at the 16th Annual Charter Conference, Toronto,
2 October 2017).
———. “Enforcement of the Charter – Subsections 24(1) and 52(1)” (2013) 62 SCLR (2d) 473.
———. ““The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics”: The Afghan Detainee and Omar Khadr Cases” (2010) 28
NJCL 115.

- 143 -

———. “Section 7 of the Charter and National Security: Rights Protection and Proportionality versus Deference
and Status” (2011) 42:3 Ottawa L Rev 337.
———. “Section 24(1) of the Charter: Strategy and Structure” (1987) 29 Crim LQ 222.
Safayeni, Justin. “Improving the Effectiveness of the Constitutional Damages Remedy: Vancouver (City) v
Ward” (2017) 47 Adv Q 121.
Sniderman, Andrew Stobo. “The Melancholy Truth: Corrective and Equitable Justice for Omar Khadr” (2014)
23 Dal J Leg Stud 172.
Sossin, Lorne. “Crown Prosecutors and Constitutional Torts: The Promise and Politics of Charter Damages”
(1993) 19 Queen's LJ 372.

———. “Damaging The Charter: Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator” (20 January 2017), online: TheCourt.ca
<http://www.thecourt.ca/damaging-charter-ernst-v-alberta/>.

———. “The Rule of Law and the Justiciability of Prerogative Powers: A Comment on Black v. Chretien”
(2003) 47 McGill LJ 435.
Van Ert, Gib. “Torture and the Supreme Court of Canada” (2014) 65 UNBLJ 21.

SECONDARY MATERIAL: PRESS REPORTING & COMMENTARY
Associated Press. “Letter shows Canada asked U.S. not to send Khadr to Guantanamo”, CBC News (17 April
2008), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/letter-shows-canada-asked-u-s-not-to-send-khadr-toguantanamo-1.774047>.

Canadian Press. “Omar Khadr should have been serving youth sentence, will be transferred to provincial jail,
court rules”, National Post (8 July 2014), online: <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/alberta-courtrules-omar-khadr-should-be-transferred-to-provincial-jail>.

Carvin, Stephanie. “Yes, sleep deprivation is torture”, Macleans (14 July 2017), online:
<https://www.macleans.ca/opinion/yes-sleep-deprivation-is-torture/>.

CBC News. “Canada to ‘implement’ Khadr plea deal”, CBC News (1 November 2010), online:
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-to-implement-khadr-plea-deal-1.902213>.

CBC News. “CSIS ignored Khadr’s human rights: report”, CBC News (15 July 2009), online:
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/csis-ignored-khadr-s-human-rights-report-1.834555>.

CBC News. “New witness account shows Khadr charges should be dropped: lawyers”, CBC News (5 February
2008), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/new-witness-account-shows-khadr-charges-should-bedropped-lawyers-1.765709>.

CBC News. “Omar Khadr returns to Canada”, CBC News (29 September 2012), online:
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/omar-khadr-returns-to-canada-1.937754>.

CBC News. “‘You don’t care about me,’ Omar Khadr sobs in interview tapes”, CBC News (15 July 2008),
online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/you-don-t-care-about-me-omar-khadr-sobs-in-interview-tapes1.709736>.

- 144 -

Chase, Steven. “Ottawa throws wrench in Khadr repatriation”, The Globe and Mail (20 July 2012), online:
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-throws-wrench-in-khadr
repatriation/article4430435/>.

Forcese, Craig. “A Once & Final Parsing of the Legal Context for the Khadr Settlement” (11 July 2017) National
Security Law Blog, online: <http://craigforcese.squarespace.com/national-security-law-blog/2017/7/11/aonce-final-parsing-of-the-legal-context-for-the-khadr-sett.html>.

Genuis, Garnett. “The ‘grievous injustice’ of the Khadr settlement”, Macleans (19 July 2017), online:
<https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/the-grievous-injustice-of-the-khadr-settlement/>.

Harper, Tim & Michelle Shephard. “Ottawa unbending in Khadr case”, Toronto Star (7 July 2007), online:
<https://www.pressreader.com/canada/toronto-star/20070707/284180806434717>.

Honickman, Asher. “The Legal Case Against the Khadr Settlement”, Advocates for the Rule of Law (9 August
2017), online: <http://www.ruleoflaw.ca/the-legal-case-against-the-khadr-settlement/>.
Lewis, Neil A. “Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantánamo”, New York Times (30 November 2004),
online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/red-cross-finds-detainee-abuse-inguantanamo.html>.

MacKinnon, Steven. “Why we had to settle with Omar Khadr”, Macleans (26 July 2017), online:
<https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/why-we-had-to-settle-with-omar-khadr/>.

Macklin, Audrey. “Ottawa failed Omar Khadr: That’s why he deserves compensation”, The Globe and Mail (5
July 2017), online: <https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/ottawa-failed-khadr-thats-why-he-deservescompensation/article35552410/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&>.

Mackrael, Kim & Sean Fine. “Harper unapologetic about Ottawa’s efforts to keep Omar Khadr in prison”, The
Globe and Mail (8 May 2015), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harperunapologetic-about-governments-efforts-to-keep-khadr-in-prison/article24334556/>.

Makin, Kirk. “Ignoring Supreme Court’s Khadr ruling, Ottawa won’t request repatriation”, The Globe and Mail
(3 February 2010), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ignoring-supreme-courtskhadr-ruling-ottawa-wont-request-repatriation/article1365051/>.

Mancini, Mark. “A Respectful Dissent from the Khadr Consensus”, Advocates for the Rule of Law (27 July
2017), online: <http://www.ruleoflaw.ca/a-respectful-dissent-from-the-khadr-consensus/>.
Nickel, Rod. “Guantanamo’s last Western detainee returned to Canada”, Reuters (29 September 2012) online:
<https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-guantanamo-khadr/guantanamos-last-western-detainee-returned-tocanada-idUKBRE88S09E20120929>.

Paperny, Anna Mehler. “Khadr’s confessions admissible, military judge rules”, The Globe and Mail (9 August
2010), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/khadrs-confessions-admissible-militaryjudge-rules/article1376518/>.

Perkel, Colin. “Canada blames U.S. for delay in transferring Omar Khadr”, The Globe and Mail (13 September
2012), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canada-blames-us-for-delay-intransferring-omar-khadr/article4541447/>.

———. “Omar Khadr moved to Edmonton prison after months in solitary confinement”, The Globe and Mail
(29 May 2013), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/omar-khadr-moved-toedmonton-prison-after-months-in-solitary-confinement/article12226347/>.

- 145 -

———. “U.S. hands over Omar Khadr material; Toews urged to make transfer decision”, The Globe and Mail
(5 September 2012), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/us-hands-over-omar-khadrmaterial-toews-urged-to-make-transfer-decision/article4521822/>.

———. “U.S. military court appoints panel to hear Omar Khadr’s war-crimes appeal”, CBC News (25
September 2019), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/u-s-military-court-panel-omarkhadr-appeal-1.5297157>.

Rath, Arun. “Trump Inherits Guantanamo’s Remaining Detainees”, National Public Radio (19 January 2017),
online: <https://www.npr.org/2017/01/19/510448989/trump-inherits-guantanamos-remaining-detainees>.
Sallot, Jeff. “Arar given $11.5 million in compensation”, The Globe and Mail (27 January 2007), online:
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/arar-given-115-million-incompensation/article17989806/>.

Savage, Charlie. “Child Soldier for Al Qaeda Is Sentenced for War Crimes”, New York Times (1 November
2010), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/us/02detain.html>.
Scotti, Monique. “Trudeau: Canadians rightfully angry after Ottawa pays $31.25M to men falsely imprisoned in
Syria”, Global News (26 October 2017), online: <https://globalnews.ca/news/3826253/ottawa-payssettlement-of-31-25m-to-3-men-falsely-imprisoned-in-syria/>.

Shephard, Michelle. “15 years and nearly $5 million in legal costs later, Ottawa apologizes to Omar Khadr”,
Toronto Star (7 July 2017), online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/07/07/lawyer-for-ussoldiers-widow-calls-for-urgent-hearing-on-freezing-khadrs-105-million-settlement.html>.

———. “CSIS failed in Khadr case, review finds”, Toronto Star (16 July 2009), online:
<https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2009/07/16/csis_failed_in_khadr_case_review_finds.html>.

———. “Khadr charges dismissed”, Toronto Star (4 June 2007), online:
<https://www.thestar.com/news/2007/06/04/khadr_charges_dismissed.html>.

———. “Khadr secret document released by accident”, Toronto Star (4 February 2008), online:
<https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2008/02/04/khadr_secret_document_released_by_accident.html?li_
source=LI&li_medium=star_web_ymbii>.

———. “Omar Khadr repatriated to Canada”, Toronto Star (29 September 2012), online:
<https://www.thestar.com/news/2012/09/29/omar_khadr_repatriated_to_canada.html>.

———. “Ottawa played down Khadr concerns”, Toronto Star (20 August 2007), online:
<https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2007/08/20/ottawa_played_down_khadr_concerns.html>.

Smith, Graeme. “Man helped by Chrétien on most-wanted terror list”, The Globe and Mail (27 December 2001),
online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/man-helped-by-chretien-on-most-wanted-terrorlist/article4158498/>.

UN News. “UN envoy calls for repatriation of last child soldier held in Guantánamo” (27 July 2012), United
Nations online: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/07/416582>.
Wherry, Aaron. “Liberals defend and Tories attack Omar Khadr payout, both citing principles”, CBC News (7
July 2017), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/omar-khadr-settlement-goodale-scheer-analysiswherry-1.4194912>.

———. “What 3 legal minds think about the Omar Khadr settlement”, CBC News (12 July 2017), online:
- 146 -

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/omar-khadr-legal-analysis-aaron-wherry-1.4199409>.

OTHER MATERIALS
Affidavit of Omar Ahmed Khadr (sworn 30 July 2008), accessed online at Khadr Case Resources Page, Bora
Laskin Law Library:
<https://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Mackin/khadr_repat_AffidavitofOmarKhadr.PDF>.

Air Force Office of Special Investigations. “Report of Investigative Activity” (24 February 2003), Exhibit “AA”,
Volume III of Joint Record in Canada (Attorney General) v Khadr, Supreme Court of Canada, File No
33289, accessed online at Khadr Case Resources Page, Bora Laskin Law Library:
<https://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Mackin/JointRecord_III.pdf>.

Amnesty International. Memorandum to the US Government on the rights of people in US custody in Afghanistan
and
Guantánamo
Bay
(April
2002),
AI
Index:
AMR
51/053/2002,
online:
<https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/116000/amr510532002en.pdf>.

Canada. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials Relating to Maher Arar, Report of the
Events Relating to Maher Arar - Analysis and Recommendations (Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services Canada, 2006), online: <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/CP32-88-12006E-AR.pdf>.

Canada. Federal/Provincial Guidelines On Compensation for Wrongfully Convicted and Imprisoned Persons
(1988), online:
<https://www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/contenu/documents/En__Anglais_/centredoc/publi
cations/programmes-services/ej_lignes_directrices-a.pdf >.

Canada. Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad AbouElmaati and Muayyed Nureddin (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2008),
online: <http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.699757/publication.html>.
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. “Umar Khadr: a meeting with” (20 April 2004), Exhibit
“DD” in Volume III of Joint Record in Canada (Attorney General) v Khadr, Supreme Court of Canada,
File No 33289, accessed online at Khadr Case Resources Page, Bora Laskin Law Library:
<https://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Mackin/JointRecord_III.pdf>.

House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, Omar Khadr –
Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (June 2008)
(Chair: Kevin Sorenson), online:
<http://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/392/FAAE/Reports/RP3572352/faaerp07/faaerp07-e.pdf>.

Human Rights Legal Support Centre. “What Remedies Are Available to Me at the HRTO?”, online:
<https://www.hrlsc.on.ca/en/how-guides/what-remedies-are-available-me-hrto#financial>.

Human Rights Watch. “Locked Up Alone: Detention Conditions and Mental Health at Guantanamo”, Human
Rights Watch (9 June 2008), online: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/locked-alone/detentionconditions-and-mental-health-guantanamo>.

Human Rights Watch. World Report 2003 – United States (14 January 2003), online:
<https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k3/us.html>.

Letter from Canadian Bar Association to Prime Minister Stephen Harper (12 August 2007), online:
<https://www.cba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=5a75b056-0a1e-4bf6-8f87-575c7e4fd74a>.

- 147 -

Neve, Alex. “The View from Guantanamo Bay – Reflections on Omar Khadr’s Journey Through Military
Injustice” (2010) University of Ottawa Centre for International Policy Studies Working Paper, online:
<https://www.cips-cepi.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/CIPS_WP_Neve_November2010.pdf>.

Omar Ahmed Khadr v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada Amended Amended Amended Fresh as
Amended Statement of Claim to the Defendant, T-536-04 (24 October 2014).
Open Letter to Prime Minister Stephen Harper. (14 June 2007), accessed online at Khadr Case Resources Page,
Bora Laskin Law Library: <https://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Mackin/Khadr_OpenLetter.pdf>.
Prime Minister of Canada, et al. v Omar Ahmed Khadr, 33289, Factum of the Appellant Prime Minister of
Canada, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/af-ma-eng.aspx?cas=33289>.
Prime Minister of Canada, et al. v Omar Ahmed Khadr, 33289, Factum of the Respondent Omar Ahmed Khadr,
online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/af-ma-eng.aspx?cas=33289>.
Security Intelligence Review Committee. CSIS’s Role in the Matter of Omar Khadr (SIRC STUDY 2008-5) (8
July 2009), File No 2800-143, online: <http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/opbapb/2008-05/index-eng.html>.
Transcript of cross-examination on Affidavit of William Hooper (T-536-04) (sworn 18 February 2005, transcript
dated 2 March 2005). Exhibit “GG” in Volume III of Joint Record in Canada (Attorney General) v
Khadr, Supreme Court of Canada, File No 33289, accessed online at Khadr Case Resources Page, Bora
Laskin Law Library: <https://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Mackin/JointRecord_III.pdf>.
United States Department of State. “Memorandum for Michael L. Bruhn, Executive Secretary, Department of
Defense” (Washington: 24 October 2010), accessed online at Khadr Case Resources Page, Bora Laskin
Law Library: <https://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Mackin/Khadr_Diplomatic_Notes.pdf>.

- 148 -

